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Resumo As redes ad-hoc e as redes auto-organizadas constituem uma a´rea de in-
vestigac¸a˜o com grande interesse. Estas redes sa˜o uteis em cena´rios onde
seja necessa´ria uma rede de baixo custo, elevada adaptabilidade e redu-
zido tempo de criac¸a˜o. As redes infra-estruturadas, tendo uma gesta˜o
centralizada, esta˜o agora a comec¸ar a adoptar os conceitos de redes auto-
organizadas nas suas arquitecturas. Ao contra´rio dos sistemas centralizados,
redes auto-organizadas requerem que todos os terminais participantes ope-
rem de acordo com o melhor interesse da rede. O facto de, em redes ad-hoc,
os equipamentos possu´ırem recursos limitados, poˆe em causa este requisito
levando a comportamentos ego´ıstas. Este comportamento e´ espectavel cri-
ando problemas nas redes auto-organizativas, ameac¸ando o funcionamento
de uma rede inteira. Algumas propostas foram ja´ criadas de modo a moti-
var a sua utilizac¸a˜o correcta. Destas, algumas sa˜o baseadas em trocas de
cre´dito entre utilizadores, outras preveeˆm a existeˆncia de entidades gestoras
de cre´ditos. Estas u´ltimas propostas, que ira˜o ser o foco desta dissertac¸a˜o,
permitem a facil integrac¸a˜o de redes ad-hoc com redes infra-estruturadas e
geridas por um operador. Este trabalho descreve o estado da arte actual e,
com algum detalhe, os me´todos utilizados e as soluco˜es relevantes para esta
a´rea. Sa˜o propostas duas novas soluc¸o˜es de taxac¸a˜o para estas redes. Am-
bas as soluc¸o˜es possibilitam a integrac¸a˜o das redes com me´todos de taxac¸a˜o
habituais em redes geridas por operadores. Para ale´m disto, a motivac¸a˜o
a` participac¸a˜o e´ aumentada atrave´s de incentivos ao encaminhamento de
pacotes. Todos os processos sa˜o criptograficamente seguros atrave´s da uti-
lizac¸a˜o de me´todos standard como DSA sobre Curvas El´ıpticas e func¸o˜es de
s´ıntese robustas. As soluc¸o˜es propostas sa˜o descritas analiticamente e ana-
lisadas, sendo os os resultados obtidos comparados com outra proposta do
estado da arte. Um exaustivo trabalho de simulac¸a˜o e´ igualmente descrito
de forma a avaliar as soluc¸o˜es em cena´rios mais complexos. Os resultados
obtidos em simulac¸a˜o sa˜o avaliados tendo em conta a variac¸a˜o de va´rias
me´tricas como mobilidade, carga na rede, protocolo de encaminhamento e
protocolo de transporte. No final, a arquitectura, implementac¸a˜o e resulta-
dos obtidos com uma implementac¸a˜o real de uma das propostas e os seus
resultados analisados.
Keywords Cooperation, MANET, Charging, Security, Motivation, Incentives
Abstract Self-organised and ad-hoc networks are an area with an existing large re-
search community. These networks are much useful in scenarios requiring
a rapidly deployed, low cost and highly adaptable network. Recently, in-
frastructure networks, which are managed in a much centralised form, are
starting to introduce concepts of self-organised networks in its architecture.
In opposition to centralised systems, self-organisation creates the necessity
for all nodes to behave according to the best interest of the network. The
fact that in many ad-hoc networks nodes have scarce resources poses some
threats to this requirement. As resources decreases, such as battery or wire-
less bandwidth, nodes can start acting selfishly. This behaviour is known to
bring damage to self-organised networks and threatens the entire network.
Several proposals were made in order to promote the correct usage of the
network. Some proposals are based on local information and direct credit
exchange while others envision the existence of a central bank. The later
solutions are further elaborated in this thesis, as they make possible inte-
gration of ad-hoc network with operator driven infrastructures. This work
presents the current state-of-the-art on the area providing a detailed insight
on the methods adopted by each solution presented. Two novel solutions are
proposed providing charging support for integrated ad-hoc networks. Both
solutions provide means of integration with standard management methods
found in operator networks. Also, nodes´ motivation is increased through
the reward of nodes forwarding data packets. The entire process is crypto-
graphically secure, making use of standard methods such as Elliptic Curve
DSA and strong digest functions. The solutions proposed are described
and analysed analytically, comparing the results with other state-of-the-art
proposals. Extensive simulation work is also presented which furthers eval-
uates the solutions in complex scenarios. Results are obtained from these
scenarios and several metrics are evaluated taking in consideration mobility,
network load, routing protocol and transport protocol. The architecture
and results obtained with a real implementation are finally presented and
analysed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Self-organised Ad-hoc Networks
From a functional point of view, organisation is of vital importance to any com-
munication system. Without any form of organisation, the interactions between the
entities composing the system are not defined and the exchange of information is not
possible. Usually organisation adopts the attribution of roles to entities, each role defin-
ing a different set of services provided and consumed. A simple organisation method
is the common server-client model where two roles are defined. The interactions of
more complex systems often follow this paradigm. By combining, in the same network,
different server and client roles, complex organisation schemes are possible to achieve.
Current communication systems are designed this way. An architecture is defined where
the roles of each component are clearly stated, typically following the old server-client
model. Independently of the complexity of the system, usually only a small amount of
self-configuration is allowed in the networks. The entire architecture is designed and
implemented by engineers and equipments occupy fixed roles on the architecture. As
benefit of such method the network architecture is always known to the administrators.
For a small communication environment, such as a home environment, it makes sense
for the hardware, software, addressing schemes and routes to be known to the adminis-
trator. The complexity of the system is low, having almost fixed topology and roles. In
an environment such as a commercial operated network, the complexity of the architec-
ture is divided into areas, functional units and individual modules. Such classification
and the resulting modularity makes possible to replace components and to efficiently
manage individual units. However all decisions are still performed by human beings.
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This results in a respectable management overhead. When enough intelligence is put
into the networks, the need for human control decreases and the level of complexity of
the services provided and scalability will surely increase. Figure 1.1 depicts how the
decentralisation of management increases the scalability of the systems. The drawback
is reduced deterministic behaviour.
Figure 1.1: Scalability vs determinism in different types of networks [dressler06]
Nowadays, many forms of self-organisation are commonly found in ad-hoc net-
works: addressing can be performed dynamically; routing is able to detect topology
changes and react accordingly; network policies are pushed into routers automatically
based on higher layer policies; service discovery mechanisms are very useful in sharing
resources between users. Although all these achievements, self-organisation is somewhat
primitive and there are many situations were more intelligence and autonomic capabili-
ties are desirable, where the network is able to identify events and where human control
is simply inadequate and undesirable. The purpose of self-organised ad-hoc networks
is thus to deploy a consciousness in the system, making it capable to take actions. The
result will be intelligent ad-hoc networks where the human beings use the networks to
enhance their interactions and where management overhead is reduced to a minimum.
Current technology is still very far from this scenario.
Ad-hoc networks are a research topic getting much attention from the academic
community. This is not because of the freshness of the topic (usually new topics get
extra attention), but due to the potential presented by such concepts, especially with
current wireless equipments. The concept of networks being able to self-organise with-
out any human intervention or previous planning is rather old. Its origins can be traced
back to 1972 and a program sponsored by the USA Department of Defence called Packet
Radio Network (PRNET). Later during the following decade, this evolved into the Sur-
2
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vivable Adaptive Radio Networks (SURAN) program. Both programs envisioned one
of the most well established scenarios for ad-hoc networks: wireless packet switched
communication in a battlefield, with moving elements with heterogeneous resources
and roles, and the existence of an enemy which should be unable to intercept or jam
communications. During the first phase of the initiative (PRNET), the mechanisms of
ALOHA, CSMA and a simple distance-vector based routing protocol were combined in
order to provide connectivity. The next phase (SURAN) enhanced the physical infras-
tructure by making radios more resilient to enemy actions, albeit smaller and energy
efficient. With both these initiatives, the basic building blocks driving self-organised
networks were studied: self-configuration, adaptability and failure resilience. In the
early 1990s, a set of new developments slowly started focusing the research community
in the direction of ad-hoc networks. Computers became lighter and powerful and the
first laptops (or slightly smaller desktops) became available to the general public. Many
of these equipments already had equipped a rudimentary form of communication by
using infrared light. The first ideas bringing ad-hoc networks to civilian scenarios were
proposed in a set of publications [perkins94], [johnson94] in conference proceedings.
Finally, by the time of these publications IEEE started considering such networks and
adopted the term “ad-hoc network” inside IEEE 802.11 [80211]. In the last half of the
90s, ad-hoc networks started to be a topic of much interest and rapidly a multitude
of scenarios, proposals and also problems were identified. Many conferences and jour-
nals dedicated only to this type of networks were then created. By the end of the last
decade, the IETF created the MANET charter which presented its terminology draft
in 1997 [perkins97]. In more recent years, ad-hoc networks met even more applications
and scenarios, with some important IST founded European projects like the BRAIN,
MIND, DAIDALOS, AMBIENT NETWORKS and more recently WIP, considering
new architectures where the concept of cooperation and self-organisation is vital.
Currently, in most ad-hoc networks it is common for mobile nodes to be heavily
constrained devices. Self-organised wireless networks usually are deployed due to their
low cost and most are also expected to be cheap, small and simple. They are often
battery-powered and have limited CPU power, memory space and persistent storage
space. The wireless interface is also very constrained specially because radios consume
a lot of battery power, therefore, in order to increase the uptime, radio range is reduced
to only a few ten of meters. Frequently nodes are mobile, not that they are capable of
moving, but because they are carried by a person, an animal or another moving equip-
ment. This is true for mobile users, sensors monitoring wildlife or vehicular networks.
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Although all the effort dedicated to ad-hoc networks, because of the disparity of
the applications, scenarios, nodes and network layers in which they can be implemented,
no clear definition has ever been formulated. We can find concepts of ad-hoc networking
in technologies and devices such as Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11, Sensors, Satellites and
Space Probes or P2P networks. All these networks have some form of self-organisation
and are somewhat dynamic, being resilient to changes in the environment. From all
the concepts existing, the definition of four types of ad-hoc networks are important to
this thesis: Mobile, Hybrid, Vehicular and Sensor. Many others exist, and also the
definition of the given concepts may differ between some authors.
• Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET): Mobile Ad-hoc Network is the most
common term associated to self-organised networks in today’s literature. Also,
this is the type of network having the most widely accepted definition. This was
once formulated by the IETF working group: “A mobile ad hoc network is an
autonomous system of mobile routers . . . connected by wireless links – the union
of which form an arbitrary graph. The routers are free to move randomly and
organise themselves arbitrarily; thus, the network’s wireless topology may change
rapidly and unpredictably. Such a network may operate in a standalone fashion,
or may be connected to the larger Internet.”
• Hybrid Ad-hoc Network: This network is an evolution from the previous one
by considering that some devices have special functionalities. Although a typical
MANET can be connected to a larger Internet, its supposed interconnection to
be performed by standard nodes. In Hybrid networks, specially deployed nodes
provide connectivity between an infrastructure network and the MANET. Such
scenarios are typical for situations where an existing commercially driven wireless
hotspot uses multi-hop relaying in order to increase its range.
• Vehicular Ad-hoc Network: Also an evolution from a typical MANET, the
term Vehicular Ad-hoc Network refers to a situation where the network is com-
prised by automobiles cruising in a road (such as a motorway) and are able to
communicate by means of MANET mechanisms. Such network may also contain
sink nodes (access points) which are fixed in the road providing connectivity to
the outside Internet. Both the definitions of Mobile or Hybrid network may be
adequate to Vehicular. However the specificity of the mobility pattern associated
with a Vehicular Network, as well as its applications makes the differentiation
4
Chapter 1: Introduction
worth.
• Sensor Network: A Sensor Network is a variety of an Ad-hoc network were
nodes, either mobile or not, are stringently limited in terms of processing, battery
and radio range. While in the previous cases the transport medium is IEEE
802.11, sensors frequently use other technologies such as Zigbee or Bluetooth.
Nodes comprising Sensor networks possess simple processing units, have only a
few KB of memory and are typically operated by standard alkaline or lithium
batteries. Its application range is wide comprising scenarios where it is required to
monitor locations, equipments or animals using cheap and easily deployed sensors.
Proposals for Sensor networks are similar to the ones of Mobile Ad-hoc Networks,
yet they must be as resource efficient as possible due to the additional constrains
on the sensors.
1.2 Rewarding Concepts
Besides the adaptability to change, resources constrains and wireless interfaces,
one another aspect is vital to an ad-hoc network to operate. All nodes should operate
both not only as clients and servers, as in standard networks, but also as routers.
Combining these functions on the same node is simple if nodes have resources, however
this is not the case of ad-hoc nodes. Forwarding traffic coming other nodes is required
from the perspective of the network, yet it is undesirable from the perspective of the
node forwarding. Each packet forwarded will reduce the already scarce bandwidth
available and consume essential battery. CPU will also be occupied in the forwarding
process and further consume battery. In order to maintain updated routing information,
a routing protocol must exchange messages between routers. This will also decrease
the available resources. More importantly, with the exception of routing, resources are
spent not based on service utilisation by the owner but by other users. Even if battery
is low and the user operating a device is not interested in generating or receiving any
flow, there are still routing operations taking place. This situation will continue while
other users produce traffic, the topology keeps changing or the battery is depleted. It
is clear users may start acting selfishly and stop forwarding others traffic.
Forwarding nodes should have some reward in forwarding other traffic, to balance
the inherent selfishness of the user. Also the reward should be attractive, motivating
a correct behaviour and increasing network usefulness. This thesis addresses the issues
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leading to selfish behaviour and mechanisms increasing user’s motivation to participate.
Many methods can be used and the most relevant to the state of the art will be de-
scribed. The main focus of the work presented is charging and rewarding of users, as
a mean to both integrate ad-hoc networks in commercial driven environments, and to
increase the participation of users.
1.3 Objectives
This thesis aims to:
1. Study concepts associated to self-organised ad-hoc networks and methods moti-
vating user participation.
2. Study architectures to increase the range of commercial hotspots through the
usage of ad-hoc networks.
3. Analyse trust management in wireless public networks.
4. Consider the application of QoS and QoS based charging in wireless public net-
works.
5. Develop new solutions to secure charging in self-organised environments.
6. Implement novel solutions and validating them in laboratory environment.
1.4 Contributions
As the result of this thesis the following papers have been published:
• Joa˜o Paulo Barraca, Miguel Almeida, Rafael Sarroˆ, Susana Sargento, Rui Aguiar,
“Experimental Evaluation of an Integrated Ad-hoc Network”, IST-Mobile Summit
2006, Mikonos, Greece, June 2006.
• Joa˜o Paulo Barraca, Susana Sargento, Rui Aguiar, “Evaluation of MANET Charg-
ing Protocols in Hotspot Scenarios”, Confereˆncia sobre Redes de Computadores -
CRC2005, Portalegre, Portugal, October 2005.
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• Susana Sargento, Taˆnia Calc¸ada, Joa˜o Paulo Barraca, Se´rgio Criso´stomo, Joa˜o
Gira˜o, Marek Natkaniec, Norbert Vicari, Francisco Cuesta, Manuel Ricardo, “Mo-
bile Ad-Hoc Networks Integration in the Daidalos Architecture”, IST-Mobile Wire-
less Summit 2005, Dresden, Germany, 2005.
• Joa˜o Paulo Barraca, Susana Sargento, Rui Aguiar, “The Polynomial-assisted Ad-
hoc Charging Protocol”, IEEE International Symposion on Computers and Com-
munications - ISCC2005, Cartagena, Spain, 2005.
• Joa˜o Paulo Barraca, Susana Sargento, Rui Aguiar, “A Lightweight and Secure
Session-Aware Ad-Hoc Charging Protocol”, International Conference on Telecom-
munications - ICT2005, Cape Town, South Africa, 2005.
1.5 Disposition
This thesis is organised as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces the issues and solutions related to self-organised ad-hoc
networks. In this chapter an overview of the proposals shaping todays’ self-organised
networks is presented. This will cover the issues of routing, self-configuration and
quality of service, which are vital for these environments.
Chapter 3 addresses the problematic of cooperation and charging in ad-hoc net-
works. The issues which required the creation of proposals motivating users to forward
are presented. Also, some of the most representative proposals are described as they
influenced the work developed for this thesis.
In Chapter 4 two new proposals are presented together with an analytical com-
parison with another proposal. Part of this chapter also describes and analyses the
results of the extensive simulation work which was performed.
Chapter 5 describes the internals of a prototype implementation of one of the
proposed solutions. Design choices of the implementation and the testing environment
are also described. Also in this chapter, the results obtained in a testbed are presented
and discussed.
Chapter 6 presents the main conclusions of this thesis together with some issues
still requiring further work.
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Solutions for ad-hoc networks
Self-organised ad-hoc networks are made by the inter-operation of heterogeneous
nodes using a multitude of protocols. Each different protocol provides a layer of ser-
vices capable of enhancing the capabilities of the wireless network. Easily the combined
capabilities will much surpass the resources handled by one single node. On this chap-
ter, solutions providing routing, auto-configuration and Quality of Service for ad-hoc
networks are discussed. Although this thesis focus on charging and cooperation, these
modules are the main building blocks of the networks studied. Only after these services
are functional, more complex solutions may be deployed. Also, it is almost inevitable
to consider interactions between protocols at different layers. All these issues make nec-
essary to describe a set of solutions which in some way influenced the work developed.
2.1 Routing
Routing is the function responsible for determining the best route from a source
to a given destination. After route is determined, forwarding mechanisms process the
packet according to the information in the routing tables. Because the own nature
of ad-hoc nodes, routing protocols for MANET should be highly dynamic and robust
to a myriad of problems, non existent in standard wired networks. Mobile ad-hoc
environments must cope with high mobility, failures of the underlying IEEE 802.11
medium, unidirectional links, grey areas [henrik02], disruptive action or simply selfish
behaviour perpetrated by malicious users. Topology may change during session lifetime,
requiring the routing protocol to react and update routes between end-points.
When developing routing protocols suited for the typical environment of ad-hoc
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networks, many different strategies and algorithms can be chosen. Because of the
choices adopted by each solution, it is usual to classify ad-hoc routing protocols in
different categories. This categorisation helps in evaluating the optimal environment
for each protocol, its weakness and strengths. Moreover it helps reaching a consensus
about the appropriate set of mechanisms suitable for a particular situation. One of the
most important categorisation parameter is the strategy to determine the best route
between two end points. Protocols can be also categorised in many other ways like
the algorithm used to determine best route (link-state or distance vector), the type
of traffic they forward (unicast or multicast), how (or if) they handle geographical
information, the effort they make in reducing the power consumption or if they create
(or not) a hierarchical structure inside the MANET. Protocols which actively monitor
network changes and update routes automatically are denominated Proactive or table-
driven. If a protocol only maintains routes when some flow requires it, it is denominated
Reactive, or on-demand. Some protocols use both methods and are categorised as
Hybrid. Reactive and Proactive are the two most popular categories and are further
discussed in this thesis.
2.1.1 Pro-active routing protocols
Pro-active protocols will synchronise topology information among a set or all
nodes in the ad-hoc network and build a distributed routing table. This is accomplished
by exchanging periodic messages between nodes. Using the exchanged messages, each
node is able to build a representation of the network topology which can be partial
or total. Routes are then established using the knowledge acquired and can take in
consideration additional metrics like delay, security or even price. The drawback is
the control overhead produced by the constant messages exchanged even when there
are no data packets to be routed. Depending on the synchronisation method, protocol
overhead can stay almost constant with varying mobility and/or number of flows routed.
However in most pro-active protocols, overhead increases together with the number of
nodes. These control messages consume CPU time, battery and wireless resources, even
when there are no active flows in the MANET. Pro-active protocols are less adequate
to networks where nodes have very low capabilities like sensors, but adequate where
routes should be provided with low delay and be maintained constantly.
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OLSR - Optimised Link-State Routing protocol
The Optimised Link State Routing protocol is one of the most mature and pop-
ular routing protocol for MANET. It was developed at INRIA and first proposed
in [clausen01] as a link state, table driven (pro-active) routing protocol for mobile
wireless networks. Later it went through a development process inside the IETF
MANET [manet] charter, being proposed to the Experimental RFC status in RFC
3626 [clausen03]. There are almost ten public implementations of OLSR (in July 2006),
many conforming to RFC 3626 and supporting most operating systems.
Each control packet generated by OLSR can have multiple control messages pro-
viding an optimisation of the resources required for protocol operation. Messages start
with a header identifying the message type. Upon reception, nodes quickly identify
the type of the message and are able to forward even unknown message types. This is
particularly useful when introducing a new functionality to OLSR which only a limited
number of nodes support. New nodes could support the additional feature while the
network would still operate because old nodes simply ignore the new message.
OLSR operation is divided in 3 main functions: neighbour sensing, optimised
flooding and forwarding, and link-state messaging and route calculation. Neighbour
sensing function provides information about status of links between nodes. It is imple-
mented by the exchange of periodic HELLO messages at all interfaces where OLSR is
active. Considering 2 nodes close by, the function may determine they are not neigh-
bours if no packets are received by either node; the link is unidirectional if only one
node receives HELLO packets or bidirectional if both nodes receive each others’ HELLO
packet. Such situation may seem uncommon on a perfect medium but IEEE 802.11 and
the wireless medium are far from that. The precision of such process is very important
to determine and maintain routes during topology changes or network start.
The optimised flooding and forwarding is one of OLSR most innovative aspects.
To carry efficient flooding and determination of a forwarding route, OLSR employs
the method of Multi Point Relaying in order to reduce overhead by avoiding duplicate
retransmition . Using MPR, the flooding process is directed through a distribution
tree both reducing the number of nodes involved in flooding and avoiding duplicated
forwarding of the same packet. The size and structure of the Multi Point Relaying tree
varies with network topology and number of nodes. Nodes can choose to participate
or not in the forwarding tree and can choose their multi-point relays using a tunable
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algorithm. To choose his MPR each node calculates the best neighbour which allows
reaching any other node two hops away. Redundant nodes are detected and removed
resulting in an efficient tree providing close to optimal routes. Figure 2.1 depicts an
example of the optimisation resulting from flooding the network using the MPRmethod.
Figure 2.1: Flooding using Multi Point Relaying
Link state and routing calculation provide optimisations over traditional link state
routing. In OLSR only MPR nodes generate link state messages and only MPR nodes
are declared in messages. The combination of both solutions (MPR and optimised link
state) is able to efficiently reduce the complexity of computing routes and the overhead
of the routing protocol.
OLSR has a clever and polished design with some other aspects of relevance:
supports multi-homed nodes and disseminates interface information to other nodes
in the network; defines the possibility of a node to explicitly define its MPR status
(i.e. participate in the MPR forwarding), allowing resource restricted nodes to be
excluded from the MPR tree or carefully deployed and more powerful nodes to always
be MPR nodes; connectivity is not restricted to the ad-hoc network making possible
inter-operation with hosts on external networks; link hysteresis detection is supported in
order to prevent using links were communication of user data packets suffers noticeable
degradation (also to avoid grey areas).
Compared to other solutions, OLSR usually fails to provide the packet delivery
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ratio [bhatia03] of some reactive protocols like AODV [perkins03b]. Also, because of
its proactive nature, overhead in networks with high number of nodes, is much higher
than the one found in reactive solutions, also making it unsuitable in low power envi-
ronments, such as sensor networks where networks may be composed by hundreds of
nodes. Most recent proposals related to OLSR are mainly concerned with aspects like
QoS [badis03], security [hafslund04] and network auto-configuration [jelger04]. Also a
new improved version of OLSR was started recently in the form of OLSRv2 [clausen06].
This new version, besides many other improvements, aims at reducing the complexity
of the protocol and the overhead generated by using methods of partial topology dis-
semination.
TBRPF - Topology Dissemination Based on Reverse-Path Forwarding
The Topology Dissemination Based on Reverse-Path Forwarding (TBRPF) is a
proactive, link-state routing protocol proposed for mobile ad-hoc networks providing
multi hop routing with optimal paths. The protocol was first proposed in [bellur99]
and recently reached the status of Experimental RFC 3684 [ogier04]. The protocol is
divided in two different parts: the Routing Module (TRM) and the Neighbour Discovery
(TND) module.
The TBRPF Neighbour Discovery module has an instance on every TBRPF en-
abled interface and takes care only of maintaining neighbour information updated and
valid. Being a proactive protocol, every TND module periodically broadcast a routing
packet (HELLO). This packet, besides its beacon function, carries information about
interface’s active neighbours and the status of the links. TBRPF considers three states
for links: lost or non-existent, unidirectional and bidirectional. Using a modified version
of the Dijkstra’s algorithm each node is able to compute the best path to any destination
required, based on the exchange of HELLO messages. In order to reduce the overhead
of the periodic HELLO messages, TBRPF authors propose the usage of “differential”
HELLOs. Instead of sending information about all neighbours on each HELLO packet,
upon modification of a link, TND only sends information about changes. On a static
network, overhead is greatly reduced while in a permanently moving network it behaves
similarly to other proactive routing protocols.
The TBRPF Routing Module (TRM) maintains a source tree providing the short-
est path to all nodes in the network. The memory and computation requirements of
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storing and processing such tree puts some limits in the maximum number of nodes on
a network. The TRM module periodically broadcasts the source tree of each node to
their neighbours, but, as an optimisation to reduce resource consumption, only part of
the tree is broadcast instead of the full tree. Additionally, a differential update of the
tree is sent to denote changes in the topology promoting a quick convergence of the
routes.
As in OLSR, TBRPF nodes are allowed to control the level of participation on
the forwarding process, but with a different method. As presented previously in section
2.1.1, in OLSR nodes can express their willingness to forward. In TBRPF, nodes
express their willingness indirectly through the size of the source tree they broadcast.
A non cooperative node unwilling to forward packets will make sure other nodes do not
select him as a hop and will not broadcast its tree. If a node wants to forward as much
traffic as possible, it should increase the amount of the source tree it broadcasts at the
same time. Although there is no certain it will be chosen, because it advertises more
available destinations (and routes), in average, it will be selected more often.
2.1.2 Reactive Routing Protocols
Reactive routing protocols differ from the previous (Pro-active) as no route is
pre-calculated. If no packets need to be routed, nodes have no information about the
current topology or route to any destination. Information about current neighbours
is typically the only information gathered. When a node wishes to send a packet, a
route discovery mechanism floods the network searching for a route to the destination.
When a route is established, nodes will maintain that route as long as there are data
packets flowing. After the flow stops and a given timeout expires, routes are dropped.
Reactive protocols are much efficient in terms of bandwidth, memory and processing
requirements. All computations are simple and nodes only maintain minimal amounts
of information. Moreover, the overhead in the network depends both on the number
of nodes, mobility and number of flows. If there are no flows, routing overhead will be
almost nonexistent. The drawbacks with these solutions are higher latency establishing
routes and lower redundancy.
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DSR - Dynamic Source Routing
The Dynamic Source Routing protocol is a simple, lightweight and efficient so-
lution for routing in mobile ad-hoc networks. DSR operates on-demand and, instead
of using the entries in the routing table of forwarding nodes, it uses source routing to
deliver packets. The protocol is composed by two main functions: Route Discovery
and Route Maintenance. When a node wants to forward a packet it should issue a
Route Request (RREQ) message to all its neighbours. This packet is forwarded until it
reaches the destination. Every time the message is forwarded, nodes add their address
to the payload of the message, and the message grows with the list of all forwarding
nodes. In order to avoid forwarding the same packet more than one time, every RREQ
message carries an identifier used to distinguish different request. Also, nodes will not
forward packets if their address is already in the message. With such mechanism, the
loop free operation of the proposal is assured. When the RREQ message reaches the
destination or a node which already knows the route, this node issues a Route Reply
(RREP) message towards the origin of the message. Before issuing the RREP message,
the destination node checks if a route to the initiator is know. If this is not the case,
another Route Discovery process is required. The original RREP message can be pig-
gybacked on the new RREQ message saving bandwidth and increasing the convergence
of the mechanism. If the underlying MAC medium provides bidirectionality, such as
frequently happens with IEEE 802.11, the destination node could further reduce the
overhead by reversing the route list contained in the first RREQ. When the Route Dis-
covery process is completed, the receiver has a list of hops willing to forward packets to
the desired destination and is able to start sending data. To every data packet is added
a routing header with the discovered list and sent to the network. In order to avoid
the necessity of restarting the process on a packet basis, this route is cached for some
time. If no RREP message is received after sending a RREQ, an exponential backoff
mechanism delays further RREQ messages.
The information resulting from each Route Discovery mechanism is not confined
to the nodes participating in the forwarding. DSR specifies nodes can listen for the
traffic in the network and cache routes created by neighbours. Such mechanism can
bring some problems with uni-directional links and consume additional battery from
low power devices. However it is an effective manner of disseminating information
about the network, making possible to react faster to topology changes. When a node
moves, one of its neighbours will be a candidate to replace it in the forwarding. If this
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new node listened to the Route Discovery process, it will have this information, making
possible to react faster. One aspect of this cached information is RREP messages can
be issued (as response to RREQ messages) by forwarding nodes if they already know
the route to the destination. With this mechanism, Route Discovery is much fasten,
but the initiator must be able to select the best route from all routes received. Also,
forwarding nodes must check if replying with cached information will create loops in
the route. If this is the case, this list contained in the RREQ message must be merged
with the cached route and the result included in the RREP.
One interesting aspect of DSR is the support of per hop delivery acknowledge-
ment. This can either be performed using DSR messages, by listening to the next
node forwarding the packet or by using MAC layer acknowledgement messages. If
no acknowledgement is received after a timeout, the packet is retransmited and after
a number of retransmissions, a Route Error (RERR) message is issued towards the
sender. The sender now has to restart the Route Discovery process or add another
known route to data packets.
Source routing method is very effective, however it suffers from overhead. As the
length of the route increases, the routing headers also increase. Using IPv6, this results
in 16 bytes per packet per forwarding node. Forwarding nodes, knowing the route to
other nodes in the route, may omit other nodes in between, saving this overhead in data
packets. Being a relatively mature and simple solution, there are many publications
supported by the mechanisms of DSR. Also, the source routing solution employed,
allows for a myriad of solutions for many other problems such as charging, multipath,
cooperation or quality of service. Currently, developments on the DSR protocol seem
to have slowed, with the researchers focusing on solutions such as DYMO [chakeres06].
AODV - Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector
The Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector [perkins03b] routing protocol is one
of the best known and well tested routing protocols for MANET environments. It
functions reactively providing routes only when needed. These routes are maintained
only during flows duration and are destroyed after a determined timeout.
Routes are created when an initiator sends a Route REQuest (RREQ) message
asking to reach the desired destination. The request is efficiently forwarded through the
network, avoiding loops through the usage of a sequence number. When a node, receives
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a RREQ message and has knowledge of a route to the requested destination, is issues a
Route REPly (RREP) message to the origin of the RREQ. The initiator will thus receive
multiple RREP messages and is capable of selecting the most suitable route based in the
number of hops. When using AOMDV [marina02], multiple routes can be selected and
some proposals [perkins03a] and [zapata05] consider extensions to support additional
metrics. Nodes forwarding RREP messages also update their route information. If
a more recent sequence number indicates a potentially shorter route, this new route
replaces the existing one. If no packets of an existing route are being forwarded, the
route entry is discarded after a timeout. This helps in reducing the existence of old
(and frequently incorrect) information in the network and to reduce memory requisites.
If topology changes during the existence of a flow, the node detecting the break will
issue a Route ERRor (RERR) message to the sender. After a RERR is received, a new
route discovery process must be initiated so that packets reach destination.
More than 10 public implementations are refered at AODV website [aodvweb] sup-
porting different operating systems, architectures and IP versions. Also inter-operation
between these versions has been tested [beldingroyer02] with much success. Currently,
after extensive comparison publications and proved functionality, AODV has reached
a stable state. New ideas and the knowledge acquired during its development are now
shifted towards the creation of DYMO [chakeres06].
DYMO - Dynamic Manet On-demand Ad-hoc Routing
In 2004, the IETF MANET Charter announced on its mailing that no more effort
should be spent on new routing proposals. Tens of proposals already existed and the
problem of dynamic routing was well understood. Research topics focused on evaluation
of the developed proposals and its usability in the various scenarios envisioned for ad-
hoc networks. After the group learned from the extensive results obtained, in 2005,
Ian Chakeres et al, leaded the definition of a new routing protocol called DYMO. It is
heavily based on AODV, using the same scheme for route discovery and maintenance.
Nodes still send RREQ messages when require routes, and responses are sent on RREP
messages. Route breaks is also still notified using RERR messages. The main differences
are related to simpler route maintenance, higher abstraction, routing gateways and the
possibility of extensions.
In DYMO, routing messages contain a common header and data is sent on Routing
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Elements (RE). Each element contains a type specifier, source and destination address,
Length, TTL and other flags. It is not required for all nodes to support all types
of RE, and unknown RE codes can be ignored. If the RE type defines it, unknown
reception of unknown RE types leads to an Unknown RE Error (UERR) message to
be sent. This feature by itself, makes DYMO more expandable and adaptable to future
enhancements than AODV. Also it makes possible coexistence of nodes implementing
different RE types.
DYMO natively supports the existence of gateways. Nodes are thus able to ad-
vertise routes to a different network using a combination of network address, mask
and the Gateway flag. Gateway nodes respond to RREQ messages querying for routes
to nodes outside the ad-hoc network. In the RREP message, they advertise the ad-
dress they are able to reach and that they are a gateway. Besides RREP messages,
all packets processed or created by a gateway node, must indicate the gateway status.
Current work on DYMO is focused on further elaboration of the current specification
and comparative studies assessment.
2.2 Address Auto-configuration
Routing protocols are only able to route packets in a network where nodes are
already configured with non conflicting IP addresses. Without this step, the same
address could appear repeatedly, or interfaces could be using different network masks
making routing impossible. Furthermore, routing protocols frequently do not handle
interconnection to outside networks (such features are usually proposed as extensions).
If nodes are not aware of eventual gateways, routing will only be available inside the
ad-hoc network thus making impossible scenarios related to integration with other
networks.
It is clear that these auto-configuration issues are out of scope of routing protocols.
However these depend on the existence of mechanisms responsible for disseminating
network information and configuring nodes. DYMO, which already specifies Internet
connectivity and auto-configuration, is one example of a more recent routing protocol
that is already aware of such issues. Comparing with routing, at least in the number
of publications available, configuration proposals are lagging behind routing propos-
als. The IETF MANET Working Group created the Autoconf Charter [autoconf] and
started developing efforts in evaluating the requirements to address auto-configuration
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in MANET. The work inside Autoconf is recent, drafts are still in very early develop-
ment stages and no RFC was proposed.
Current trends propose the usage of a simple protocols broadcasting important
configuration information. The most popular protocol, at least in wired networks,
should be standard IPv6 address auto-configuration [thomson98]. It describes the
mechanisms for automatic IPv6 address configuration based on MAC addresses and
information provided on Router Advertisement messages. A Duplicate Address Detec-
tion (DAD) phase avoids the existing of conflicting nodes with same address. Other
proposed methods range from network delivered addresses by DHCP6 [droms03] to
more complex solutions like Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA) [aura05].
Information about the available gateways and the distance, in terms of number of hops,
could also be delivered to nodes. This would make possible nodes to differentiate be-
tween several existing networks and select the one with less number of hops to the
gateway. When considering more complex ad-hoc networks, besides information like
address, mask or default route, it could be important to further disseminate information
about services available to the network. Due to resource constrains not all services can
be announced, but basic services required for inter-operation should be announced. Ex-
amples of such services are: set of protocols to use, location of DNS and Authentication
services and details of the PKI available (if any).
Proposals like [wakikawa06] [jelger04] and [jeong06], being developed as Internet
drafts, present methods for disseminating network configuration. [wakikawa06] pro-
poses a method to propagate the network prefix inside the network by means of an
Internet Gateway Discovery process, similar to the Router Discovery process of IPv6.
In the proposed method, the address and network mask of the gateway, together with a
sequence number and a timestamp are transmitted in a Modified Router Advertisement
message. The authors envision several solutions capable of integrating the solution with
various routing protocols and Mobile IPv6. No security mechanisms are specified, mak-
ing this solution much vulnerable to a set of impersonation and Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks: a malicious node, incorrectly advertising network information, is capable of
severely disrupting network operation.
Jelger et al [jelger04], proposed a method where the gateway providing connec-
tivity to the Internet periodically broadcasts a message denominated GW INFO. The
message is forwarded by all nodes which currently selected the gateway sending the
message as its default gateway. This forms an optimised flooding method following
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a directed tree sourced at each gateway. One point of interest is that this provides
a method of supporting multiple gateways in the same ad-hoc and allowing nodes to
choose which to use. Because a node selected a specific gateway and an upstream neigh-
bour connecting him to the gateway, the routing protocol may decide to use a different
route to the Internet. The default route will always be their upstream neighbour but
it will only be used if the routing protocol does not provide a route (eg. destination
is out of the ad-hoc and routing protocol is not aware of it). Besides IPv6 address
configuration, it specifies an extension to GW INFO messages which is able to inform
nodes about the address of a global DNS server to use. There are no security consider-
ations in [jelger04] allowing nodes to forge GW INFO messages, spoofing the address of
the gateway or the address of the DNS server. Recent proposals [calc¸ada05] emerging
from the IST-Daidalos project [daidalos] extend this proposal by incorporating message
authentication and integrity to control messages. Nodes are then able to verify the au-
thenticity of the GW INFO message, solving the spoofing vulnerabilities the original
proposal suffered from.
Jeon et al propose [jeong06] another solution to auto-configuration. It differs
from the previous by specifying mechanisms both for IPv4 and IPv6 and to allow auto-
configuration of isolated ad-hoc networks. Also it supports the existence and merge of
different partitions of the network. The bases of this proposal are the mechanisms of
Strong DAD and Weak DAD. The first process is used to rapidly detect a duplicate
address in the local partition of the node. The late’s used to detect duplicate addresses
during routing and, particularly, during merge of partitions. When a node wants to join
a network it starts the Strong DAD process by setting a temporary address and issuing
a message requesting the address (AREQ). The message is flooded to the entire network
one hop at a time. If any node has the address announced it should send an AREP
message and the incoming node should restart the process. Nodes also send AERR
messages when they detect an address conflict. When two or more partitions merge
there is a possibility of existing duplicated addresses between nodes of the different par-
titions. The Weak DAD will ensure collisions do not occur by keeping, at each node, a
table with addresses and so called Interface Identifiers. If there are two or more entries
with the same address and different Interface Identifiers there are nodes with conflict-
ing addresses. If a nodes’ address change and active flows exist, the authors specify
a method to notify active peers of the new address by issuing a specific AERR mes-
sage. Most recent work also refers the use of IPSEC ESP with a shared pre-distributed
key to authenticate control messages. No support for other auto-configuration param-
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eters besides IPv4 and IPv6 address configuration was envisioned. Globally routeable
addresses are referred as usable, but the network must provide the network mask to
use. The process of choice is the standard Route Advertisement/Route Request pro-
cess but performed in a multi-hop manner. In case of multiple gateways, nodes can
configure multiple global addresses, but multiple Global addresses raises some issues
because traditional MANET routing protocols usually only support one prefix inside
each network.
2.3 Quality of Service
Quality of Service (QoS) generally aims at providing differentiation on the way
packets are handled either (or both) at the sending node or at intermediate nodes. If
no other definition exists, standard packets are always scheduled as Best Effort (BE).
Interestingly some authors [chown03] describe situations where Less than Best Effort
(LBE) traffic is also possible (and useful). Other higher priority classes may exist
which are related to higher priority in queueing process. Real time classes are used by
services like VoIP calls which require low delay and jitter. The IntServ model defines
the existence of end-to-end reservation for the classes. Besides priority, also bandwidth,
delay or jitter parameters are possible to be applied. Although more powerful than the
more recent DiffServ model, IntServ also requires more state information to be kept
at each node. In order to avoid routers to retain states of long terminated flows, it is
required to refresh the reservation periodically. This method is very effective at the
cost of additional overhead.
The protocols for wired networks provide powerful mechanisms and are well known
for a long time. They provide mechanisms like end-to-end flow reservation, QoS routing
or differentiated services. Wired networks are much stable and resourceful than ad-hoc
networks and QoS is common from the user terminal to network provider’s transport
cores. In ad-hoc networks resources are scarce. Solutions like RSVP [braden97] are
overkill and many other proposals following the IntServ model are unsuitable.
In ad-hoc networks, service differentiation is typically applied on a class basis
providing differentiation between critical services and best effort traffic. Mainly due
to the instability of the IEEE 802.11 medium and the mobility of ad-hoc nodes, it is
common to consider signalling (Routing, QoS, Charging) also as a real-time service.
Typically ad-hoc solutions do not aim at the complexity of traditional QoS solutions
21
Chapter 2: Solutions for ad-hoc networks
like RSVP. The basic ideas of QoS in MANET are based on already existing solutions
but often offer simplified models. Most of the current proposals allows to differentiate
between a small amount of services (less than 10) while the most complex additionally
allow to combine some other metrics like bandwidth and delay.
An ad-hoc network integrated with an infrastructure requires QoS mechanisms
efficient enough to be deployed in mobile nodes, and powerful enough to handle wired
networks requirements. Instead of performing differentiation based on services or a
traffic class, each node has a user profile associated typically containing some QoS con-
strains. Some solutions to this problem introduce additional signalling and intelligent
shaping and admission control modules like it is proposed at [criso´stomo05]. Others
propose mechanisms to choose the most appropriate gateway based on additional pa-
rameters [sethom06].
2.3.1 QOLSR
Although not a standalone solution providing QoS in ad-hoc networks, the QOLSR
[badis03] protocol has being actively developed inside the IETF MANET group. Be-
cause of the pluggable nature of OLSR a QoS solution was developed as an extension to
standard OLSR. The QOLSR improves OLSR by adding an extension to HELLO and
TC messages. This extension disseminates information about many network parame-
ters like available bandwidth, delay, jitter, loss probability or cost. The election of MPR
will be performed as in OLSR but considering the additional parameters. Bandwidth
and delay parameters are the only ones which should always be included in messages
and should be always available. Accordingly, each node should select is set of MPRs
so that they are able to reach all 2 hop neighbours with maximum bandwidth and
lowest delay. If an MPR informs its bandwidth and delay values dropped below a given
threshold, the non-MPR node will restart the process of selecting a new MPR taking
in consideration the updated values. Calculation of routes will be performed using one
of two algorithms; QoS constrained shortest-widest path or an alternative based on La-
grangian relaxation. The first is used if only bandwidth and delay should be considered.
If more parameters are to be used, the Lagrangian relaxation based algorithm can pro-
vide a number of solutions optimising the QoS constrains in use. The solution proposed
is usable both in IPv4 and IPv6, only by changing the type of addresses included in
TC and HELLO messages. Security and cost of links are mentioned in [clausen03] and
two TLV types are already reserved for this.
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2.3.2 INSIGNIA
INSIGNIA was first proposed by Ahn et al [lee98] as a lightweight, in-band im-
plementation of the RSVP model. At the time of its publication INSIGNIA was the
most complete and supported QoS proposal taking in consideration the particular re-
quirements of ad-hoc nodes. It supports fast reservation, restoration and adaptation of
flows delivering flow differentiation between Real Time and Best Effort traffic.
QoS signalling is exchanged as an in-band extension to IP packets (called IN-
SIGNIA option) in an attempt to minimise the bandwidth due to signalling overhead.
The INSIGNIA extension is composed of four 1bit fields followed by two 8bits fields
taking a total of twenty bits per packet. When a node wants to perform a reservation it
should mark the data packet with a Reservation message indicating the bandwidth and
class values desired. Here nodes can reserve for Minimum guaranteed bandwidth (base
QoS) and Maximum used bandwidth (enhanced QoS) depending on the application
requirements. The packet will be forwarded along the route making soft reservations
on intermediate nodes which are refreshed by data packets. If a node has no available
resources to perform the reservation, the packet is still forwarded but treated as best
effort and no reservation is created.
In mobile environments, such as a MANET, it is common that reservations are
not possible to be performed in the moment the flow is created but only later. This
is due to flow characteristics or routing changes. The opposite case is also common
and INSIGNIA provides an adaptive mechanism which dynamically drops and recovers
reservations without explicit signalling between or to endpoints. A feedback mechanism
is also implemented allowing the destination node to inform the flow source about the
state of the reservation and eventual degradation due mobility. The feedback mecha-
nism is of vital importance during the setup of a reservation so that the sending node
can have some assurances that the reservation was performed. Also, because the path
or the channel parameters may change, the feedback mechanism allows sending nodes
to adapt flows to maximise usability. The reason this adaptation is application driven
is justified by the different requirements of applications. Real time MPEG flows, VoIP
calls or bulk downloads are frequent exemples pointed out by INSIGNIA authors.
The stateful behaviour of INSIGNIA, also characteristic of the Intserv model,
makes INSIGNIA not suitable for networks with high mobility or high number of nodes.
Because of the not so lightweight and the adaptable behaviour of INSIGNIA, later
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research focused on other proposals and models, such as the FQMM [xiao00], IMAQ
[chen02a] and more recently SWAN (DS-SWAN) [domingo04].
2.3.3 SWAN
The Stateless Wireless Ad-hoc Network [ahn02] proposal is a complex QoS model
providing stateless QoS differentiation in ad-hoc networks. SWAN is comprised of
several distributed mechanisms glued together to form a complete QoS solution. These
mechanisms are: Admission Control; Rate Control; Traffic Classification and Shaping;
and MAC feedback. Figure 2.2 depicts the relations among different modules.
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Figure 2.2: SWAN Internal structure
The Admission Controller module operates at source nodes and controls the ad-
mission of UDP real time flows only. Deciding whether a flow is allowed or blocked will
depend on feedback from other mechanisms: Active probing, ECN detection and MAC
feedback used.
Active probing works by sending probes from the origin to the next hop when
a new real time flow is created or when renegotiation is required. Routing may also
change the QoS characteristics of a path thus also invoking a probing process. Notice
that the packet is forwarded and processed at each intermediate hop and not sent
directly to the destination node. Each node changes the bottleneck bandwidth thus
limiting the maximum rate acceptable to the lowest acceptable rate along the path.
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The destination node will then send a probe reply with the available bandwidth in the
path.
Rate control module shapes best effort traffic using adaptable shapers and is
performed is a distributed manner at every node. Real-time traffic should not be
shaped (only admitted). The algorithm used to adjust the shapers is denominated
Additive Increase Multiplicative Decrease (AIMD) and was first proposed at [chiu89].
According to AIMD, best effort traffic starts at rate |c| and the rate increases by |c|
kbits every time unit. After a few time units, if no other traffic exists, best effort traffic
uses almost all available resources, just as in a normal situation. When the MAC layer
reports a delay higher than a determined threshold D ms, the shaper is adjusted and
rate is decreased by a multiplicative factor F%.
MAC feedback is specified only for 802.11 standard, though. It works by enabling
RTS/CTS negotiation for all send packets and measure the delay between the first
RTS to send a data packet and the ACK received from the next hop. Collisions and
delay getting access to the medium are then reported to upper layers. MAC layer
also eavesdrop the radio environment and permanently calculates the occupancy of the
network and available bandwidth. Forwarding nodes may detect packets are congesting
the network (using MAC feedback). In this case they mark the ECN field of forwarded
packets. The receiving node, upon reception of an ECN marked packet will issue a
Regulate message to sender causing the Admission Control on the sending node to
re-probe and re-admit the flow. If multiple flows exist simultaneously to the same
destination, and no avoidance measure is considered, a regulate message will force all
sources to restart the probing process. Improvements may involve insuring a delay
between probes or to mark only one, randomly selected flow for congestion, instead of
all flows. If the link still continues to have congestion, other is selected until congestion
stops. This solution of shapers adaptable by feedback presents many problems to bursty
data, due to the time shapers take to adapt. Examples of problematic applications are:
Instant Messaging Service, DNS requests or even a single ping. If these are considered as
best-effort they will suffer from extreme delay and packet loss until shapers reconfigure.
If the shapers allow for burst of best effort traffic it could be problematic to existing real-
time flows because they could experience degradation (from collisions) only corrected
in the next time unit.
Classification of packets is performed at the sending node and packets are marked
using the DSCP field (in IPv6). Originally SWAN only considers the existence of
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2 classes: best-effort and real time; recently other authors [criso´stomo05] proposed
adopting SWAN to control 4 classes in total. All classes with exception of the Real
Time class will suffer shaping and shapers will be placed one after the other. The delay
provided as feedback to each shaper will thus correspond to the total delay accumulated
in higher order shapers. The initial feedback will correspond to the MAC delay.
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Cooperation in Ad-hoc Networks
The concept of a spontaneous network, composed by wireless nodes getting to-
gether at radio range, all sharing the idea of cooperating to a common purpose, and
“everything simply works”, is, in almost all situations, a utopia. Real world ad-hoc
networks are far from perfect and are affected by a huge amount of difficulties limiting
its usage, amongst which the lack of equal interest in the node’s cooperation.
Some authors [huang04] claim that incentive and cooperation should only be de-
ployed when networks reach a respectful maturity. Although this concept can be par-
tially true, cooperation between nodes, in the general sense, must be vertical and exist
at all levels. Three types of non-cooperating nodes are usually considered: faulty,
malicious and selfish.
The first type of nodes do not follow the protocols due to some malfunction.
The second are nodes operated be users who do not wish the correct behaviour of the
network. Both aspects can be permanent or temporary. Faulty nodes are expected
to be very common due to software or hardware faults but especially due to problems
(interferences, network congestion) in accessing the 802.11 medium. Malicious nodes
are expected but its number should be small as, generally, specialised tools or knowledge
is required and only a rejection of service is achieved by the offending node. Selfish
nodes differ from the malicious nodes because there is an intention to abuse the network
resources in self advantage. One common selfish action is to simply drop packets forming
a black hole. Routes are computed through the selfish node but no data packets are
actually forwarded. In opposition to the others, where there is not much additional
protocols can do, selfish users can be motivated to participate.
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Cooperation at the MAC layer is commonly achieved by the rules composing an
access protocol. The physical medium, typically IEEE 802.11b/g/a, provides a shared
resource, affected by problems like packet collisions, radio interferences and hidden
nodes. Because the medium is shared and IEEE 802.11 radios are half duplex, if no
reservation mechanism is deployed, packet collisions will severely degrade the bandwidth
available and increase round trip delays and packet losses [li02]. Thus nodes will need
to manage together the wireless medium in order to achieve a better user satisfaction,
though the access protocol. Radio interference is external to the ad-hoc network and
there is nothing nodes can do besides changing wireless channel, or choosing routes
based on additional parameters like available bandwidth, delay or noise. The later
has the problem these changes must be coordinated and all nodes must change at a
time. In practice it is rarely convenient, due to the technical difficulties and reduced
number of channels available to 802.11b/g. The hidden node problem is inherent to the
channel and must be solved by all nodes cooperating using an organised and respectful
mean of communication. Typically this is minimised by using the Multiple Access with
Collision Avoidance mechanism. Whenever a node wishes to send a packet, first it tries
to reserve the medium by issuing a Request to Send (RTS) message. If the destination
node is ready to receive data, it issues a Clear To Send (CTS) message. Other nodes
listen to the message exchange and no station will send packets until this reservation
expires.
At the transport level, nodes must cooperate in the discovery of routes and for-
warding of packets. If nodes all belong to the same managing entity (owner or admin-
istrative domain) they will surely cooperate. Examples of these networks are sensor
networks or wireless ad-hoc backhaul networks: the owner of the sensor network will
want it to be efficient so that it could have accurate measures and act in real time, and
a backhaul wireless network also must be a highly controlled environment with max-
imum efficiency. On the other hand, in a multi user environment, selfish forwarding
is harder to achieve. Users usually have different behaviours, thus taking preference
on a different set of applications. Because coexistence of different services or simply
expectations is not as peaceful as it should be, satisfaction level may drop. If a user
expects to use the ad-hoc network to download files from other nodes at X kbits/s,
but only achieves X/2 kbits/s, because if it is forwarding Y kbits/s, it may decide
to simply stop forwarding. Another situation may arise if a node is becoming really
short on battery or all available CPU is required to perform a user task. Unless the
network offers something to the user himself, it may become unsatisfied and eventually
28
Chapter 3: Cooperation in Ad-hoc Networks
start acting selfishly. This “compensation” may simply be the feeling of belonging to
a particular group, such as an ad-hoc composed by a group of friends. Unfortunately
this type of rewarding is not often everywhere.
Scenarios considering heterogeneous users motivated researchers to address the
problem of cooperation. Several studies were performed addressing the problematic
of cooperation and selfish behaviour in ad-hoc networks. Initially they started with
simple methods to detect non-cooperating nodes and exclude them from the network
[michiardi00], [buchegger02]. In these proposals, the concepts of trust and reputation
were introduced, where the actions of users were monitored. Later research studies
started applying gaming theory [fang04] in the analysis of the forwarding process. While
reputation and trust was used to enforce cooperation, another set of proposals relied on
virtual currency (which can be directly related to money or some profit related to the
services that can be accessed, resources in the network, etc.). Virtual currency methods
such as the ones proposed at [weyland04], [blazevic01], [chen04b] enable the existence
of a real distributed algorithm without the necessity of a common point of trust. Nodes
are able to exchange currency directly without the intervention of an additional entity.
Distributed ad-hoc environments are fully supported using these proposals. Problems
like credit starvation and the necessity of tamper resistant modules appear, making its
deployment difficult. Also, operator driven scenarios are not well supported due to the
lack of control over credit, fraud and session establishment. Examples of centralised
proposals include [zhong03], [lamparter03] and [salem06] which consider the existence
of an operator managing the network. In these proposals, the operator is common
and trustworthy to all participants. Such proposals are specially suited for scenarios
considering operator driven environments.
In the following sections an overview of relevant work involving cooperation either
by punishment or by rewarding will be presented. Proposals to promote cooperation
by credit rewarding are the main focus of this thesis and will be addresses with more
detail.
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3.1 Cooperation by punishment or reputation
3.1.1 CONFIDANT
Buchegger and Boudec propose a solution [buchegger02] named CONFIDANT
(Cooperation of Nodes: Fairness in Ad-hoc Networks) which makes selfish misbehaviour
unattractive to users. The mechanisms proposed work by detecting misbehaviour and
isolating the offending node from the network. CONFIDANT specifies four different
entities: the monitor, the trust manager, the reputation system and the path manager.
Monitors will listen and analyse communications performed by all 1hop neighbour
nodes. Case misbehaviour is found, an ALARM message is sent to the trust manager.
To minimise false positives, a single misbehaviour does not trigger an alarm. Instead
the node must detect violations repeatedly and will trigger the ALARM if they exceed
a configured threshold. The trust manager receives ALARM messages and decides
whether further routing information is accepted for processing or not depending on
node trustfulness. A “friend list” is also kept at this module containing a list of nodes
considered as friends and which will be notified of anomalies using ALARM messages.
An ALARMmessage will not necessarily block a node as it may be discarded if the trust
manager module assumes the sender of the ALARM message itself is not trustworthy
(e.g. does not belong to the friends list). The Reputation System tracks known nodes
and keeps a reputation rating about each node. If enough evidence is received indicating
a node is cheating, its trust level will be decreased. Reputation lists are local to each
node but can be exchanged between friends in order to fasten reputation convergence.
The Path Manager module will choose routes avoiding nodes with low reputation or
already excluded from the network.
CONFIDANT proposes the existence of first hand and second hand reputation.
Such mechanisms are vulnerable to liars which falsely accuse other nodes of misbehaving
and was further addressed in [buchegger03]. The first is collected directly by the node
while the second results from ALARM messages sent by friend nodes. Only if the trust
of the sending node is acceptable, and the reported information is according to eventual
first hand reputation measures, the second hand table will be updated. Adding these
mechanisms minimises problems related with false reputation information, which make
CONFIDANT resistant against direct attacks to the reputation system.
This solution is not very adequate to low resource (mainly battery) environments
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like sensor networks, since it adds more processing to each node (related to monitoring
of the surrounding wireless environment).
3.1.2 Context Aware Detection
In [paul02] proposal Paul and Westhoff describe mechanisms capable of detecting
node misbehaviour in a wide range of situations. More importantly, they allow identi-
fication and propagation of a specific misbehaviour of a node. It is assumed all nodes
are promiscuously listening to the wireless medium and networks have medium to high
concentration of nodes. A tamper resistant module obliges MAC and IP addresses to
be linked and cannot be changed by user intervention. DSR should be used to provide
routes, being the proposal highly linked with its the discovery and route maintenance
processes.
When node A wishes to initiate communication with node B, it should discover a
route to destination. Using DSR this is performed by broadcasting a RREQ message
indicating the destination node B. Each neighbour node receiving the RREQ message,
adds its IP address to the previous packet and rebroadcasts it. [paul02] proposes se-
curing the route discovery process of DSR by adding a sequence number and a Hash
to every RREQ message sent. The sequence number is randomly chosen to each new
RREQ while the Hash is the result of a digest computed over IPA, IPB and the se-
quence number. Each forwarding node, before forwarding the message must replace the
Hash by a new digest computed over the concatenation of the previous digest with its
IP address. Consecutively calculation of digests will create a Hash Chain. The result-
ing value can be later verified using the list of IP addresses added, and the sequence
number included in the packet. When B receives the RREQ it checks its validity by
recalculating all values and comparing the result with the Hash presented. If the values
match, B can be sure no node manipulated the route presented and a RREP message
is sent. This however allows a node to add additional entries to the list; only chang-
ing previous values is prevented. In order to prevent this attack every node listens and
caches every RREQ packet received by its neighbours Ni. After messages are processed
and forwarded, neighbours analyse the response and verify if node Ni only manipulated
the packet by adding its IP address and updating the Hash. Adding more than one
address or adding an erroneous address is easily detected by neighbours, due to the
existing mapping between MAC and IP addresses.
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When an attack to the address list is detected, each node detecting the attack
should inform both neighbours and A. This is performed by broadcasting a SECM
message to all neighbours. Upon reception of such message, nodes compare the alarm
with its cache. If they know (have in cache) the packet accused of being forged they send
a SECM message toward A including both the original content (cached packet) and
the forged data (packet manipulated by attacker). Upon reception of SECM messages,
node A can identify if they are correlated to the same event (RREQ) and time frame.
If this is true and a reasonable number of nodes agree on the accusation (more than 4)
the node is considered a culprit and is avoided. In some situations, Paul et al consider
culprit a node issuing a SECM if it is the only accuser. This is valid for high density
environments where number of neighbours is expected to be between 8 and 10.
Dropping RREQ messages remains the only attack which can be performed by a
forwarding node. Also, due to asymmetry in radio range, this attack cannot be easily
distinguished between low card sensitivity or malfunction.
3.1.3 OCEAN
The Observation-based Cooperation Enforcement in Ad-hoc Networks (OCEAN)
[bansal03] was proposed by Bansal et al, as a solution to increase cooperation a MANET.
In OCEAN nodes monitor others’ behaviour but in contrary to CONFIDANT, they
do not exchange collected information. Because no second hand information is used,
OCEAN does not suffer the problem of false accusing a node of misbehaving. In CON-
FIDANT this could happen either by incorrect detection or by a malicious attempt to
exclude a node from the network. The drawback is the same node will have different
reputation information at all neighbour nodes. Also, if a node blocks an offending
neighbour, it is not guaranteed common neighbours will reach the same conclusion and
the offending node could still be active in the network.
OCEAN proposes each node must classify every neighbour in a rank based on
observation of messages exchanged and packets forwarded. The starting value is 0
(Neutral) which is increased by 1 at every positive action and decreased by 2 at every
negative action. After the value reaches a negative threshold (-40), the neighbour is
considered as being faulty. Faulty nodes are added to a black list and stay there until
the expiration of a timeout. After the expected time, messages are processed and the
offending node has the possibility to correct its rank. Because rank value is not set at
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a different value when a node is removed from the black list, one single negative action
will be enough to add it to the list until the next timeout.
This method of giving an opportunity to neighbours to redeem is important in
order to proper operation of a network; OCEAN is not perfect in judging neighbours
and in some conditions it can indicate a neighbour is misbehaving when that is not the
case; users can change their behaviour and start cooperating if they realise they have
no advantages by being selfish. Without this periodic check, nodes would be banned
permanently from the network. Eventually, the entire network could be banned and no
communication would be possible.
Calculating routes based on reputation is performed by adding an extension to
DSR RREQ messages. This extension contains a list of nodes which should be avoided
in the route. If a node receives a RREQ to a destination he knows the route, and no
hop exists in the avoid list, a RREP message can be sent. If such node exists, the
RREQ packet can be re-broadcasted or silently dropped depending on the avoid list
and the local faulty list. Following this concept, when a RREP message is received,
the requesting node also checks if any node in the route is present in the current faulty
list. If this is true, the RREP message is discarded. Although the authors of OCEAN
only propose the usage of DSR, it is possible to adapt similar concepts to other routing
protocols such as AODV or OLSR.
3.2 Cooperation by Credit Incentives
3.2.1 CASHNet
The authors of CASHnet [weyland04] presented a solution allowing operators do
deploy a pre-paid scheme in ad-hoc integrated networks. For deployment, it requires
the existence of a cheat proof hardware module. This could be easily implemented as
a SIM card similar to those currently used in GSM networks.
CASHnet assumes the existence of two types of virtual currencies which can be
exchanged in a virtual bank. The first are called Traffic Credits and the second Helper
Credits. Each node joining the network registers with the operator sending its identi-
fication, and public key. The operator will cache the public key for latter verification
of reported Traffic Credits. After the registration is performed, node requires Traffic
Credits so that other users allow him to send packets. It can pre-buy some currency
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in the bank using real money, or it can stay silent forwarding others packets. Each
sent packet contains a Traffic Credit token which can be collected by forwarding nodes
becoming a Helper Credit. Later on, nodes can deliver Helper Credits to the bank
receiving some Traffic Credits back. The ratio used in the exchange must be carefully
chosen by the operator so that users feel rewarded and operator still gets enough profit.
Packets also contain two independent message authentication codes signing the packet.
One belongs to the sending node, while other belongs to the previous forwarding node.
In order to verify the authenticity of data, each node must verify two signatures
upon forwarding a packet. Usually the verification operation would make this solution
very resource hungry. Due to the usage of dedicated hardware (required by CASHnet),
the operation would take low number of cycles in the main CPU, thus optimising the
process. Also nodes must exchange and cache certificates from neighbour nodes, as
well as from sender nodes. In CASHnet, certificates have low lifetimes obliging nodes
to synchronise with the operator frequently. A low validity will reduce the granularity
of contract expiration or of usage control. The drawback will be the higher exchange
of certificates between nodes.
3.2.2 A Charging and Rewarding Scheme for Packet Forwarding in Multi-
hop Cellular Networks
A Charging and Rewarding Scheme for Packet Forwarding in Multi-hop Cellular
Networks was first proposed in [salem03] and then at [salem06] for multi-hop extended
cellular networks. Such networks are heavily influenced by current cellular technologies,
like GSM or UMTS, where a base station is directly connected to all terminals. The AP,
being trusted by the network provider, and also by the nodes, is capable of enforcing
individual user profiles and account for all traffic produced. Although the authors
consider the multi-hop scenario, traffic is always obliged to cross the Access Point (AP)
independently of the locations of source and destination nodes. If the traffic is only to or
from the outside of the network, thus crossing the Access Point, this solution should be
very efficient. However, if it is considered direct traffic between the nodes in the ad-hoc
network, the sub-optimal routing will have a dramatic impact in performance. Also, in
all cases, the maximum bandwidth of the entire network is limited to the bandwidth of
the wireless medium available to the Access Point.
According to [salem03], when a node wants to send a packet, first it must create
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a session to the AP (also gateway) by means of a SessionSetupRequest message (Figure
3.1). The gateway then creates a session with the destination node, or signals another
AP to start the session, in the case the destination node is outside the local ad-hoc
network. The request message includes a SessionID, an OldSessionID, a TrafficInfo
with a description of the flow and a MAC signing the entire packet. Each intermediate
node checks the TrafficInfo field and decides if the flow should be accepted. In this
case, the MAC is updated and the packet forwarded.
Access Point
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Request A
Request B
Configuration A
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Figure 3.1: Control signalling of a session establishment
The destination node should also check the TrafficInfo. If the flow is accepted
it will reply with a SessionSetupResponse message to the Access Point containing the
result of the request, the Route and a keyed MAC computed over the Request mes-
sage. The AP, upon reception of the SessionSetupResponse, then starts the charging
procedure and sends a SessionSetupConfiguration to both the sending and destination
nodes. It should be noticed that a session is really composed by two sub-sessions: the
first session is established between source node and AP, and between AP and destina-
tion node. Moreover, the sending node is charged by the traffic in both directions. After
the sending node receives the SessionSetupConfiguration, it starts sending packets to
the AP. These packets have a header indicating the SessionID negotiated during the
setup phase, a sequence number and a keyed MAC. The payload is also ciphered using
a stream cipher, first by the sending node and them by all forwarding nodes. Ciphering
the entire payload by all forwarding nodes is a bandwidth efficient method of certifying
the packet was forward by the correct nodes. The Access Point, knowing the nodes
belonging to the session will decipher the packets in the reserve order. If the packet
was forwarded by a different node than the ones contained at the list established during
the session setup, deciphering will result in garbage and the packet is lost.
Since the list of forwarding nodes is established during the setup phase, if the route
changes a new sub-session must be created. The node detecting a change in the route
should send a BrokenSessionError message to the sending node. Upon reception of a
BrokenSessionError, the sending node verifies if the reporting SessionID is a valid one,
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and restarts the sub-session. If a node receives a packet to forward and the SessionID
is unknown, a UnknownSessionIDError message is sent requesting the creation of the
sub-session. Recreating the sub-session is similar to the creation process, however the
SessionID in the SessionSetupRequest will contain the value of the existing session.
Moreover the session re-created is only the one between the source node and the AP,
or the AP and the destination node, depending in which segment the route changed.
During the forwarding, even if the session is valid, any node can notify the sending node
he does not want to participate. This can be either because its battery is very low,
or simply he does not want to participate. Such node should send a CancelationError
message to the sender. This also triggers the re-establishment of the sub-session, but
the cancelling node can now be excluded of the forwarding from the start.
Another aspect of this proposal is the support for destination acknowledgement.
To acknowledge the reception of data packets, the receiving node should keep a list of
all Sequence Numbers received. Because the values are sequential, a missing value will
indicate a missing packet. After a timeout or sufficient number of losses, the receiving
node should transmit to the AP the missing values. As explained at [salem06] there is
no advantage to the receiving node to not acknowledge the reception. Charging is done
before packets reach the destination, this information is only used to identify which
packets were forwarded and issue rewards. Although there are no proofs returned
to the Access Point from the receiving node, the acknowledge mechanism allows to
correctly charge users in the second sub-session. Nodes of the first sub-session are
clearly identified by the Access Point without any additional mechanism. Because all
traffic must cross the Access Point, operators have a great control over the packets
forwarded. The cost of such control is higher bandwidth usage and higher delay, due
to sub-optimal routing, for traffic with both end-points inside the ad-hoc network.
The method used to create sessions is very vulnerable to user colluding in order
to gain additional reward credits. When a packet is in the setup phase, a malicious
node can easily add the identifier of all of the nodes colluding instead of adding only
its identifier. When this node is forwarding a data packet, instead of ciphering the
payload with its secret, it will need to cipher it using the secrets of the nodes colluding.
The Access Point will have no way of identifying this fake forwarding and will reward
them appropriately. If all nodes colluding perform the same operation it is clear that
the group will have more profit than expected by the operator. This attack poses a
serious threat to the charging process and no practical solutionsis available to avoid
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it. The authors propose the usage of statistical analysis to detect nodes emulating the
forwarding process, but this can be avoided by careful manipulation by the malicious
nodes.
Other serious shortcoming of this solution is control messages are not authenti-
cated. Any node can perform a DoS attack on the communication between two end-
points be sending a CancelationError, BrokenRouteError or UnknownSessionIDError.
Everytime the sending node receives one of these packets, and the SessionID is valid,
it will block all packets and re-establish the session. As the SessionID can be easily
listened from any node neighbour to a node forwarding the flow, this attack is very
easy to execute yet, very disruptive.
3.2.3 SPRITE
One of the first solutions providing charging in ad-hoc networks without direct
transactions between nodes was presented by Zhong et al as SPRITE: A Simple, Cheat-
Proof, Credit-Based System for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks [zhong03]. SPRITE considers
the existence of a Credit Clearance System where nodes can pre-buy credits. It also
requires a Public Key Infrastructure available. Nodes will have a private and public
keys and a certificate, issued by a trusted partner. All packets are authenticated using
these keys directly by means of a MAC and nodes can verify if a packet received for
forwarding is from a authorised node or not. Because nodes will only be rewarded by
forwarding a valid packet from an authorised node, if the verification fails packet is
silently dropped. It should be noticed, nodes are expected to have enough processing
resources in order to compute key verifications in real time which will require dedicated
hardware in most ad-hoc devices. However, and in contrast with concurrent proposals,
SPRITE does not require a safe and trusted environment to run the SPRITE algorithm.
The authors present this solution integrated with a Source Based routing protocol,
namely DSR. They also refer the possibility to charge multicast traffic. However no
description of such interaction was presented in the original publication. When a node
wants to send a packet, and after it has a route to the destination, it adds the full route,
a sequence number and the signature of a digest calculated over the message payload,
the sequence number and the route. The route is encoded by simply concatenating
all IP addresses. The digest will be the start of a hash chain. When a node receives
a packet to forward, it performs a number of checks. If any of these checks fails, the
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packet is dropped. First the node checks if it already is in the route present in the
packet. If this is false, there will be no reward for the node to forward the packet. In
mobile networks, route can and will change often. If route changes, nodes will refuse
to forward a packet without their address included in the route and will silently drop
the packet. The undesirable result will be a higher probability loss under high mobility
leading to a low performance under those scenarios. The next step is to verify if the
sequence number is higher than the last sequence number received from the source node.
In the final check the signature is verified assuring the packet was not manipulated. If
all these steps are successful, the forwarding node will store the new sequence number
and update the Hash Chain. Before the packet is forwarded to the next hop, each node
will collect the Hash Chain in the packet, and store it on the nodes permanent storage
medium like a flash drive or a hard disk. Finally the packet is then forwarded to the
next hop in the route.
When a node is connected to a more resourceful network such like a LAN or a DSL
access, it should deliver the collected digests to the Credit Clearance System. Based
on the digests received, the Credit Clearance System, upon correct verification of the
cryptographic keys, will charge initiators and reward the node reporting information.
According to SPRITE, session initiators are only charged when forwarding nodes
deliver digests back to the Charging Clearance System. If they never deliver the proofs
they will not be rewarded, however they will also not be charged. Although this attack
is possible, it is not simple to implement. If a single node report a digest, the node
will be charged. Assuring all nodes in the route are colluding, specially in a mobile
environment, is not trivial. Also, the price delivered to forwarding nodes will be less
than the price paid by the initiator. This is because some profit must return to the
network operator owning the bank. If nodes do not collude, the system will be efficient.
However, if the user initiating the connection has control or is associated with one or
more nodes along the path, it may choose to not deliver proofs because it will receive
less money than it will be charged of.
The solution provides an interesting application of cryptographic methods. How-
ever, because all nodes must verify, in real time, the integrity of packets, this may
pose serious performance constraints. The alternatives to increased delay will result in
increased overhead. The fact that all nodes store digests of all packets forwarded also
poses some concerns. Considering a typical digest, size between 16 (MD5 [rivest92])
and 20 bytes (SHA1 [eastlake01]), storing one digest per packet will require significant
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storage, hard to handle in PDAs or low-resource laptops. Reporting all the digest cap-
tured will also make mandatory the existence of higher bandwidth links. These issues
make SPRITE only usable in a very small number of situations and on very specific
scenarios.
3.2.4 SCP
The Secure Charging Protocol [lamparter03] is an AAAC protocol which improves
the ideas first proposed by SPRITE [zhong03] and extends them by incorporating a
more complete set of functions. SCP focus on securely retrieving accounting informa-
tion for traffic flows, while retaining relevant information associated with the routes that
were taken by each of the packets, in a iterative, efficient and online manner. Moreover,
it operates in a partially distributed environment where nodes do not require to period-
ically having available a high bandwidth connection to the operator (like in SPRITE).
A vital component of SCP is the existence of a centralised AAAC infrastructure under
control of the operator managing the network. Besides storing all information regard-
ing business models, users and credit, this system provides mechanisms to control the
access of users to the network and the return of traffic information. In the case of
SPRITE, the Credit Clearance System only provided functions to allow returning the
traffic proofs and no active access control was deployed. In SCP, the Access Router,
still owned by the operator, interfaces the infrastructure network with the ad-hoc cloud.
It serves as a proxy between nodes and the central AAAC infrastructure deployed at
the Core of the network and can actively authorise or block access to services after the
user is authenticated into the network. Communication between nodes and the Ac-
cess Router is performed using SCP, while communication inside the operator network
is performed using standard protocols such as DIAMETER [calhoun03] or RADIUS
[rigney00]. The usage of such protocols also makes SCP able to be simpler to introduce
on existing networks where such systems should already exist.
SCP assumes each node is operated by a user and the user must have a contract
with the operator managing the AAAC. From this contract results a credit profile, a
pair of symmetric keys and a shared secret. The credit profile will have the guidelines
for translating traffic information in real currency deduction or increase according to
the business model and nodes’ role. Cryptographic material is required to avoid attacks
such as impersonation of a user, free-riding others’ packets or faking control messages
and it is an important component of SCP. Each node has a private key used to sign all
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control messages and a public key, presented in a certificate signed by the operator. The
shared secret is used to perform functions internal to the protocol and later described.
SCP is divided in three separate phases: Registration, Data Transfer and Ac-
counting. These phases are depicted in Figure 3.2.
1 - Registration
2 – Data Transfer
3 - Accounting
IPv6 Packet
With Charging Header
SCPServiceProvision
ConfirmationRequest
SCPServiceProvision 
ConfirmationResponse
SCPAccessResponse
SCPAccessRequest
SCPServiceProvisionVerificationRequest
SCPServiceProvisionVerificationResponse
Figure 3.2: Diagram representing the different phases of the SCP proposal
The first phase is the Registration phase and occurs when a node wishes to partic-
ipate on an ad-hoc network. Because no traffic without a valid signature and certificate
is allowed on the network, nodes must first register with the network operator. When
a node wants to join an existing network, it sends a SCPAccessRequest message to the
local Access Router (AR) with its user identification and a common secret. The infor-
mation provided if verified with the AAAC server and, case the verification succeeds,
a SCPAccessResponse message is sent back. The response contains a private key, a
signed certificate with a public key, a shared secret and some charging information.
Upon reception of a successful response, the node has all required credentials to initiate
a session to a destination node.
In the Data Transfer phase, an already registered node (denominated the Initiator)
wishes to communicate either with a node inside the network or with a node located
in a foreign network. The Initiator should intercept all packets going out of its ad-
hoc enabled interfaces and add a charging header to each. Headers are required for
operation of the distributed charging mechanism and nodes are obliged to add them.
Packets without the charging header will be dropped by forwarding nodes. Authors
of SCP only considered IPv6 and proposed adding headers as a Hop-by-Hop extension
[deering98] making this proposal independent of the transport protocol used (at least
at this phase). The charging header contains a Header Type, an optional Route List, a
Sequence Number, a Hash Chain and a Message Authentication Code (MAC).
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SCP assumes the possibility of operating with Source Routing (SR) based pro-
tocols such as DSR or with other routing protocols such as AODV or OLSR. When
used with the DSR protocol, it exploits the route already contained in every packet
and incorporates this information in the charging header added to packets. If the rout-
ing protocol does not include a route header, SCP authors further extended [gira˜o04]
the original proposal by adding a method to iteratively build the route supporting on-
demand protocols. Instead of including the full route at the sending node and because
no route is added by the routing protocol, each node forwarding a packet, adds its
address to the charging header before sending or forwarding it. This behaviour brings
some advantages such as higher independence from the routing protocol used and lower
charging overhead, especially with long routes. On the other hand, it forces nodes to
fragment packets more often and to adjust upper layer protocols, such as TCP, upon
each forward. The type of charging header added (with iterative route or with full
route) is set using the Header Type field.
In order to avoid replay attacks, SCP makes use of a 32 bits long Sequence Number.
This field is set with a random value upon initiation of a new flow and is increased upon
each new packet sent. If a forwarding node detects a Sequence Number with a value
lower than the last Sequence Number received in the same flow, the packet is considered
as part of a replay attack and is silently dropped.
The Hash Chain is a digest calculated over a pseudo header using cryptograph-
ically graded digest algorithms such as MD5 or SHA-1 and has a length of 128 bits.
This field is required so that the AAAC, upon reception of traffic proofs, can validate
the route presented and reward the users which really forwarded the packet. When
the Initiator adds the charging header, it initialises the Hash Chain by concatenating
the Sequence Number, its IPv6 address, packets’ Traffic Class and the personal Shared
Secret and calculating the digest. The less significant 128 bits are then copied to the
charging header. This can be expressed in equation 3.1 where || denotes concatenation
of fields:
HashChain0 = H(SeqN ||IPv6Address||IPv6TC||SharedSecret) (3.1)
Forwarding nodes process the Hash Chain and update it almost like the sending
node. However, because adding a new digest at each forwarding node would create too
much signalling overhead, the digest is calculated using a iterative manner. The Hash
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Chain which is already present in the charging header is concatenated to the same
fields used by the Initiator and a new digest is calculated. Although this new digest is
completely different from the value present in the packet, because it was created using
the previous value, it will be useful in authenticating forwarding nodes. The result is
then added to the header replacing the previous value.
HashChainn = H(SeqN ||IPv6Address||IPv6TC||SharedSecretn||HashChainn−1)
(3.2)
The MAC field on the charging header is of variable size and contains the result
of a sign operation performed by the Initiator using its private key. In SCP control
messages, the ECDSA [ansix9.62] algorithm is often used to create and verify theMAC.
When a node receives a packet, either because it is the destination node or a forwarding
node, the MAC field must be verified, validating the data transmitted. If the corre-
spondent public key is already cached and is still valid, it is used to verify the MAC.
If this is not true, before the verification can be performed, the public key must be ob-
tained by sending a SCPCertificateRequest message to the source IPv6 address. When
a SCPCertificateRequest message is received, the certificate issued upon registration, is
returned using a SCPCertificateResponse message. Upon reception of the certificate,
the node is able to both verify the authenticity of the message, and the authorisation
of the node to send a packet, by checking the validity of the certificate.
When a node is forwarding a packet, besides verifying the MAC, updating the
Hash Chain and eventually (depending on the routing protocol used) adding its IPv6
address, it also checks the distance to the destination node. This is achieved by con-
sulting the routing protocol itself or the routing tables in the operating system. If the
forwarding node determines that the destination node is a neighbour and that it will
be the next hop of the path, a snapshot of the packet is stored locally. Source and
destination addresses, Traffic Class, Packet Size, Sequence Number, Route and Hash
Chain are some of the values captured from the forwarded packet. If a second packet is
forwarded for the same flow, only the Packet Size, Sequence Number and Hash Chain
are recorded. After a number of snapshots are captured (or a pre-configured timeout) a
SCPServiceProvisionVerificationRequest (SPVReq) message is assembled and sent to-
ward the destination node. This message contains information about the session such
as the session end-points, the route and the number of packets and bytes delivered,
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(since the last SPVReq sent) related to the same flow. Upon reception of a SPVReq,
the destination node checks the validity of both the message and session and verifies
the amount of packets and bytes received. If less packets and bytes were received than
present in the SPVReq, the internal counters reset. However if the internal counters
have higher values, they are decreased for the amount present in the SPVReq message.
In both cases, the total decrease of the counters is acknowledged using a SCPService-
ProvisionVerificationResponse (SPVResp) message. The last forwarding node, which
previously issued a SPVReq receives the SPVResp and builds a SCPServiceProvision-
ConfirmationRequest (SPCReq) towards the Access Router. This message contains
information about the flow (source and destination addresses), the route and a proof
representing each packet forwarded. The proof contains the values of each Hash Chain,
Traffic Class, Sequence Number and Packet Size captured. A SCPServiceProvision-
ConfirmationResponse (SPCResp) acknowledges the reception of the proofs and is able
to additionally issue an order such as allowing or blocking further communications from
the Initiator. Contents of the SPCReq message are validated, first by verifying theMAC
and then by computing the Hash Chain according to the reported route and additional
fields such as each node shared secret. If the computed values for each Hash Chain are
consistent with the values reported, the Initiator is charged while the forwarding nodes
are rewarded. If the verification fails, some error or fraud attempt took place and no
action is performed (besides eventually blocking the Initiator).
The authors of SCP described with detail the most appropriate business models
usable in the scenarios presented. Particularly since they presented a very complete
work describing what should be the relation between the credit paid to a consumer
node and the credit paid to a forwarding node, yet yielding profit for the operator. A
set of parameters denominated P+ and P-, representing the amount of data sent or
forwarded, are used to calculate a ratio which will influence the amount of credits paid
by users. This ratio reflects the amount of traffic a node helps forwarding versus the
amount of traffic produced, thus revealing users behaviour.
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Proposed Solutions
Based on the proposals discussed in the last chapters, two proposals for secure
charging protocol have been developed: the Polynomial-assisted Ad-hoc Charging Pro-
tocol and the Session-aware Ad-hoc Charging Protocol.
4.1 PACP - Polynomial-assisted Ad-hoc Charging Protocol
The Polynomial-assisted Ad-hoc Charging Protocol aims at providing charging,
rewarding, access control and flow admission functionalities, in ad-hoc integrated net-
works. The scenarios envisioned by PACP consider a MANET interconnected to the
infrastructure network managed by a network provider. Such scenario consists of an
extended hotspot environment, where one (or more) ad-hoc nodes are connected to a
wireless hotspot, and this interconnection capability is shared to all nodes in the ad-hoc
network. Note that these scenarios have wider applications scope than this extended
hotspot. Other scenarios envisioned are the ones where infrastructure networks require
methods for distributed charging, rewarding and flow control mechanisms. It also copes
with eventual disconnections to the infrastructure network: the ad-hoc nodes are able
to store (cache) a significant amount of charging information. Upon reconnection to the
infrastructure that information would then be reported. The PACP protocol is based
on SCP concepts, but improves manifold over most proposals in the literature [salem06],
[zhong03], [lamparter03]: it includes the capability for flow admission without the need
of sub-optimal routes, the network overhead introduced by the protocol is reduced and
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the processing requirements in every node are low. Moreover, the complexity of the
forwarding process is low due to the use of polynomial encoding of the intermediate
nodes.
Internet
PKI
Credit Database
User Profile Database
Access Router
Applications
Farm
Internet Gateway
Figure 4.1: Ad-hoc integrated network
Figure 4.1 depicts the architecture of an ad-hoc network in the extended hotspot
scenario. Inside the ad-hoc network, the traffic is routed through reactive or proactive
ad-hoc routing protocols, like AODV, OLSR or DSR. The ad-hoc network is connected
to the infrastructure network through an Access Router (AR). This element is a node
(often infrastructure) that routes packets between the external networks and the ad-
hoc cloud, collects the charging proofs, both for rewarding and charging, and sends
them to a AAAC server in the infrastructure network. The AAAC server handles
all authorisation, authentication and charging issues: it receives the proofs containing
information on the senders, receivers and forwarding nodes, and processes the charging
and rewarding information. Since the PACP protocol is secure, the ad-hoc nodes need
to maintain cryptographic material to be able to send, forward and receive packets.
This key management is provided by a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The ad-hoc
nodes can access operator services available in the infrastructure network (located at
an Application Garden), and can access any node in the Internet through the Internet
Gateway. The rewarding mechanism operates under the assumption that, if the nodes
between sender and receivers do not have a benefit to forward a packet, they will
start acting selfishly and drop packets, instead of forwarding them. This behaviour is
undesirable both for users, located far from the access point, and for network operators.
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The first will be unable to communicate with other nodes, the second will have less
users consuming their services. However, if nodes are rewarded for the packets they
forward, they will become interested to cooperate in the ad-hoc cloud. To reward the
forwarding nodes, the operator, through the AAAC, needs to have information on the
paths crossed by each packet in the ad-hoc network. This is one of the main challenges
of any rewarding protocol: to implicitly (with low overhead), and securely carry and
transport information required for the correct charging and rewarding process. Notice
that security is of major importance, since it is required to assure that the ad-hoc
nodes report the correct ad-hoc paths to the AAAC. Without security issues taken in
consideration this problem would be much simpler.
Briefly, the PACP works as follows (see Figure 4.2). When a node enters in the
ad-hoc network it goes through a registration process to become known by the AR
(and the AAAC), to be authenticated and authorised, and to receive the cryptographic
material required for the charging process (Registration phase). When communicating
with other nodes inside or outside the ad-hoc network, the node implicitly (through
polynomial encoding) includes in every data packet the identification of the route,
which will be updated at each node as the packet is forwarded. The fields containing
information on the route are fixed size and cryptographically secured, so they cannot
be wrongly modified by malicious nodes (Participation and Forwarding phases). The
node belonging to the flows’ path, one hop way from the receiver, denoted as the last
forwarding node, is responsible for sending the proofs to the AR (Reporting phase).
These proofs implicitly contain information on the path(s) of the flow. They are sent
to the AR when the number of proofs collected at the node reaches a specific number,
or when a timeout expires. Notice that, in the case of traffic with destination outside
the ad-hoc network, the last forwarding node is replaced by the AR. When receiving
the proofs, the AR sends them to the AAAC to verify the truthfulness of the infor-
mation, through the cryptographic information contained in the proofs, and retrieves
the information of the ad-hoc route (Verification phase). The AAAC is then able to
correctly credit the sending (and, eventually, the receiving) nodes, as well as correctly
reward the forwarding nodes. In the next sub-sections it will be detailed the security
basics required for the protocol operation and the several phases of the protocol. The
messages and contents depicted in 4.2 will be detailed in the following sub-sections.
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1 - Registration
2 - Participation
3 – Forwarding
Flow Authorization
Route Encoding
4 - Reporting
IPv6 Packet
With Charging Header
Flow Authorisation 
Request
Flow Authorisation 
Response
Proof Report
Report Ack
5 - Verification
Session Initiation
Response
Session Initiation 
Request
Figure 4.2: Different phases and messages of the PACP proposal
Security Assumptions
It is assumed all packets contain a Message Authentication Code (MAC ) used to
verify the integrity and ownership of the packets. The network provider has a public
key, that can be used by the ad-hoc nodes, both to authenticate packets from the AR,
and to protect control packets sent to the network operator.
Because of the resource limitations of nodes composing a typical ad-hoc network,
the cryptographic algorithm and duration of the associated keys need to be carefully
evaluated. The algorithm needs to have a very high security per bit ratio and should be
easily implemented either in dedicated hardware or in software (Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography [koblitz87] has been the algorithm of choice when dealing with low power
equipments and low bandwidth environments [ingo03]. We consider the key pair be-
longing to the operator to be valid for a long period. These keys should be strong
enough to avoid impersonation of the trusted equipments belonging to the provider.
Compromising such key can bring many problems to the operator and users.
On the other hand, the keys associated to mobile nodes are only needed during
the time the node is connected to the network, and thus the key validity can be small,
also leading to shorter keys. Moreover it is considered nodes should generate new
keys periodically, avoiding the disclosure of too much ciphered material. The use of
short keys minimises the overall overhead introduced by the message authentication
code. Also, the delays associated with cryptographic verification and encryption are
smaller, increasing network performance, battery life and available processing resources
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of mobile nodes. All equipments participating in the ad-hoc network are operated by
one or more users, each user having a user profile result of a previous agreement with
the operator. The profile is composed by identification data, public and private keys, a
charging profile and a traffic profile. The user profile should be fully known to the user
and partially to the network operator AAAC (the operator cannot access user private
key). Based on these assumptions, the PACP mechanism defines the five previously
referred phases that compose the charging and rewarding process.
Registration Phase
When a mobile node joins an ad-hoc network, it needs to be authenticated and
authorised in the network before being able to communicate and access the services
available. The AAAC is the element responsible for this authentication and authorisa-
tion process. Communication in the registration process is performed through the AR.
To start the registration phase, the ad-hoc node sends a Session Request message to
the AR providing its authentication data and public key. The sensitive fields of this
message are protected with a stream cipher. The cipher key is ciphered using the net-
work operator public key and the entire packet signed using the nodes private key. The
AR replies with a Session Initiation message indicating if the node is allowed to par-
ticipate in the network. In the case of a positive answer, the nodes’ public key is stored
locally and a shared secret is generated and sent in the Session Initiation message with
the resulting code and configuration objects. The payload of this message needs to be
protected, using the same stream cipher and key used by the registering node. The
configuration objects include a timestamp stating the validity of the registration. After
the specified timeout, user must repeat the process. Optionally it may also generate a
new pair of keys.
Generating keys periodically is important to avoid disclosure of too much cryp-
tographic data and should be performed by all nodes. However, if nodes feel confidant
about their security they may opt to maintain their key during several registration pro-
cesses. Moreover, each node is free to choose the key size used. More powerful nodes
will be able to operate with larger keys while others will opt to use smaller key, easier to
process and weaker. Because the public key is provided to the operator upon the reg-
istration process, it may force the minimum accepted key size by rejecting registration
attempts with weak keys.
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After the registration process is complete, the node is ready to send packets and
participate in the ad-hoc network. Notice that even if the node just wants to forward
or receive traffic, first it must register with the AAAC.
Participation Phase
After a successful registration process, nodes have all required information en-
abling them to participate in the network. When sending a packet, nodes need to
include a tracking header (see Figure 4.3) in all data packets sent. Control packets are
essential to network operation; because they are not related to transfer of data between
nodes, they are excluded of processing in the charging protocol. No charging or re-
warding will thus result from sending or forwarding these packets. Part of the header
will be used as a charging and rewarding proof and will carry the identification of the
nodes in the route.
The tracking header is composed by: a control code (Code), a sequence number
(SeqN ), a route hash (RHash), a hop count (HopC ), a route identifier (RID), an index
(Xi), a hash chain (HashChain) and a message authentication code (MAC ). If the
sending node is directly connected to the receiving node, the RHash, HopC, RID and
Xi fields, which are required in the tracking header for route identification, should be
omitted to reduce control overhead.
NextProto Ext Length Option Type Data Length
Code Sequence Number
Route Hash
Route Identifier
Hop Count Xindex
MAC
Hash Chain
IPv6 Header
Data Payload
Figure 4.3: IPv6 packet with a PACP charging header
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The Code field includes External andOptimization bits. The External bit, when 1,
identifies the case where the endpoint is inside the ad-hoc network and the sending node
is a node in an external network; the charging header is added by the AR to incoming
packets. The Optimization bit, when 1, identifies the direct connection between sending
and receiving nodes (remove of the route identification related objects). The SeqN field
is used to avoid replay attacks and represents an identifier recently unique for each
end-to-end session. It is initiated with a random value and incremented upon each
packet sent. When all values are exhausted, previous sent values can be reused. The
RHash field is a hash chain with 24 bits initially computed over the IPv6 addresses of
the sending node, and interactively computed over the IPv6 address of each (and at
each) forwarding node. The HopC represents the size of the route. RHash and HopC
provide a rough mechanism to detect route changes. Although collisions can (and
will) occur, this method provides some additional information helping the operator to
reconstruct route information. RID is the field that contains the encoded route. This
field represents values of a polynomial. It is updated at every node (see below) and will
be used to reconstruct the path. Xi is the polynomial term and will also be used to,
together with RID, reconstruct the path. The HashChain is a 128 bits value divided
in 2 blocks of 64 bits. The first block is called Charging Block and the second one
Rewarding Block. The sending node initialises the entire HashChain with the result
of the MD5 calculated over a pseudo header (concatenation of the following fields:
source address, destination address, traffic class, protocol code, source port, SeqN and
the nodes’ shared secret). Other digest functions like SHA-1 can be optionally used,
however all nodes must use the same function and packets without the tracking header
or with an invalid MAC will be automatically discarded by forwarding nodes.
Forwarding Phase
When receiving a packet, each forwarding node needs to validate the MAC field,
update the fields identifying the route and update the HashChain. Then, the packet
can be forwarded. Because verification of signatures over ECDSA [ansix9.62] can be
very time consuming, verification of the MAC field should be performed on new flows,
and can be done otherwise periodically if no verification failed in the recent past. If
a single verification fails, all packets should be verified and only after no verification
fail occurs, nodes can start verifying packets selectively. Selective MAC verification
allows for better performance at a cost of higher probability of forwarding fake packets
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(which will result in no reward), if an attack is ongoing. Fake packets are not charged or
rewarded because AAAC will detect the forgery by correlating the information returned.
Forwarding nodes will update the left most bits (64 if MD5 is considered, 80 if SHA-1 )
of the HashChain (corresponding to the rewarding block) with the less significant bits,
resulting from the digest function, applied over a new pseudo header with the same
structure as the one used by the sending node. Notice the values of this pseudo header
are all the same but the shared secret, which corresponds to this forwarding nodes’
shared secret. With this process, each node can assure its identity.
The route is encoded as points in a polynomial that are later reconstructed by the
AAAC server. This encoding process allows the proofs to be small and with fixed size,
reducing the overhead necessary to identify the route and decreasing the complexity
associated to variable length packets. Making the proof size invariable of the route
length is a major benefit as compared to other proposals. For example, in the case
of SCP, the size of the packets is incremented by 16 bytes at each hop (length of the
forwarding nodes’ IPv6 address), thus requiring recalculation of the TCP checksum at
every node, adjustments in the TCP MSS and IPv6 fragmentation. Other upper layer
protocols may even require additional processing or just may be incompatible with
SCP. Therefore, the invariability of the packet size implies a significant reduction in
the operations associated with the forwarding process.
Route Encoding
Two sizes for the encoded route identifiers are defined: 64 and 128 bits. Identifiers
with 64 bits are used to encode local subnet suffixes or user identification; identifiers
with 128 bits can be used as globally valid identifiers or used to provide inter-operation
with identity approaches like Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [moskowitz04], where the
Host Identity Tag (HIT ) is used.
IPv6 addresses as polynomials was first proposed at [dean02] to solve the IP
traceback problem under Distributed Denial Of Service (DDOS ). The idea behind the
polynomial encoding is that for any polynomial f(x) of degree d in the prime field
GF (p), with p being the smallest prime greater than 2d − 1, it is possible to recover
f(x), given f(x) evaluated at d + 1 unique points. If IPi represents the IPv6 address
of the i forwarding node, and Xi an unique packet identifier in the route R with n
nodes, the AAAC Server can recover all the IPv6 addresses if it receives Fr(x) =
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IP1x
(n−1)+ IP2x
(n−2)+ ...IP(n−1)x+ IPn. Recovering this information is done by
inverting a Vandermonde [press92] matrix under a prime field GF (p) for a number of
packets d >= n. The complexity of the problem is O(n2) and it can be solved in real-
time for the average route length of ad-hoc networks. The recovering process through
the Vandermonde matrix is depicted in the set of inequalities 4.1.


X1
n−1 ... X1
3 X1
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
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
(4.1)
Following the proposed approach, the sending node sets the RID field to 0 and Xi
to a random value. Each forwarding node n computes RID(Xi) = [(RID(Xi) ∗Xi +
IPn)mod(p)] and updates the RID field in the packet with the new value. This should
be performed in chunks of 8 bits and using a p value of 257 (smaller prime larger than
28). The RID will be constructed iteratively in the forwarding nodes and the AAAC
server will be then able to reconstruct the path. One restriction of this approach is that
the AAAC server needs a number of packets larger or equal to the number of encoded
IPv6 addresses, to be able to reconstruct the path and identify the forwarding nodes.
If the number of packets traversing the same route is smaller than the number of hops,
the forwarding nodes will not be rewarded for these packets (the charging process is
not affected, and the sender/receiving nodes will be correctly charged). This restriction
can be minimised by caching recently reconstructed routes at the AAAC server, which
can be evaluated following a try and error approach. This is not considered to be a
limitation of the proposal. Nodes will still be interested in cooperating by forwarding
packets if they know that they will be rewarded by the majority (even if not all) of the
forwarded traffic. Moreover, the simulation results that will be depicted in this thesis
confirm that the percentage of times it is not possible to identify the forwarding nodes
is very small, and thus nodes will still be interested in forwarding packets.
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Flow Authorisation
In the registration phase, the AR includes message the objects that define the re-
quirements for flow admission in the Session Initiation. Depending on the requirements
imposed by the operator, traffic inside the ad-hoc network can be admitted without re-
strictions. Other possibility is to only perform flow admission control on internal traffic.
Traffic with one of the endpoints located on an external network is expected to be ad-
mitted at the AR, requiring no additional authorisation control. Other possibility is to
perform flow admission in all new flows independently of the location of flow endpoints.
Although this solution is the one with most overhead and less adaptable to mobility, it
ensures no non-authorised packet is ever forwarded without explicit permission.
To authorise a flow, a forwarding node sends a Flow Authorisation Request mes-
sage to the AR specifying the source and destination endpoints (SrcIP and DstIP),
Protocol (ULProto), source and destination ports (SrcPort and DstPort), IPv6 traffic
class (TrafCl), and a timestamp. Also, if not available, the public key of the sending
node can be requested using the Key flag. As in all control packets, a MAC is also
added (4.2), by concatenating:
SrcIP ||DstIP ||ULProto||SrcPort||DstPort||TrafCl||Timestamp||MAC (4.2)
The AR issues a FlowAuthorisationResponse message allowing or denying the flow
to be forwarded. The answer sent by the AR will take into account the user profile
of the endpoints, credit information reported by the AAAC server or management
policies defined by the network operator. Note that, potentially, this phase could be
waived in many scenarios. The response is composed of a token stating the validity
of the response. After this token expires, forwarding nodes must discard the token.
If the flow is active and was accepted, token should be renewed some time before it
expires. This is necessary to ensure the session is not temporarily suspended while
forwarding nodes renew flow tokens. If the forwarding node also requested the public
key of the sending node, besides the token, the key is also provided and should be used
to authenticate the packet queued to be forwarded.
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Reporting Phase
Like in SCP, the last forwarding node of each packet flow is responsible for gath-
ering the proofs present in each packet. All information in the proofs is signed in order
to provide protection against changes. Therefore, the node collecting the proofs cannot
manipulate the reports in an attempt to obtain some additional profit. The reports
are sent periodically, or as soon as it is reached a number of stored proofs enough to
fill a packet with the size of the (MTU ). If the end-point of a flow is located outside
the ad-hoc network, the AR collects the proofs directly and reports them to the local
AAAC server. Notice that the control packets will be forwarded without additional
verification by the intermediate nodes, allowing a multiple hop return channel for the
collected proofs. Since all proofs are cryptographically protected, nodes will not be able
to alter the proofs without compromising the rewarding process.
The proofs are reliably sent to the infrastructure network; if an acknowledgement
of the proofs reception is not received, a back off timer is activated and the proofs are
sent again.
Verification Phase
After receiving the proofs, the AR sends them to the AAAC server, which will
verify its authenticity. If the proofs are authentic, the relevant nodes are charged and
rewarded; otherwise, the proofs are discarded.
To verify the sending node (charging validation), the AAAC calculates the digest
from the information reported as performed by the sending node, and compares the 64
most significant bits of the result with the 64 most significant bits from the reported
HashChain. If the values differ, the proof is considered to be invalid and it should be
immediately discarded. If the values match, the proof is stored.
When the number of reported proofs is, at least, equal to the reported route length,
the identification of the forwarding nodes can be performed. In this identification
process, the AAAC solves the Vandermonde matrix using the values of the RID and Xi
fields and considering the number of hops specified in the route length. The obtained
result will be a list of IPv6 addresses that will be repeated every HopC terms. The
last forwarding node needs to match the IPv6 of the node that reported the proofs. If
the RID fields are corrupted, the solutions of the matrix will not be unique. For each
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proof (rewarding validation), the AAAC will compute the HashChain, in the same way
performed by the forwarding nodes, and compare the less significant values of each proof
with the values calculated. If all these procedures complete successfully, the proofs are
considered to be valid and the nodes are rewarded; otherwise, the proofs are discarded.
If the proofs received refer to a route for which there is not enough information
to identify the forwarding nodes, the charging procedure is executed and the proof is
stored for a period of time. If the timer expires the proof is discarded and no rewarding
occurs. If another proof for the same route arrives at the AAAC server, they are both
cached until the number of proofs stored matches the number of hops reported. When
this happens, the rewarding procedure occurs, and the new route is cached. The caching
of the routes at the AAAC server will increase the efficiency of the rewarding algorithm.
4.2 SACP - Session Aware ad-hoc Charging Protocol
The Session Aware Ad-hoc Charging Protocol is a charging and rewarding proto-
col for ad-hoc networks in scenarios with interconnection to the infrastructure network
managed by a network provider. Just like the previous proposal (PACP), SACP is
based on rewarding concepts of SCP, but improves over existing proposals by adding
functionalities capable of providing distributed access control while minimising control
overhead. It shares many design solutions with PACP, yet, some mechanisms operate
differently. Also, its usage scenarios are similar to the ones presented previously for
interconnected ad-hoc networks (see Figure 4.1).
Like PACP, the general SACP operation is depicted also by figure 4.2. When a
node enters in the ad-hoc network, it goes through a registration process to become
known by the AR (and AAAC), to be authenticated and authorised, and to receive the
cryptographic material required for the charging process (Registration phase). When
communicating with other nodes inside or outside the ad-hoc network, each forwarding
node processes the packet and forwards it; the fields containing information on the
route are cryptographically secured, so they cannot be wrongly modified along the
path (Participation and Forwarding phases). However, SACP includes concepts of
Automatic Route Shortening (ARS) [johnson04], with routes cached at the nodes for
a specified amount of time. Therefore, the packets only carry information about the
route for the charging process when the route information in the nodes is about to
expire or topology changes are detected. The last forwarding node, is again responsible
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for sending the proofs to the AR (Reporting phase).
These proofs contain again information on the path(s) of the flow, and are sent
to the AR when the number of proofs collected in the node reaches a specific number,
or when a timeout expires. Notice that, in the case of traffic with destination outside
the ad-hoc network, the last forwarding node is replaced by the AR. When receiving
the proofs, the AR sends them to the AAAC to verify the truthfulness of the infor-
mation, through the cryptographic information contained in the proofs, and retrieves
the information of the ad-hoc route (Verification phase). The AAAC is then able to
correctly charge the sending (and, eventually, the receiving) nodes, as well as correctly
reward the forwarding nodes. The Registration and Verification phases are similar to
the same phases in PACP, as well as the security assumptions and specificities. In the
next sub-sections it will be detailed the remaining phases of the mechanism which are
specific to SACP.
Participation
When a node generates a packet, it checks if there is already information of this
flow and its current destination. This information is denoted by a session. The infor-
mation about this session is stored in the node. If this session does not exist, it creates
a new one. Then, it activates a timer, the RouteUpdateTimer that, upon expiration,
triggers the event of adding the route information, in the outgoing packets, at specified
intervals. This route information is included in RouteUpdate (RU ) messages. In order
to save bandwidth, RU messages are sent inband in data packets. The node also sets
the number of packets that may be sent, before a new RU message is sent. Such value
is named PacketsUntilRU and is initialised to a user defined value. It also generates a
new Flow ID for this session, different from 0 and from recently used values. The first
data packet sent will then carry a RU message and will have the generated Flow ID set
in the IPv6 header. The fields of the RU message are described by 4.3, concatenating:
Code||NHops||RouteList||SeqN ||HashChain||MAC (4.3)
Code field is used to notify nodes that the header was added by the AR and
not the sending node. This bit is used to notify whether a packet is coming from the
outside the ad-hoc. It is comprised of a 8bit value where only the least significant bit is
currently defined. Others are reserved for future enhancements to the protocol. NHops
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indicates the number of addresses present in the list of nodes in the path, the RouteList ;
it starts with the value 0 at the sender and is incremented by one at each hop towards
the destination. The RouteList will be non-existent in the packet just sent, and will
grow by one IPv6 address at each forwarding node. The sequence number SeqN is a
random number used to avoid repetition attacks. The MAC (Message Authentication
Code) field contains the signature of the data packet, created with the sending node
private key. The HashChain will be initially created by hashing a pseudo header with
data from the packet and the node itself. If the originator is located outside the ad-hoc
network, Code field less significant bit should be set to 1 and the public key of the AR
should be used to verify the MAC. This MAC is used both to assure the identity of the
sending node and the integrity of data.
When sending a packet, if the RouteUpdateTimer expired or if PacketsUntilRU
reaches 0, the RouteUpdateTimer is rescheduled, PacketsUntilRU is reset to the pre-
configured value, a new Flow ID is generated, and a RouteUpdate message is added.
The combination of a variable counter with a timer allows the refresh of the route after
a certain timeout or after a certain number of packets, thus minimising errors in the
rewarding mechanism.
Further packets will not carry a RouteUpdate header, but instead will carry the
new Flow ID and a PacketProof (PP) header with the structure defined in 4.4:
Code||SeqN ||HashChain||MAC (4.4)
The HashChain field is constructed through the same pseudo header as before (as
in PACP). This much smaller proof requires less processing from the forwarding nodes
and causes less network overhead. However, it may not contain information about the
“real” list of forwarding nodes: the ones rewarded will be the ones that forwarded the
packet containing the RouteUpdate header with the correspondent Flow ID. Because of
this issue, nodes will only be willing to forward packets with known Flow ID values.
Forwarding
Upon receiving a packet, each forwarding node checks if the MAC field is correct.
If it is not, the packet is dropped. Depending on the origin of the packet, it should
be using either senders’ public key, or ARs’ public key. This operation should be
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performed independently of the type of inband message included. It could be ignored
if no signature verification failures were detected in the recent past and the operator
allows it.
If the packet has a RouteUpdate message, the node increases the NHops vari-
able and adds its IPv6 address to the RouteList. In the case of a TCP packet, this
operation will require adjusting TCP fields like the checksum and maximum segment
size (TCP MSS ). However, this is only required to be performed at each node when
RouteUpdate messages are present. Then, the node concatenates the charging pseudo
header constructed from the packet with the HashChain and calculates a new digest.
The result of the new hash will be inserted in the HashChain field. After this process,
since the forwarding node needs to remember that it is included in the route indicated
by the Flow ID, it caches the pseudo header until a configured timeout expires or until
a packet of the same session arrives with a new Flow ID.
If the packet carries a PacketProof header with a known Flow ID, the forwarding
node just updates the HashChain and forwards the packet. On the other hand, if the
packet only carries a PacketProof header but the Flow ID is unknown, the forwarding
node decides (based on user configuration) if it should forward the packet for free. The
decision will depend on users’ interest in forwarding packets without being rewarded,
and in the number of packets already forwarded for free. It is assumed nodes are
willing to forward a very small percentage of the traffic for free, if that results in better
connectivity in the network. Because packets may be forwarded by a node different
from the one to be rewarded, there is an inherent error.
A situation without errors happens when all packets have the full route encoded
or the network is static; the error ratio grows both with higher mobility of nodes,
higher periods between RouteUpdate and higher values of PacketsUntilRU. However,
the purpose of the mechanism is to minimise these situations. In either situations
(packet being forwarded or not), nodes should notify the sending node (or the AR)
that the route changed. This is performed using a RouteUpdateRequest message. This
message contains information about the session source and destination, and Flow ID.
By requesting a new RouteUpdateMessage, the forwarding node will insure it will be
included in the charging process and will be rewarded in a near future. The effects of
mobility should not create too much control overhead in the network; thus the rate of
sending RouteUpdateRequest messages should be limited (2 per second per flow). If the
sending node receives these messages at a higher rate than expected from a single node,
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they should be silently dropped. Upon successful reception of a RouteUpdateRequest
message, the node will determine if that session is still valid and, case it is true, verify if
the Flow ID reported is the flow active for that session. If all is true, next data packet
will carry a RouteUpdateMessage instead of a PacketProof.
Reporting
The last forwarding node is responsible for collecting the proofs present in the
packets, either RouteUpdate or PacketProof messages. Proofs are packed in a ProofRe-
port message and are sent to the AR periodically, or as soon as the number of proofs
cached is enough to fill a packet with the Maximum Transmit Unit (MTU ). The AR
verifies all information and the various HashChains contained in the ProofReport, and
issues a ProofResponse to acknowledge the reception of the proofs. Both the ProofRe-
port and ProofResponse messages are protected by public key cryptography. Before
trying to decode either message, first the MAC field must be verified.
4.3 Overhead analysis
Both the proposed solutions focus on reducing the network overhead of SCP.
PACP also focus in avoiding the necessity of fragmentation as a packet is routed. All
three proposals are very similar from a behaviour point of view. Most of the charging
overhead will be due to packet marking and proof reporting which is performed by all
the proposals.
Registration and flow admission, present in PACP and SACP, increases the overall
overhead, but its contribution is meaningless compared with other factors. SCP lacks
these mechanisms. Moreover, flow admission is an additional feature and not a required
functionality. Cryptography also poses a major contribution to the overhead created
by each solution. Because the same set of primitives is used in all three proposals, the
relative overhead of each solution will not vary, instead the absolute overhead will.
In the following section an analysis of the overhead produced by each proposal
will be described. All values obtained are calculated in relation to the amount of data
sent to the network. Overhead is expressed as the percentage of additional control bytes
added by each analysed charging protocol; routing and other mechanisms are ignored.
In all proposals, the total overhead has two individual contributors which are refered as:
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marking overhead and reporting overhead. Marking overhead is the amount of control
data added to data packets (inband). Reporting overhead is the overhead produced by
reporting proofs back to the AR. The total overhead will thus be the sum of both.
4.3.1 SCP
SCP adds a hop-by-hop extension to all packets sent. The size of the header, and
its evolution as a packet is routed, will depend on the routing protocol used, and the
mode SCP is operating.
Headers can be divided in three parts: SCP control information, hop list (route),
and MAC. The first part has a fixed size of 27 bytes and is used by SCP in all modes.
The Hop list will either contain the full path or a partial path and each entry takes 16
bytes on the header. MAC size will much depend on the size of the key used by nodes
and its value will be the same as in other proposals. The marking process overheads’ will
vary with the number of hops, due to the variation on the size of the hop list. Equation
4.5 denotes the overhead using Full encoding while Equation 4.6 refers to Interactive
encoding; A full list of the symbols used in the following equations is present in table
4.1.
Symbol Description
DPkts Size of data packet
DPkti The ith data packet
FullProofs Size of a PACP Proof when end-points are not neighbours
IPv6s Size of IPv6 header
MACs Size of Message Authentication Code
MTU Maximum Transmit Unit
nhopsr Number of hops in the route
nhopsLFNtoRN Number of hops between last forwarding node and receiving node
nhopsLFNtoAR Number of hops between last forwarding node and the access
router
pads Size of additional padding
Proofs Size of an individual proof
ProofReports Size of a ProofReport message
ProofReplys Size of a ProofReply message
RouteReqs Size of a RouteRequest message
SmallProofs Size of a PACP Proof when end-points are neighbours
SPCReqs Size of a ServiceProvisionConfirmationRequest message
SPCResps Size of a ServiceProvisionConfirmationResponse message
SPV Reqs Size of a ServiceProvisionVerificationRequest message
SPV Resps Size of a ServiceProvisionVerificationResponse message
UDPs Size of a UDP header
Table 4.1: Symbols used on the equations of current section
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SCPmFull =
27 + nhopsr ∗ 16 +MACs + pads
DPkts
(4.5)
SCPmIter =
(27 +MACs + pads) ∗ (nhopsr + 1) +
nhopsr∑
n=0
n ∗ 16
DPkts ∗ (nhopsr + 1)
(4.6)
Equations 4.5 and 4.6 are only true if fragmentation dost not occur. Considering
the initiator is sending a packet size ofMTU and the number of hops (nhopsr) is higher
than 0, more overhead is added. This overhead corresponds to additional IPv6 and
Fragmentation headers. If the packet is only fragmented once (a reasonable assumption
for ad-hoc networks), the overhead can be further stated as in Equation 4.7.
SCPmIterFrag =
25 +MACs + pads +
nhopsr∑
n=0
(n ∗ 16 + IPv6s + IPv6Frags)
DPkts ∗ (nhopsr + 1)
(4.7)
In the SCP report process, a pair of SPVReq and SPVResp messages are ex-
change between the last forwarding node and the destination node. Later SPCReq and
SPCResp messages are exchange between the last forwarding node and the AR. The
process can thus be divided in two phases. The overhead of the reporting process will
be the sum of both phases.
In the first phase the last forwarding node sends a SPCReq to which the receiving
node replies with a SPCResp message. The size of both messages is easy to calculate
because it only varies with the size of the MAC. Typically the last forwarding node is
a neighbour of the receiving node, but this is not always true. If the flow terminated
before the process started and topology changed, nodes could be separated (represented
by nhopsLFNtoRN and nhopsRNtoLFN). The overhead regarding the first phase of the
report process is represented by equation 4.8.
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SCPrep1 =
SPCReqs ∗ (nhopsLFNtoRN + 1) + SPCResps ∗ (nhopsRNtoLFN + 1)
nproofsscp∑
i=1
(DPkti ∗ (nhopsr + 1))
(4.8)
The number of proofs (nproofsscp) which can be reported on a single packet,
depend on the MTU and the size of the MAC. Equation 4.9 determines the value of
this parameter. The values present in the equation represent field of fixed size.
nproofsSCP =
MTU − IPv6s − UDPs − 48− 16 ∗ nhopsr −MACs
21
1 (4.9)
Considering the default MTU in 802.11, no security (MACs = 0) and nhopsr is
lower than 8, nproofsSCP will be 60. The impact of using security will depend on the
size of the key and algorithm. An ECDSA key of 160 bits produces a signature with
40bytes. The maximum number of proofs reported will thus be reduced by 2. Figure
4.4 depicts how the ECDSA key size limits the maximum number of proofs reported.
Figure 4.4: Variation of the number of proofs reported by SCP in relation to the size of the
ECDSA key; assuming a MTU of 1500, MACs of 0 and nhopsr lower than 8.
The second phase of the reporting process occurs when the last forwarding node
sends a SPVReq message to the Access Router. The result will be later transmitted with
a SPVResp message. The first will contain session information and proofs acknowledged
in the first phase. Its size will be approximate to theMTU but, because the granularity
imposed by the size of proofs and session, it could be lower. Each SPVResp message
1
UDPs: Size of an UDP header, MTU : Maximum Transmit Unit (1500 bytes in 802.11)
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has 54 bytes, plus MAC, (considering IPv6 and UDP). The overhead related to the
second phase of the reporting process in stated in equation 4.10.
SCPrep2 =
SPV Reqs ∗ (nhopsLFNtoAR + 1) + SPV Resps ∗ (nhopsLFNtoAR + 1)
nproofsSCP∑
i=i
DPkti ∗ (nhopsr + 1)
(4.10)
The total control overhead of SCP will be the sum of both the marking and the
reporting phases. Because the overhead during the marking phase can be produced by
two different methods of encoding, there are two equations (4.11 and 4.12) representing
the total control overhead produced by SCP.
SCPtotalIter = SCPmarkIter + SCPrep1 + SCPrep2 (4.11)
SCPtotalFull = SCPmarkFull + SCPrep1 + SCPrep2 (4.12)
4.3.2 PACP
In the case of PACP, marking overhead is constant along the route and almost
independent of the packet size or contents. It is not absolutely constant because size
of ECDSA signature can vary with different security levels. The fields composing a
charging header take 46 bytes on each packet, plus MAC and padding (equation 4.13).
PACPmarkFull =
46 +MACs + pads
DPkts
(4.13)
Also, PACP tries to reduce the overhead by eliminating some fields from the
header in the case of a communication between neighbour nodes. Instead of the typical
46 bytes per packet (plus MAC ) each header only takes 26 bytes (also plus MAC
and padding). The fields removed are only those required for identifying forwarding
nodes. All other functionalities are maintained. The overhead of control data in case
of neighbouring nodes is stated in equation 4.14.
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PACPmarkNeigh =
26 +MACs + pads
DPkts
(4.14)
Unlike SCP, PACP reporting phase only considers one phase where the last for-
warding node reports the collected proofs to the Charging Manager. The report message
is then acknowledged thus completing the report phase. Each report comprises of a set
of session information (42 bytes), a list of routes and a list of proofs inside each route.
Each proof is composed by the SeqN , the Xi, a RID, the TrafficClass, and the result
of the HashChain. The PACP proofs are much larger than SCP or SACP proofs. This
will cause the number of proofs reported per Report packet to be smaller. The number
of proofs sent in each report, considering multiple routes per report and the usage of
MAC, is given by equation 4.15 and some results depicted in figure 4.5. The number
of routes in each packet will depend on the available space and proofs in each route.
That is, when a route needs to be reported, all proofs of that route will be included
while there is space in the packet. If, after all proofs are copied, there are still some
free bytes, another route is included. The process repeats until adding another proof
would exceed the MTU . If the session end-points are neighbours, each proof occupies
21 bytes ( Proofs). If this is not the case, each proofs takes 38 bytes.
Figure 4.5: Variation of the number of proofs reported by PACP in relation to the size of the
ECDSA key; assuming a MTU of 1500, MACs of 0 and nhopsr lower than 8.
nproofsPACPFull(Proofs) =
MTU − (IPv6s + UDPs + 42 +MACs + nroutes ∗ 4)
Proofs
(4.15)
The overhead resulting from PACPs’ reporting phase will then be expressed by
the ratio presented in equation 4.16
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PACPreport =
ProofReports ∗ (nhopsLFNtoAR + 1) + ProofReplys ∗ (nhopsARtoLFN + 1)
nproofsPACP∑
i=i
DPkti ∗ (nhopsr + 1)
(4.16)
PACPs’ total overhead will be the sum of the overhead at each phase (equations
4.17 and 4.18). The value will depend on the distance between sender and receiver as
the size of the charging proof will vary.
PACP = PACPmarkNeigh + PACPreport(SmallProofs) (4.17)
PACP = PACPmarkFull + PACPreport(FullProofs) (4.18)
4.3.3 SACP
SACP differs from SCP because it tries to optimise the marking overhead by re-
ducing the need for iterative or full encoding. The route is only sent when there is a
change in the topology or after a determined timeout or number of packets. Overhead
will much depend on the mobility of the network and packet rate. Networks with low
mobility will be much benefited from using SACP. Networks with high mobility will
show to induce high rates of overhead. The definition of low or high mobility, to SACP,
represent networks where route changes faster than the RouteUpdate period (high mo-
bility) or are more stable (low mobility). The typical value for the RouteUpdatePeriod
is 5 seconds. The marking overhead for the static case is represented by equation
4.19. The first ratio corresponds to the PacketProof message while the second to the
RouteUpdate message.
SACPmarkStatic =
26 +MACs + pads
DPkts
+
nhopsr∑
n=0
(1 + 16 ∗ n+ pads)
PacketRate ∗ 5 ∗Dpkts ∗ (nhopsr + 1)
(4.19)
In the dynamic case, it is required to consider that most data packets will contain
a RouteUpdate message and nodes send RouteUpdateRequest (RUR) messages. There
66
Chapter 4: Proposed Solutions
are two probability values which must be considered. First is the probability of a node of
sending a RouteUpdateRequest message (RURprob). Second is the probability of a data
packet to contain a RouteUpdate message (RUprob). In the worst possible case, both
probabilities will be 1, meaning all data packets will contain a RouteUpdate message
and route changes on a packet basis. In the static case, the period between automatic
RouteUpdate messages can also be expressed as a probability (equation 4.20) while the
probability of RUR messages is 0. If no packets are lost, the second probability will be
the sum of all nodes RURprob plus the probability of the RouteUpdatePeriod expiring.
The overhead of SACP in a dynamic scenario is stated in equation 4.21.
RUprobstatic =
1
PacketRate ∗RouteUpdatePeriod
(4.20)
SACPmarkDyn =
(26 +MACs + pads) ∗ (nhopsr + 1) +RUprob ∗
nhopsr∑
n=0
(1 + 16 ∗ n)
DPkts ∗ (nhopsr + 1)
+
nhopsr∑
n=0
(RURprob ∗RouteReqs ∗ n)
Dpkts ∗ (nhopsr + 1)
(4.21)
As in the case of PACP, SACP sends proofs to the operator without any verifi-
cation of the receiving node. The number of proofs is also variable and depends both
on the MTU and the size of the MAC. This value is the same as in SCP and can be
calculated as stated in equation 4.9. The control overhead of SACP due to report of
proofs is stated as equation 4.22.
SACPrep =
ProofReports ∗ (nhopsLFNtoAR + 1) + ProofReplys ∗ (nhopsARtoLFN + 1)
nproofsSACP∑
i=i
DPkti ∗ (nhopsr + 1)
(4.22)
After all phases are correctly represented, it is now simple to state the total
overhead expected from SACP. Equation 4.23 states the overhead in static networks,
while equation 4.24 can be applied to the dynamic case.
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SACPstatic = SACPmarkStatic + SACPreport (4.23)
SACPdyn = SACPmarkDynamic + SACPreport (4.24)
4.3.4 Overhead comparison
With the simplified equations identifying the overhead ratio of each protocol, it
is possible to perform a more detailed analysis of each proposal. If the same scenarios
are considered, it is also possible to compare the expected overhead. Because it was
assumed the network to be reliable (no collisions or packet drops) the results obtained
should be considered as the best case. Using real world equipment and the 802.11
shared medium, overhead can (and will) differ. It is however expected this analysis
is still helpful in providing a rough characterisation of each proposal. Because it is
difficult to characterise all possible scenarios, only 3 are evaluated in this thesis. The
first scenario represents a hotspot where all traffic departs from the access point and
all nodes are directly connected to the AP. Node mobility is considered to be restricted
to link coverage and no multi-hop forwarding is considered. Although this scenario
does not represent a MANET in is true sense, it is the most frequent scenario involving
hotspots using wireless technologies.
The second scenario represents a static network where it is possible to have multi-
hop communications. Nodes are not able to move and routes are static. This scenario
represents a static, multi-hop network such as the internet or an hotspot with no mo-
bility.
The last scenario represents a multi-hop capable network where routes have some
probability of change. In order to facilitate calculations, the number of hops is con-
sidered to be constant. Figure 4.6, figure 4.7 and figure 4.8 represent the 3 scenarios
considered.
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Figure 4.6: Scenario 1 - A typical hotspot with no mobility or multi-hop forwarding
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Figure 4.7: Scenario 2 - An ad-hoc extended hotspot with no mobility but with multi-hop
capabilities
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Figure 4.8: Scenario 3 - An ad-hoc extended hotspot with mobility and multi-hop capabilities
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The values considered for the value of the different variables are expressed in table
4.2. The value of the padding depends on each protocol, scenario and message and is
calculated depending on the other fields. Except where noted, all size values are in
bytes, rates are in kbits and time is represented in seconds.
Variable Value Description
MTU 1500 Maximum Transmit Unit
MACs 40 Size of the MAC (ECDSA 163bits)
IPv6s 40 Size of the IPv6 header
UDPs 8 Size of the UDP header
DPkts 512 Data Packet Size (Payload)
PacketRate 20 Packet Rate (pkts/s)
SCP SPV Req 1479 Size of a SCP SPV Req message
SCP SPV Resp 54 Size of a SCP SPV Resp message
SCP SPCReq 74 Size of a SCP SPCReq message
SCP SPCResp 58 Size of a SCP SPCResp message
PACP ProofReply 58 Size of a PACP ProofReply message
SACP RUReq 68 Size of a SACP RUReq message
SACP RUP 5 Delay between automatic RU messages
(RouteUpdatePeriod)
Scen 1- nhopsr 0 Hops between endpoints
Scen 1- nhopsFNtoAR and
nhopsARtoFN
0 Hops between LFN and AR (and vice versa)
Scen 1- PACP ProofReport 1495 Size of a PACP ProofReport message
Scen 2,3- PACP ProofReport 1464 Size of a PACP ProofReport message
Scen 2,3- nhopsr 7 Hops between flow end points
Scen 2,3- nhopsFNtoAR and
nhopsARtoFN
5 Number of hops between LFN and AR (and vice
versa)
Scen 3- RURprob 0.10 Probability of a route change implying a RUR mes-
sage.
Table 4.2: Values used to calculate overhead in the different scenarios
Values obtained for scenario 1 are depicted in table 4.3. In this scenario only SCP
should present overhead in the reporting process due to the confirmation of proofs.
Other protocols have no overhead (inside the ad-hoc network) related to reporting
as they do not acknowledge reception of proofs. Both PACP and SACP present the
lower values for Marking and Total overhead. These should be the best solutions to
provide charging on the depicted scenario. The difference between resulting overhead
values is 0.59% which can be considered as irrelevant. If a real network was to be
deployed, other factors such as processing requirements or easy of deployment should
be considered before these values of overhead.
Table 4.4 presents the values obtained for scenario 2. Comparing with the first
scenario, control overhead is higher in the second case. This is due to the increase in
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Protocol Marking Reporting Total
SCP Full 12.86% 0.59% 13.45%
SCP Iterative 12.86% 0.59% 13.45%
PACP 12.86% 0.00% 12.86%
SACP 12.86% 0.00% 12.86%
Table 4.3: Expected overhead on Scenario 1
the size of the route and the necessity for report proofs (Last Forwarding Node is not
collocated with Access Router). In contrast with the first scenario, where the different
methods of route encoding supported by SCP produce the same result, in the second
scenario there is some difference. The Iterative encoding is able to reduce in 10% the
overhead produced by SCP with Full route encoding. SCP with full route encoding
is the proposal producing more overhead (36.77%) with a difference of more than 6%
from the most efficient proposal. PACP presents less marking overhead than SCP due
to its polynomial encoding. In contrast, the reporting overhead is higher because of
its higher proof size resulting. The result will be fewer proofs will be sent per report
packet. SACP is the most efficient proposal both at marking and reporting, achieving
an overhead as low as 16.81%. SACP report overhead is similar to the values obtained
for SCP. The difference exists because SACP performs no confirmation of the proofs.
Protocol Marking Reporting Total
SCP Full 32.86% 3.91% 36.77%
SCP Iterative 22.86% 3.91% 26.77%
PACP 16.43% 6.97% 23.40%
SACP 12.96% 3.84% 16.81%
Table 4.4: Expected overhead on Scenario 2
It is noticeable that the increase in the number of forwarding nodes, also increases
the marking overhead of some proposals. Figure 4.9 depicts how the increase influences
the number of control bytes transmitted in-band on data packets. SCP (both Iterative
and Full encoding) grows linearly, making this proposal less suited for networks with
high number of hops. Using SCP on the Internet where the average number of hops
is around 23 [frei98], SCP with Full encoding adds more than 350 bytes (plus MAC )
to each data packet. In ad-hoc networks it is safe to consider the average number of
hops to be much lower, never reaching such values. PACP shows the number of control
bytes per data packet to be almost constant. The only variation existing is between
neighbour and non neighbour flows. SACP is the proposal adding the fewer control
bytes to each packet independently of the number of hops. It grows with the number of
hops, but it does so very slowly never getting higher than PACP for reasonable values.
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Figure 4.9: Variation of marking overhead with the increase on number of hops
Scenario 3 is similar to scenario 2 with some differences; nodes are able to move,
and routes will change with a probability of 10% when a packet is to be forwarded or
sent. In a real environment, such value for mobility can be considered as high. As
presented in table 4.5, only SACP seems to be affected by the mobility. Its values
are almost the double compared with scenario 2. Such variation is explained by the
necessity of sending RouteUpdateRequest messages informing about the route change.
Also, RouteUpdate messages, which will contain the full route, are added to data packets
more often. The result of the two effects will be an higher marking overhead for SACP.
As PACP is immune to the increase in route length, is now the most efficient proposal.
Protocol Marking Reporting Total
SCP Full 32.86% 3.91% 36.77%
SCP Iterative 22.86% 3.91% 26.77%
PACP 16.43% 6.97% 23.40%
SACP 24.67% 3.84% 28.51%
Table 4.5: Expected overhead on Scenario 3
If the probability of the route changing increases, SCP and PACP will remain im-
mune to this change. However, SACP will start generating more overhead associated to
the marking process. Figure 4.10 depicts the expected variation in marking overhead
according to several values for route change probability. As mobility increases SACP
surpasses PACP when route change probability is around 8%, SCP with Iterative en-
coding around 20% and SCP with Full encoding when it is near 40%. As mobility
further increases, so will SACP marking overhead, limiting SACP usability to scenar-
ios with low mobility. Such scenarios would probably also be unusable to applications
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unless they were specially designed for these scenarios. With a 30% probability of a
route changing when a packet is sent or forwarded, even for low number of hops, routes
would be changing on a packet basis. This would result in high routing overhead, high
delay and high percentage of packet drops.
Control Marking Bytes vs Mobility
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Figure 4.10: Variation of marking overhead with the increase of mobility. SACP line has
fluctuations due to padding.
From the results obtained in this analysis, it is clear SACP is the protocol with
better efficiency in slow (or even moderately) moving or static networks. In all scenarios
it was able to always present lower values of overhead. If nodes are able to move, SCP
usage should be carefully evaluated against the expected route change probability. As
the probability increases, SACP will be even more inappropriate and PACP or SCP
will be a better choice. Considering route length, the only proposal not affected by this
issue is PACP.
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4.4 Obtained results
In order to further validate the solutions proposed, a set of simulations were
performed. This simulation work was done using NS-2 [ns2] version 2.27, compiled
using gcc 3.3.6 [gcc] on Linux hosts.
4.4.1 Simulation Modules
Besides implementing the protocols being evaluated (SCP, SACP and PACP), a few
changes had to be made to the simulation environment. The changes envisioned the
possibility of intercepting data packets either received, sent or being forwarded. The
developed module (NSTAP) is installed in the node entry-point (see figure 4.11) acting
as a generic filter intercepting packets and delivering them to any agent registered into
it.
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Figure 4.11: Diagram of an wireless node in NS-2 and the NSTAP module
Upon reception of the packet, the agent (charging protocol) has the opportunity
to process it and issue a verdict. Four possible values for the verdict are possible:
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ACCEPT, DROP, FREE, QUEUE. The first verdict (ACCEPT ) orders the NSTAP
module to let the packet proceed to other agents. Notice the payload of the packet could
have been modified by the agent. The DROP verdict will drop the packet and write
a message to the trace file. The FREE verdict works as the DROP but no message
is added to the logs. This is useful to deal both with packets received and internal
messages. Besides being accepted or dropped, some packets are required to be queued.
The QUEUE verdict issues the NSTAP module to stop processing the packet. Later
the agent is able to reschedule a concrete action to be performed on the packet (receive,
forward, drop...).
Because the internal structure of a node running DSR is slightly different (see
figure 4.12) from a node running AODV, another interception point had to be defined.
This point was set inside DSR just after the route was found and the packet is to be sent
of forwarded. Only DSR and AODV were tested using the NSTAP. Unless the routing
protocol changes the internal structure of wireless nodes, this modules can probably be
used with other protocols.
By using NSTAP, the interceptor agents (charging protocols) will receive more
packets than standard agents. While routing messages (as well as MAC Layer packets)
are filtered out, TCP and IP retransmissions are processed by NSTAP agents. While
using charging agents, this will result in more packets being charged than the ones really
received by application agents. In real world, methods for intercepting packets, such
as IP6Queue (from Linux Netfilter stack), suffer from similar same issues. Because the
charging protocols operate at a network level, (that is: protocols charge and reward
packets in the network, opposed to messages to higher layer services) this situation is
acceptable. Also, forwarding nodes should be rewarded by the packets they actually
forward, even if they are retransmissions since they will spend resources also.
One important aspect when doing simulations is the Random Generator and the
seed used to initialise it. NS2 uses the default seed of 12345. If the seed is not changed,
running several times the same environment would result in similar results. NS-2 Ran-
dom Number generator (MRG32k3a [ecuyer99]), as the majority of generators, provides
the possibility of initialising the seed. One additional feature is the support for inde-
pendent sub-streams. This can be seen as a bi-dimensional generator where the same
seed, will also provide n independent sub-streams of random events. The method used
to generate random values for the various variables was the following. When creating
simulation environments, for each combination of mobility pattern, transport protocol
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Figure 4.12: Diagram of a DSR wireless node in NS-2 and the NSTAP module
and number of flows a random seed is created. At each (n) of the 100 simulation runs of
each scenario, the random number generator is seeded with this value and one generator
is created per variable. Depending on the purpose of the variable, the parameters of the
individual random number generators, such as value interval, average and distribution
were configured. At last, the n sub-stream was selected for each variable. The result
of such method is each variable of the same scenario use the same seed, while each run
uses an independent sub-stream of values. The result would be similar to using the
same stream and different seeds at each run. The described method was used because
it was more adequate according to the way the simulations were structured. Just by
analysing the seed, it was possible to rapidly identify if two simulations were from the
same scenario.
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4.4.2 Simulation Environment
Two set of tests were executed: one using AODV and other using DSR. In both
sets the three proposals (SACP, PACP and SCP) are evaluated. Both DSR and AODV
are evaluated because SCP and SACP perform differently when using DSR or other
non source route based routing protocol, such as AODV.
In order to evaluate the behaviour of the proposals on real environments, it was
created a scenario representing an ad-hoc extended wireless hotspot. In this environ-
ment with 1000x1000 meters, 40 nodes are deployed randomly and one is selected to
be the hotspot gateway. Nodes are able to move following a Random Waypoint Model
with pause time of 0s. Because variations on mobility affect the performance of the
protocols, several simulations were created with different velocity intervals. In each
instance the values for mobility, of each node, were uniformly distributed between 0
and either 1, 5, 10 or 30ms−1. When nodes reach the expected destination, a new
destination is chosen together with the new node speed. An additional scenario was
also simulated where nodes were randomly placed and static.
Traffic generated can be either direct between ad-hoc nodes or from the hotspot
gateway. The number of flows from the outside (gateway) is the triple as the number
of direct flows between nodes. Both TCP and UDP were tested. Flows simulated
FTP (File Transfer Protocol) applications using TCP and the number of total flows
generated on the network vary between 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30. All TCP
options were set at the default, except the ECN mechanism which was activated. In
each experiment, the flows are initiated according to a Poisson process with a mean time
interval between calls of 200/(numberofflows), and each flow has an average duration
exponentially distributed with average 30s. 3 classes of UDP flows were generated on
the network: Constant Bit Rate (CBR) flows representing Audio and Video streams
and on-off exponential (Exp) representing a Variable Bit Rate (VBR) stream. The
characteristics of these UDP flows are summarised in table 4.6. The total number
of UDP flows generated in each run also varied as with TCP. Individual flows were
created until the total number of flows was reached. The generation of UDP flows took
in consideration the probability values expressed in table 4.6.
Each simulation lasted 200s and each run was generated as follows. First a topol-
ogy is generated, which includes placing nodes and creating mobility patterns. Then
a routing protocol is chosen together with the transport protocol (UDP or TCP). For
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Arrival (s) Duration
(s)
Packet Size
(bytes)
Bit Rate
(kbs−1)
ON/OFF
time
Probability Name
15 30 80 48 - 50% Audio
30 60 1000 256 - 25% Video
10 60 512 128 1/1 25% VBR
Table 4.6: Parameters modelling the creation of UDP flows in the simulation environment
each value of number of flows, a connection pattern is then created. The resulting envi-
ronment is them applied to all evaluated proposals, and to a plain reference without any
charging protocol running. This additional run will be useful in identifying the impact
of each proposal. For each combination of mobility speed, routing protocol, transport
protocol and number of flows, 100 independent runs are generated and applied to all
proposals (plus the reference network). The results presented are the average of such
number of runs.
In the following sections it will be analysed the performance of the different pro-
posals using several metrics. Each metric will be analysed by variation of several factors
such as network load, mobility or routing protocol. Network load is an important vari-
able because it reflects how each solutions performs under different traffic patterns
and loads. It will be implemented by increasing the number of flows generated in the
scenario. Mobility is important, because it stresses both the routing protocol and the
charging protocol which must adapt to the new infrastructure. Other aspect is the rout-
ing protocol in use. The different proposals behave differently in AODV or in DSR.
SACP and SCP can use the routing header added by DSR instead of adding a new one.
This will potentially result in lower overhead for SACP and SCP when using DSR. In
opposition, PACP adds its headers independently of the routing protocol, which may
result in higher overhead when using DSR.
4.4.3 Network Performance
As additional data is transmitted on the networks, charging protocols will degrade
the performance of the network. Considering the current scenarios, one parameter
which contributes to indicate the performance is data packet delivery ratio. This ratio
is calculated by the ratio between data packets received on a network with a charging
proposal and the same network without any charging support. Calculating the ratio
between received and sent packets could also be interesting but this method was found
to be better since the influence of other aspects like mobility, number of flows, routing
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and transport protocol is removed. Considering mobility, it is assured it will have some
impact on packet delivery ratio. However, given the same network with same mobility
pattern, it is interesting to analyse how different proposals behave.
Mobility
Mobility affects the delivery ratio of the network, independently of the existence
of charging mechanisms. Higher mobility will undoubtedly stress the routing protocol
generating more routing messages. Also, higher mobility will imply routes will start
to shorten as it will be more difficult to maintain longer routes. Because charging
proposals are affected by the route length, as this value varies, the performance of the
network may also be affected. In very high mobility scenarios, the routing protocol may
start to be replaced by direct delivery. Higher mobility results in higher probability of
nodes reaching in close contact, delivering packets directly or just using a small amount
of hops.
Figure 4.13 depict the variation in the number of hops reported in proofs. These
values are not the real length of routes but the length in reported proofs which may
be slightly different. If the reporting node is closer to the Access Router, proofs will
be delivered easily. In the contrary, if the forwarding node is distant from the Access
Router, it will be more difficult to create a stable route to deliver reports. These proofs
will have less probability of being delivered during the duration of the simulation. If
enough time is given, or the mobility decreases, all proofs will eventually be reported.
According to results presented (refer to figure 4.13) the number of forwarding
nodes rapidly decreases as the mobility increases. TCP is unable to differentiate link
failure from congestion and, independently of the existence of network congestion, mo-
bility will badly degrade performance of TCP [holland02]. Because UDP is a simple
protocol, lacking any adaptation to network conditions, it will achieve higher through-
put. Also it will allow the delivery of data through a higher number of nodes. UDP
packets are only dropped if queues are full and no route to destination exists. TCP
packets are shaped according to TCPs’ congestion control mechanism and rate will
decrease if the delay or loss increase.
PACP is the proposal reporting proofs with fewer number of hops. SACP achieves
slightly higher values while SCP is the proposal reporting longer routes. The reason
why PACP reports lower route length is due to the higher proof size of PACP. Larger
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proofs will require more reports to be issued than SCP and SACP. Because most of
the flows are leaving the Access Router, the ones with shorter lengths will have higher
probability of getting their reports received. On the opposite, flows with longer routes
will require their report packets to be forward by a larger number of nodes and have
a smaller probability of being delivered. The same principle can be applied to all
proposals. This is also one effect contributing to reduce effective route length with the
increase on load in networks with secure charging.
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Figure 4.13: Evolution of the average number of hops in reported proofs. Using (a) 10 TCP
and (b) 10 UDP flows
The impact of mobility on the performance of each proposal is depicted in 4.14.
The results obtained do not try to state the impact of mobility on packet delivery but
the impact of charging proposals with variable mobility. Although relative performance
charts show a pronounced decrease with increasing mobility, this does not states mo-
bility has no impact on packet delivery ratio (actually is quite the opposite). Adding
charging protocols to a network with TCP flows seems to create an almost fixed penalty
of 11%, even without mobility. All proposals achieve similar results with a maximum
difference of only 3% when nodes are moving at 30ms−1. The fixed penalty can be
related to the overhead produced by the additional control data in the network. At
30ms−1 SCP seems to differ from other proposals but it is not clear if this tendency
would be maintained. UDP flows present results slightly different from TCP. The trend
of all proposals is clearly defined, yet, there is a bigger difference between protocols.
PACP achieves between 2 and 4% difference to SACP, with an average ratio of 93.5%.
SACP is the second with an average ratio of 91%. SCP is the proposal with higher im-
pact in performance with a difference varying between 2 and 6% of PACP. As mobility
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increases, PACP and SACP show only a slight increase while SCP increases its packet
delivery ratio by an higher value. This happens because SCP is highly influenced by the
number of hops in the route. The shorter the route, the lesser the overhead resulting
in higher performance. SACP is only slightly influenced showing also a small variation,
while PACP shows a variation of only 1% between a mobility of 1ms−1 and 30ms−1.
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Figure 4.14: Variation of the performance ratio of (a) TCP and (b) UDP flows with the
increase of mobility.
Routing protocol
Figure 4.15 depict the impact of the routing protocol on the performance of dif-
ferent proposals, on a static scenario. Because SACP and SCP behave differently in
AODV and DSR the ratio of received packets vary. The variation is only slightly visible
with TCP flows. UDP flows seem to be depend highly on the routing protocol, showing
higher differences.
PACP shows a slight degradation in performance using DSR over AODV both
with UDP and TCP flows. SACP shows almost the same impact with TCP flows, with
only a small degradation of DSR of AODV. With UDP flows, SACP is able to achieve
a ratio of packets delivered 4% higher, when using DSR. The cause of this difference is
the usage of the route in RouteUpdate messages contained in the DSR header. SCP is
the proposal showing higher dependence on the routing protocol. With TCP, SCP is
able to perform around 3% better while with DSR, the gain reaches 10%. Both with
TCP and UDP, SCP is the proposal with higher performance when using DSR. The
reason of such increase is also the recycling of DSR headers, avoiding the inclusion of
81
Chapter 4: Proposed Solutions
more control data.
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Figure 4.15: Performance ratio of the different proposals over AODV and DSR using (a) TCP
and (b) UDP flows
Network load
The load on the network will influence the performance of the network due to the
additional control data added. This parameter is especially important as the network
becomes congested. In such scenarios, some control packets are lost requiring retrans-
mission. Although retransmissions are required in order to reliably deliver messages to
the destination, it costs bandwidth and affects the delivery of data packets.
Figure 4.16a depicts the impact of each proposal under varying network loads,
when using TCP flows. The penalty of adding these charging proposals is not constant,
showing a small increase with the increase in network load. The difference from a
network with 1 flow and with 30 simultaneous flows is close to 10%. Individual values
of each proposal are very similar showing almost no difference between them. As with
other performance results obtained, UDP shows higher variation than TCP. Figure
4.16b represents the impact of the proposals under load of UDP flows. In contrast
to TCP, proposals present clear differences from each other. PACP is the proposal
showing less impact on performance, followed by SACP and finally SCP. It is also clear
the increasing impact of performance with the increase in network load. This is due to
higher concurrency in accessing the medium which results in retransmission of control
messages.
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Figure 4.16: Performance ratio of the different proposals using (a) TCP and (b) UDP flows
under various values of network load
4.4.4 Control Overhead
Control overhead is defined as the ratio between control bytes and data bytes
received. The fewer bytes are added, the more efficient the proposal. The usage of
signatures in packets is one of the major contributors to overhead, other is the protocol
messages themselves. Because the cryptographic methods are very similar, in order to
further isolate each solution, the usage of cryptographic methods was not simulated.
Because the same amount of overhead would be added to all packets, no discernible dif-
ferentiation would result. Simulating the creation and verification of ECDSA signatures
would only increase the running time of simulations. As with network performance, the
overhead may vary both with mobility, routing protocol and network load.
Mobility
Overhead of the reporting process should be only slightly influenced by mobility.
However, marking, especially in the case of SCP and SACP, will vary with changes in
the route and in its length. The higher the route length, the most overhead should be
added by SACP to all packets. In the same manner, as changes in routes increases,
more additional signalling is required by SACP. This additional signalling is required
in order to notify the sending node of route changes. Also, every time the sending
node detects a change in the route, it will issue a RouteUpdate message inband. SACP
marking overhead is also influenced by the length of the route, increasing linearly with
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the increase in the number of forwarding nodes. As stated previously in section 4.3,
the increase on mobility will reduce the number of forwarding nodes which should be
reflected in both SACP and SCP. The values obtained for marking overhead when
using TCP flows is depicted in figure 4.17. Because PACP always adds the same
amount of control data to all data packets, it presents a horizontal line without major
fluctuations. In static networks, where routes are longer, SCP adds more overhead than
other proposals. With the increase in mobility, the value decreases below PACP due to
the reduction in the length of the route. SACP maintains the overhead almost constant
with also a straight line. It is expected SACP inband overhead to increase together
with mobility. However, because the route length also decreases, this is able to balance
the route length. Results of the same simulation environment using UDP flows ( refer
to figure 4.17 are very different from the ones obtained for TCP. SCP is the proposal
producing most inband overhead under all mobility values. Moreover the value increases
both for SCP and the other proposals. PACP achieves a reduction of 10% over SCP
while SACP is the most efficient solution. In contrary to the results obtained with TCP,
the overhead of PACP and SACP is not independent of the mobility. This is because
of the inexistence of contention mechanisms, more packets are dropped and never reach
the destination. However, control overhead was added to these packets. The more the
network is congested, the more the packets drop and higher the ratio between control
bytes added and data bytes received. Because the NSTAP module accounts for packets
at a lower level than applications, more packets are processed than the ones received
at the application agents.
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Figure 4.17: Inband overhead of the different proposals using (a) TCP and (b) UDP flows
with increasing mobility
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Out of band overhead is produced by the reporting process of all proposals and the
route change notification of SACP. As the mobility increases more routes are created
requiring more report packets to the Access Router. The results obtained for TCP and
UDP are respectively depicted in figures 4.18. Result of TCP are very similar in all
proposals showing a decrease in all solutions. Such decrease is due to the increase in
directly delivered packets. As 2/3 of flows are from the Access Router, when delivered
directly, they will not require any report to be issued inside the ad-hoc network. With
UDP flows, SACP is the protocol producing more overhead maintaining a clear increase
as mobility also increases. Retransmissions of report packets are one contributor to
this increase which affects all proposals. SACP is additionally influenced by mobility
because of the route change notification mechanism. Under high mobility (30ms−1),
PACP is most efficient solution in terms of out of band overhead.
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Figure 4.18: Out of band overhead of the different proposals using (a) TCP and (b) UDP
flows with increasing mobility
Considering the results obtained for inband and out-of-band overhead, figures 4.19
represent the total overhead. When using TCP flows, SACP is the proposal producing
less overhead with a difference less than 2% from PACP (the one producing most
overhead). With UDP flows, the difference between solutions is more clear. PACP is
always the most efficient solution while SCP is the less efficient. It should be noticed
that the difference between them is of almost 10%. This can be claimed to compensate
for the 2% difference of TCP flows, making PACP the most efficient proposal in the
presented situations.
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Total overhead - TCP
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Figure 4.19: Total overhead of the different proposals using (a) TCP and (b) UDP flows with
increasing mobility
Routing protocol
Changing the routing protocol from AODV to DSR will also influence overhead.
SACP and SCP are optimised to source routing protocols while PACP isn’t. It is
thus expected the differences obtained in performance to be related to differences in
overhead as well. The reporting process suffers no influence from using DSR, however
the marking process is slightly different in SACP and SCP.
The results of inband overhead obtained while testing the proposals over AODV
and DSR, with no node mobility, are depicted in figure 4.20. As expected PACP shows
no relevant difference from charging TCP and UDP flows over either DSR or AODV.
The same is not true to the other proposals. With TCP, SACP show a little decrease in
overhead using DSR, while with UDP, the decrease is well pronounced. Such difference
comes from the re-utilisation of DSR headers in RouteUpdate messages. SCP is the
proposals showing the highest benefit from using DSR. As all charging headers are small
size, the overhead is reduced. This does not mean there is no hop list being transmitted
on packets, simply such data is added by DSR and not accounted as charging overhead.
Because of the optimisations performed by SACP and SCP, the total overhead,
including inband and signaling, of these solutions with DSR is always less than with
AODV. The values do not differ much when TCP flows are present. The result for UDP
flows are more differentiated with a clear difference in overhead, especially for SCP.
The reason for TCP showing almost no difference is due to the congestion avoidance
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Figure 4.20: Inband overhead of the different proposals using (a) TCP and (b) UDP using
AODV and DSR
mechanisms. When delivering packets to neighbours, all proposals induce the same
overhead, independently of the routing protocol in use. This is because there is no
necessity of sending the list of hops, which is the only thing optimised by DSR. TCP
congestion avoidance, as shown in the analysis of performance, has the dramatic effect
of much reducing the route length of established flows. TCP packets from flows with
longer routes will suffer higher delay and packet losses thus leading TCP to reduce the
packet rate of the affected flows. With small route lengths, the differences of the several
proposals become smaller, resulting in the variations observed. On the contrary, UDP
does not regulate flows to lower packet rates in order to avoid congestion, allowing for
longer routes and clearer differentiation of each proposal. Also, as the average UDP
packet is much smaller than a TCP packet, the relative impact of the charging protocols
is more perceptible.
Network load
Network load has no direct effect on overhead. All proposals operate in the same
manner whether the network is highly congested or without load. However, adding more
flows to the network makes the available bandwidth scarcer. Packet collisions become
more frequent, both requiring retransmission of TCP and control packets. Retrans-
mission of control messages has the effect of worsening the already congested situation
of the network. The implemented exponential backoff is able to minimise this effect,
however it is impossible to really avoid it.
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Figure 4.21: Total overhead of the different proposals using (a) TCP and (b) UDP using
AODV and DSR
TCP interprets packet drops as a sign that the network is congested and starts
to decrease the packet rate at which packets are sent. Packets of longer flows will have
a higher probability of collide. The result is that the packet rate of longer flows will
severely decrease.
As shown in figure 4.22, the inband overhead of PACP and SACP is almost
constant with the increase in the network load, but not for SCP. The route shortening
effect is also present in this case, apparently lowering the inband overhead of SCP. In
both UDP and TCP flows, SCP always seems to add more inband data to packets than
the competitors.
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Figure 4.22: Inband overhead of the different proposals using (a) TCP and (b) UDP while
increasing the load in the network
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The values for out of band overhead are completely different from the previous.
Besides a small tendency to decrease, overhead with TCP flows shows no substantial
difference between proposals. PACP reporting process is slightly less efficient than
others, which results in values higher than SCP. Even without mobility SACP frequently
sends RouteUpdate messages. Also, fluctuations in the wireless link may force routes to
be rewired by other nodes. Both mechanisms create additional out-of-band overhead,
not found on other proposals. PACP overhead is almost constant and relatively low,
while SCP presents the best results of overhead in relation to network load. However,
as congestion increases, SCP two reporting phases is more vulnerable and may results
in higher overhead figures. This tendency is clearly noticed as the number of flows
increase. For values higher than 15 flows, SCP surpasses PACP in terms of overhead
making PACP more suitable in networks with high congestion. This behaviour does
not mean PACP is really more efficient in reporting (because it isn’t). At this stage,
overhead is not created because in PACP the protocol is caching proofs for later delivery.
Same happens in other proposals, however with less impact. This aspect will be further
discussed in the next section.
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Figure 4.23: Out of band overhead of the different proposals using (a) TCP and (b) UDP
while increasing the load in the network
Adding the values from both graphs, two distinct conclusions are obtained (fig-
ure 4.24). For TCP flows, there is no substantial difference between proposals. The
congestion avoidance mechanisms plays a dominant role in limiting the total network
congestion, also shaping the graphs displayed. UDP flows do not possess this capability
and the impact is more visible. PACP is the most efficient proposal followed by SACP
with just 4% more overhead. SCP becomes the less efficient with a steady difference of
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10% from PACP. Interestingly, the total overhead with UDP seems to follow a tendency
to decrease with the load in the network. This is related to the effective reduction on
route length (this graph only compares completed sessions).
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Figure 4.24: Total overhead of the different proposals using (a) TCP and (b) UDP while
increasing the load in the network
4.4.5 Charging Rate
Charging rate is defined as the ratio between the number of proofs reported suc-
cessfully and the totals packets to be charged. While there is only one definition, it can
be calculated in different forms depending on the business model.
One common method to charge users in IP networks is to charge the receiver
of data. It is assumed the receiver requested information and is consuming a service,
thus it should be charged. According to this business model, the charging rate should
be calculated as the ratio between charged packets and the number of packets really
received.
Other popular method, especially in broadband access, is to charge the sender.
While services made available to the public focus on the downstream capability, oper-
ators are really more concerned about the upstream than downstream usage. This is
one of the reasons why broadband is highly asymmetrical. Most of the common user
generated traffic was on the downlink. Currently P2P communities start to making this
concept inadequate preferring symmetric connections. However, operators are limiting
the availability of symmetric connections only to enterprise environments. Having a
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connection with 2Mbits of downstream bandwidth is relatively cheap while a connec-
tion with 2Mbits of upstream bandwidth is really much more expensive. In some cases
besides limiting the upstream bandwidth to low values, operators also charge packets
sent. According to this business model, users are charged either by the packets sent or
received. The charging rate is defined as the total number of packets charged by the
number of packets sent or received.
In cellular networks, this model is also applied to data packets over GPRS or
UMTS. However, in the same cellular networks, the most common business model states
that the initiator is always the one charged. While in cellular networks with a centralised
management infrastructure this is easy to implement, in distributed packet switched
networks this is more difficult to achieve. The only commonly found method is to use
explicit application signalling and perform charging based on session establishment.
This method is usually only found on VoIP applications.
In a MANET environment the business model poses additional concern. The
network is not under direct control of an operator and may present anomalies. Example
of such anomalies are congestion, unreachable destinations, flapping routes and high
delay.
Congestion is related to the load in the network and its effects are an increase in
packets dropped. Unreachable destinations also result in packets being drop but may
be caused by many different factors. A node malfunctioning, unstable radio medium,
unidirectional routes, interference or mobility are factors causing unreachable destina-
tions. Flapping routes refers to unstable routes temporarily dropping packets and may
also be caused by the previous factors. High delay can be caused by network congestion,
by nodes with low processing capabilities, interferences and many other factors.
When a packet is lost and it was (or was going to be) charged, an error occurred.
If the sender is paying for the packets sent, if a packet is dropped, the sender will
be charged for a service never realised. If the sending node or a forwarding node,
intentionally or because of a malfunction, drops all packets received, nodes would be
depleted of credits without using any service. If the receiver is charged for a packet
received, three things can happen. In the first situation, the packet is dropped before it
reaches an accounting point (the last forwarding node in this case). Such packet is not
charged or rewarded, but some nodes may have spent resources in forwarding it and
will never be rewarded for that. The packet may reach the accounting point and be
dropped before it reaches the receiving node. Actually it can reach the forwarding node
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and be stopped by a firewall or a malfunction. The receiving user would be charged
for the packet, however the message was never really received. Users which forwarded
this packet would be correctly rewarded for the effort. The third case corresponds to a
node receiving a packet correctly and being charged for it. This is the ideal situation.
Such problems exist at some level in all networks. The reason they are relevant in
MANET is because packet losses are not an temporary exception to network behaviour,
but a normal occurrence. During those occurrences the charging process will have some
error associated. The most effective solution to handle this problem would be something
along the lines of SPRITE: all nodes send information to the “bank”, which is then
correlated. As usual, efficiency is very different from effectiveness and the overhead
here required is overkill in wireless links. Because this issue is completely unrelated to
the routing protocol, only the effects of mobility and network load are analysed on this
thesis. The results obtained for charging rate while varying the routing protocol were
obtained but omitted due to their irrelevancy.
Mobility
Mobility affects the efficiency of the charging process because of increasing packet
drops. TCP flows react to the losses and limit the error by limiting packet rate. UDP
flows are more vulnerable to this issue. Other aspect is that as mobility increases, it
may be more difficult to deliver proofs and the charging rate will have a tendency to
drop. This is particularly true for SCP and PACP. The first requires acknowledgement
of the proofs. If the receiving node moves out of reach, proofs will never be able to be
delivered. PACP is less efficient in reporting proofs than SCP and SACP because of
the higher proof size. From the simulations executed, two business models were taken
in consideration: charging sent packets and charging received packets.
Figure 4.25 depicts the results obtained for charging accuracy while varying the
speed of nodes. For the sake of brevity, only the results obtained with TCP while
charging packets received, and UDP while charging packets sent are represented. Re-
sults using TCP flows and charging the sender and UDP flows while charging the
receiver, are extremely similar to figure 4.25a and were omitted. With the increase in
mobility, as expected, the charging rate also changes. Because curves are never higher
than 100%, this means the efficiency of the reporting process if having a huge influence
on this figures. If packets were lost between the last forwarding node and the receiving
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node, the charging rate could rise above 100%. This is also true for UDP traffic and
even TCP when the sender is being charged. TCP limits the error but also makes it
similar from the point of view of both endpoints.
Charging the sender for UDP flows presents very different results. The charging
rate is very low and decreases with the increase in mobility. This is a result of packet
losses before the packets reach the last forwarding node (packets are never charged),
together with congestion making some reports to be also dropped. The first explains
the low values, while congestion accounts for the tendency to decrease presented.
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Figure 4.25: Efficiency of the charging process with increasing mobility. Sub-figure (a) relates
to TCP flows charged to the receiver, while (b) relates to UDP flows charged to the sender.
Network load
The load in the network has the effect of increasing delays and collisions. As
already explained in this section, collisions induce error into the charging process and
should be analysed.
As presented in figure 4.26 the increase in the load is highly related to the accuracy
of the charging process. TCP flows seems to be somewhat unaffected but there is a
clear differentiation between proposals. PACP always achieves lower charging amount
than other proposals. SCP, which was shown to be much affected by mobility, seems
to do not suffer from the increase in load. This is probably due to the close proximity
between the last forwarding node and the receiving node.
Results for UDP are, once again, different from the ones obtained by TCP. If the
operator is charging the receiving node, congestion will increase packet loss resulting in
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the user being charged for more packets than he actually received. The only exception
to this case is PACP which maintain steady, although lower, percentage. For TCP,
PACP showed the charging rate to decrease with network load; for UDP such tendency
is not showing, because it is compensated by packet loss. If enough time would be given
in the simulations to all proposals to report all proofs back, the results of PACP would
be similar to the ones obtained for SACP and SCP.
When the sender is being charged of UDP flows, the results show a huge differ-
ence from the other cases. Many packets are being dropped and never reach the last
forwarding. The error increases with mobility and, even for a network with 1 flow, it
is always much lower than 100%. In a carefully deployed network, it is expected to
exist routes between all nodes, but this was not always the simulation case. Nodes
were deployed randomly, the movement pattern was randomly created and the flow
end-points were also randomly chosen. There are no guaranties that the created flows
can be established resulting in the high values of packet drops.
4.4.6 Rewarding Error
The Rewarding Error is defined as the ratio of incorrectly rewarded (or simply
not rewarded) proofs in function of the total number of proofs received at the AR. This
parameter is not the ratio between the actual proofs rewarded and the total packets
forwarded. Such definition could be used, however its results are strongly related to
the ones observed for Charging Error. Instead, the Rewarding Error analysed is able
to predict the error inherent to some of the implementation choices of the proposals.
SCP charges and rewards all proofs at the same time and the operator always
knows the list of forwarding nodes corresponding to those proofs. In SACP this is
also true, however it is possible the list contains one or more incorrect entries. Such
incoherences exist because when a route changes, packets are forwarded by nodes not
identified in the last RouteUpdate message of that flow. They will issue a RouteUp-
dateRequest but packets will still be allowed to be forwarded for some time. These
packets will be charged correctly, but rewarded to the wrong users. PACP suffers from
the problem that the list of hops can be unknown. If the number of proofs of a flow
is less than the number of hops, there is no possibility for the Charging Manager to
recover the proofs. End-points are identified, and charged according to the business
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Figure 4.26: Variation of error in charging hosts both for (a) TCP and (b) UDP with increasing
load. Sub-figures (a) and (b) relate to flows charged according to the receiver, while (c) and
(d) relate to flows charged according to the sender.
model, however the forwarding nodes are not. The errors of both SACP and PACP are
expected to be highly dependent on the mobility but, even when nodes are moving at
30ms−1, its value should be acceptable by users. As with Charging Rate, the routing
protocol has no discernible influence on the accuracy of the rewarding mechanism, so,
its analysis will not be presented.
Mobility
Mobility is one of the most important variables shaping the Reward Error. As the
velocity of the nodes increase, the error is expected to also increase proportionally. In
SACP this happens because the route changes more frequently which always induces
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some error. In PACP rapid changes in the route can be problematic if the packet rate
is low. Not enough packets are forwarded in each individual route and the Charging
Manager is unable to identify the forwarding nodes. Figure 4.27 depicts the error
obtained for TCP and UDP with increasing node velocity. Both proposals are directly
affected by mobility. SACP error, even without mobility, is higher than PACP and this
difference increases as the mobility increases. The maximum rewarding error obtained
by PACP is below 1.5% and usually stays below 1%. SACP error is much higher,
reaching 3% for a network with nodes moving at 30ms−1. The values obtained are
small in relation to errors affecting the ratio of packets forwarded and rewarded such
as packet loss. It is expected nodes will still cooperate in the forwarding knowing that
only 1% or 3% of the traffic will not be adequately rewarded.
Higher values of error are possible, however, according to the results obtained,
error should not reach values making rewarding unattractive to users. Moreover, net-
works with nodes moving at speeds higher than 30ms−1 (108kmh−1) are only possible
in automotive scenarios which present quite different mobility patterns.
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Figure 4.27: Variation of error in rewarding hosts both for (a) TCP and (b) UDP with
increasing mobility.
Network load
Network load is expected to influence the Rewarding Error because of two factors:
packet loss and delay. Of course, the most efficient proposals is SCP which has no error
related to this aspect.
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Packet loss affects SACP by requiring several RouteUpdateRequest messages to be
sent until one is received successfully. Also, as the load in the network increases, also
does the end-to-end delay. Even if the first message is successfully received, it will take
more time to reach the sending node. During this period, packets are being forwarded
by nodes different from the ones included in the last RouteUpdate message. Because
the congestion increases, TCP will limit the rate of packets to congested flows. Such
flows are first probably the ones with longer routes, and limiting them will decrease the
average number of hops in flows. This issue has a positive effect on Rewarding Error.
The less nodes there are forwarding a packet, the less error is possible to occur. PACP
is affected by this issue, but not from the packet loss, because no additional signalling
is required in case of route changes.
Figure 4.28 depicts the results obtained for TCP and UDP flows in a network with
increasing load. TCP flows react to congestion and reduce the average route length
which has the effect of reducing the error. As depicted, SACP error rate is higher
than PACP, however it also decreases faster finding a common point when there are 20
active TCP flows. The maximum error corresponds to a network with only one flow,
but still, the value obtained is considered to be perfectly acceptable. The behaviour
of the proposals using UDP flows is different from TCP. The route length also become
shorter, as the number of flows increase. However, as the delay increases, SACP will
have difficulty in notifying the sending node about changes and will see its error increase
with the load. Such topology changes are induced by false disconnections resulting from
routing messages being dropped due to collision. Results obtained for PACP show the
error to be very low, staying always below 0.2%. According to network load, both
proposals are affected, however they are affected in different manners. From the two,
PACP seems to be the proposal with better efficiency in identifying the forwarding
nodes.
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Figure 4.28: Variation of error in rewarding hosts both for (a) TCP and (b) UDP in relation
to network load
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PACP implementation evaluation
This chapter describes the experimental work performed with PACP in a labo-
ratory prototype. Besides the prototype NS-2 implementation, PACP was fully im-
plemented. Every detail described in section 4.1 was implemented and the produced
prototype was adopted by the IST-Daidalos project and presented in the Daidalos Ad-
hoc demonstrator [sargento05]. Before the implementation started, the main modules
were modelled using the Specification and Description Language (SDL) [ituz.100]. The
complexity of the implementation was not sufficient to justify applying such methodol-
ogy. However, the developed modules had to be integrated in the Daidalos architecture,
which required clear specification of the interfaces and analysis of the interactions. As
depicted in figure 5.1 the internal structure of both ad-hoc nodes and Access Routers is
not trivial, with many dependencies between modules. PACP plays an important role
in providing charging and rewarding mechanisms integrated with the central AAAC
infrastructure.
5.1 Implementation details
The implementation was developed on a Linux environment using kernel 2.6.8.1.
Extensive tests have been performed using kernels v2.6.3 through v2.6.16. All modules
should also work with a 2.4 kernel, however no tests have been performed using such
kernel. Code was developed using ANSI C/C++ having in consideration issues like
portability between architectures, resource consumption and modularity.
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All modules are implemented as user space daemons. This fastened the devel-
opment and debugging of the implementation making it possible to focus resources
in the optimisation and range of features supported. Ultimately, userspace programs
maintaining a fairly high independence between kernel modifications increase the com-
patibility with further developments and among different systems. Threads were used
where they proved to be necessary or where they could be useful in maximising perfor-
mance and/or efficiency of the protocol. Locking mechanisms were carefully deployed
so that concurrency is optimised and its related penalty reduced.
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Figure 5.1: Internal structure of Daidalos ad-hoc nodes and ad-hoc Access Routers
5.1.1 Netfilter
Kernel changes were required because of limitations on Netfilter code in the Linux
kernel. Netfilter provides an interface called IP6Queue allowing to intercept packets at
different parts of the path inside the kernel. Using Netfilters’ IP6Queue, an application
can listen at inspection points (hooks) intercepting packets. Depending on the origin
and destination, packets will be routed through different hooks making possible to se-
lectively process packets. In combination with iptables rules, it is possible to further
refine the criterion by which packets are sent to applications making this solution very
powerful. When a packet is intercepted (i.e sent to an application), the application is
allowed to fully inspect its payload, and return a verdict. The verdict indicates if the
packet should proceed in the kernel, be dropped or just queued for further process-
ing. Applications can even provide alternative payloads, replacing the original packets’
content. Figure 5.2 depicts the structure of Netfilter with the different hooks where
packets can be intercepted.
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Figure 5.2: Netfilter hooks, tables and chains
PACP places rules intercepting packets at INPUT, OUTPUT and FORWARD.
The INPUT hook is used to capture packets with destination address of the local host.
Here, PACP performs admission control based on verification of the MAC and flow
authorisation. Also it removes the charging header from packets. The OUTPUT hook
is used to intercept packets generated locally and going out to the network. In this
hook, PACP authorises and adds a charging header to packets. The FORWARD hook
is used by PACP to intercept packets crossing the host but which are neither from or
to it. Here, the charging header is updated, flows are authorised, the MAC is verified
(if present) and proofs are collected.
As shown, Netfilter is very resourceful but there is one limitation to the mecha-
nism: only one application can be connected to IP6Queue at the same time. Because
several modules used this same interface, modifications to the IP6Queue interface were
required. The modifications aimed at enabling IP6Queue to support multiple peers
(applications) simultaneously connected to the interface, all issuing verdicts to packets.
The implemented algorithm is simple yet as efficient and effective as required.
First the packet is sent to every application registered according to the order they
connected. If the application issues a verdict ACCEPT, the packet is passed to the
next application. If a QUEUE is issued, the packet remains on that position. If the
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verdict is a DROP, packet is immediately dropped without further processing. Because
packets could be changed by applications, the order by which they register is important.
Although a more efficient method of registration could be used, allowing applications
to specify the priority, that would also require changes to libipq, which was not desired.
5.1.2 Implementation modules
PACP was implemented using C++ and made fully use of the object oriented
model. Most of the classes are shared by the Mobile Node (MN), Access Router (AR)
and Charging Manager (CM). Some others are only present in specific nodes. This
modularity was vital for a rapid and efficient implementation.
Figure 5.3 represents the classes composing a Mobile Node or a Access Router
and the interfaces between them. The main difference between a Mobile Node and a
Access Router is the main protocol logic. Mobile Nodes’ logic is implemented by the
Charging Manager. Access Routers’ logic is implemented by the Internetwork Adapter.
All other classes are the same.
Figure 5.4 represents the classes composing the Charging Manager. This node is
very different from both the AR and the MN. Most of the classes are different and only
packet manipulation, timer management or cryptographic interfaces are shared.
Figure 5.3: Class structure of an Ad-hoc Node (using ChargingAgent) or Access Router (using
InternetworkAdapter)
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Figure 5.4: Class structure of the Charging Manager
KeyManager (All)
The KeyManager class exists in all entities and acts as an abstraction to crypto-
graphic operations using keys. It offers various methods to (de)cipher, sign and verify
messages which are used by all other classes. Also, a repository allows to cache keys
and query them as needed. Other modules are totally unaware of the implemented
cryptographic modules as long as the interface is maintained. This allows for further
improvement of the implementation or test of other cryptographic methods.
PacketHandler (All)
The PacketHandler class is the interface between the network and other PACPs’
classes. It provides methods to get packets from the network, abstracting the actual
source of packet capture. Data packets are captured using IP6Queue while control
packets are transmitted directly between sockets. In both cases, other classes will
receive a Packet object correctly decoded depending of its type. It supports methods
to hold and release packets which were queued until other event happened (such as
authorisation). Sending packets to the network is also performed using PacketHandler.
If there are data packets, it is issued a verdict to the IP6Queue. Otherwise, they are
sent through the control socket.
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Timer (All)
The Timer class is used by almost all classes to schedule events. The events to
be schedule can be either timeouts or packet retransmissions. The first type of events
are used to call functions which should be called after a timeout. Examples of such
methods are key renewal, flow authorisation renewal, or sending proofs. Other type
of events is used to send control packets and insures retransmission of packets with
configurable parameters. Retransmissions are performed until the maximum number of
retransmission is reached or the event is cancelled. Packets to different destinations are
maintained in different queues insuring some level of ordering at the source. If an event
is rescheduled to a later time, all existing events added after it will also be rescheduled.
Maximum resolution of both types of events is limited to 1ms. This results in a good
compromise between timer resolution and performance.
A4CManager (CM)
The A4CManager class handles SessionInitiationRequest messages and tracks reg-
istered nodes. When a SessionInitiationRequest message is received, it decodes the mes-
sage, verifies if the node is able to register the network, activates the charging process.
When these processes are complete, it replies with a SessionInitiationResponse mes-
sage to the requesting address. Verification is performed by consulting the permanent
database and verifying the credentials provided.
ChargingManager (CM)
The Charging Manager class is the main class of the charging manager. It runs the
main logic of the CM by invoking other classes and listening to control packets. When
control packets arrive, they are dispatched to the correct class to further handling.
Database (CM)
The Database class implements an interface to a central repository of user profiles
and accounting data. It is located at the Charging Manager and used by some of its
classes. It provides methods capable of querying values of the database and return
database independent results. This makes possible to change the database backend
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without changing the application. All calls to the database are synchronous. The
current implementation supports only MySQL [mysql] servers located either locally or
on remote hosts. Other possibilities would be the usage of LDAP [sermersheim06] or
Postgres [postgresql] systems. Also, this class could implement methods interacting
with more complex AAAC systems over protocols such as DIAMETER or RADIUS.
FlowManager (CM)
The FlowManager class manages end-to-end sessions (or flows). It exists only
at the Charging Manager and is responsible for processing FlowAuthorisationRequests
and issuing FlowAuthorisationResponses. It uses the key repository to recover nodes’
keys and the local database to verify users’ profiles. The answer will depend on the
profile and current status of both systems. If the source or requesting nodes have no
key registered, it is assumed they are not registered and access will be denied. If any of
the end-points or requesting nodes are not present on the permanent database, profiles
are unable to be verified and access will also be denied.
PolSolver (CM)
The PolSolver class is fed with a set of proofs and calculates the inversion of the
Vandermonde matrix based on the reported RIDi and Xi values. Because these cal-
culations can be expensive, in order to maximise performance, this class communicates
in an asynchronous manner. After the route is decoded, a callback is called in order to
report the result.
ProofManager (CM)
The ProofManager class is instantiated at the Charging Manager and manages
proofs reported by the last forwarding nodes. Proofs are verified and nodes are charged
by this class. When sufficient proofs are gathered, they are sent to the PolSolver class
for offline decomposition. Upon successfully decoding the proofs, the ProofManager
will reward nodes by sending the correct order to the permanent database. After the
first time a route is decoded, the process is only repeated if verification fails, indicating
a possible collision of the RHash.
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ChargingAgent (MN)
The ChargingAgent class is the main class of all mobile nodes. It is responsible
for initiating other classes and processing packets accordingly.
InternetworkAdapter (AR)
The Access Router behaves almost as a normal node sharing almost all the classes.
The exception is the main logic which is different. The InternetworkAdapter class
replaces the ChargingAgent class found at ad-hoc nodes. It is able to interconnect the
ad-hoc network with the infrastructure. Packets entering the ad-hoc cloud require a
charging header to be added. Packets going out of the ad-hoc cloud require the proof to
be collected and the charging header to be removed. Packet with source and destination
inside the ad-hoc network are forwarded normally as if the Access Router as a normal
ad-hoc node.
A4CClient (AR and MN)
The A4CClient exists at the mobile nodes and at the Access Router. It is re-
sponsible for registering the node upon join, and refresh that information. Only when
the A4CClient in a registered stated, data packets are allowed to be forwarded. Other-
wise the are queued, waiting for a registration, and later dropped if no registration is
received or buffers are full.
FlowAttendant (AR and MN)
Each packet sent or forwarded will require some form of authorisation. This
can be done automatically (i.e authorising all packets) of by explicit querying to the
Charging Manager. The FlowAttendant class manages authorisation of flows, issues
FlowAuthorisationRequest messages and handles FlowAuthorisationResponse messages.
Session tokens are cached until they are about to finish. If the flow is active, a renewal
is triggered on the background.
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GWInfoClient (AR and MN)
PACP can be integrated with Jelgers’ [jelger04] solution of gateway mobility. The
class handling this interface is the GWInfoClient. Upon initiation, it connects to the
mobility daemon receiving notifications about the current gateway used. These mes-
sages are used in order to identify the Charging Manager to use and the identification
of the Access Router.
ProofAttendant (AR and MN)
The ProofAttendant class captures proofs from packets and issues Report mes-
sages periodically to the current Charging Manager. When packets are forwarded or
sent and the next hop is the destination hop, proofs are sent to this class. Periodically,
the ProofAttendant verifies the proofs pending submission and issues the proper report.
Also, Report Response messages are sent to the ProofAttendant when received at the
ChargingAgent. Upon reception, the proofs which were marked as being submitted are
finally flushed from the cache. If no answer is received and the Report retransmission
fails, proofs are marked as to be submitted and the process repeats.
RoutingClient (AR and MN)
The RoutingClient class provides methods making possible to query other ser-
vices about the next hop a packet will take. Currently two services are supported:
Plain Kernel and AODV. The first is used in static situations and gathers the re-
quired information using the Linux RTNetlink interface. The second should be used
when AODV-UU (AODV implementation from Upsala University) [aodvuu] is used and
queries the internal routing tables of the daemon directly. Although the first should be
generic enough to be used in all situations, using AODV directly provides additional
performance and eliminates some errors related to how AODV-UU manipulates kernel
routes. In both cases, queries are cached for a configurable period. Using caches makes
necessary to query the routing system less often, decreasing the delay of processing
packets. After a request is issued and until a timeout is reached, the information in the
cache is maintained synchronised with the routing system.
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5.2 Ad-hoc testbed scenario
The implementation of PACP was tested on a IPv6, ad-hoc testbed, hosted at
IT-Aveiro [itav] premises. The integrated ad-hoc testbed is comprised of several Linux
computers runnin Mandrake 10.1. The kernel was not the one provided by Mandrake
but a vanilla 2.6.8.1. Using a vanilla kernel provides higher control over the modules
running and allowed better development of the required changes. All machines have
between 400Mhz and 2.4Ghz CPU, 256Mb RAM, and enough storage space. They do
not reflect typical, resource limited, ad-hoc nodes, but are suited to a test environment
were heterogeneous machines coexist on the same network. All machines are equipped
with 2 network interfaces: one wireless and one wired. The wired interface is used to
provide remote access during the tests and to perform administrative tasks. Also, this
enabled the usage of remote logging to a central point correlating information.
Wireless interfaces were D-Link DWL-650 PCMCIA cards either plugged directly
into the PCMCIA slot of laptops or to PCI-PCMCIA adaptors in nodes lacking such
slots. The chipset of these cards is the well known Prism2.5, developed by Intersil, in
its versions 1.1.0 and 1.7.4 (primary and secondary). All cards were configured in ad-
hoc mode using channel 12, rate was fixed to 2Mbits and RTS/CTS was enabled with
threshold of 1 byte. The surrounding environment, as in most research facilities dealing
with 802.11 technologies, was crowded with wireless networks. In order to reduce the
external influences, most of the tests were performed without traffic in the building
(weekends), and in some cases, with the nearby access points powered off.
One of the nodes is used to interconnect the ad-hoc cloud with the infrastructure
network (acting as a Access Router), and here the wired interface will also be used
to transfer data between the ad-hoc and infrastructure networks. The infrastructure
network was a prototype of an operator manager network as envisioned by the Daida-
los project. The entire Daidalos testbed is comprised of several tens of equipments
providing functionalities such as AAAC, PKI, routing, MobileIP Home Agents, DNS,
several application servers and over ten access networks each providing different access
technology. The ad-hoc testbed represented two of the access networks.
Figure 5.5 depicts relevant nodes of the ad-hoc prototype. In the ad-hoc net-
work, routing was provided by AODV while in the infrastructure RIP [hedrick88] was
used. Because AODV only provide routing inside the ad-hoc cloud, an implementa-
tion of [jelger04], developed on the Daidalos project, provided auto-configuration and
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connectivity to the outside of the could.
Figure 5.5: Representation of the integrated ad-hoc network testbed.
Because it is difficult to reproduce with precision high speed mobility of nodes
(especially inside a research facility), mobility was not evaluated in the testbed. Such
results were already extensively discussed the previous section. The nodes have been
physically deployed inside a roughly square building with around 36x36m, and normal
office/lab divisions. Figure 5.6 depicts the IT-Aveiro building and the location of the
ad-hoc testbed.
Figure 5.6: Map of IT-Aveiro and the location of the ad-hoc testbed. Nodes were distributed
inside that room.
Since there is not enough physical space to create the desired topology without
nodes interfering with each other, the MACKILL [mackill] tool was used to perform
filtering (in kernel), based on the source MAC address, ensuring a logical string topol-
ogy. MACKILL had to be adapted to the kernel version in use during the course of this
thesis. Because MACKILL operates at the MAC layer, although no IP messages can
be transmitted between nodes configured to appear as non neighbours, at the physical
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level there are still interferences. The result is that throughput values measured will be
lower than the maximum values achievable on a non-emulated topology. Because the
focus of these experiments is to evaluate the impact of PACP, opposed to the through-
put of the 802.11 medium, this situation was found to be acceptable. Moreover, further
experiments revealed the difference in throughput to be minimal.
Experiments were performed either using MGEN [mgen] generating CBR UDP
traffic, and IPerf [iperf] for TCP throughput analysis. The destination for the traffic was
always the Access Router while the sender was iterated through the ad-hoc nodes, de-
pending on the parameter being tested. Tcpdump [tcpdump] andWireshark [wireshark]
were required in order to intercept messages at various points, further processing the
results at a central node. In all situations, TRPR [trpr] was used to analyse the cap-
tures originating both from tcpdump and MGEN, and provide graphs and summary
results. LabPlot [labplot] provide far more data analysis capabilities than traditional
tools and was used to generate some of the charts.
5.3 Delay
5.3.1 Registration
When a node joins a network, it must register with the local Charging Manager.
In this process, node is authenticated, public key is stored at the Charging Manager
and a shared secret is exchanged. Because the registration process is only performed
upon join of a network, or to refresh keys, its duration is not critical. However, if more
complex scenarios are envisioned, where Fast Handover [mccann05] mechanisms exist,
this delay should be studied.
Figure 5.7 depicts the 6 nodes registering with the Charging Manager. The delay
between individual SessionInitiationRequests is not meaningful as nodes were launched
manually. As depicted, the registration delay varies between 5 and 36ms. Such variation
is due to the delay in processing the SessionInitiationRequest, fetching and storing data
in the MySQL database. Also, to these values should be added the processing delay at
the receiving node. In reality, although the SessionInitiationResponse is received, only
after verifying theMAC and decoding the packet, the registration is complete. Typical,
3 to 5ms should be added, corresponding to ECDSA signature verification. Analysing
only this values shows PACP is able to provide very reduced registration delays. From
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the results obtained, reasonable delay can be added, especially because the backend
databases will get slower as the number of clients increase. Fast Handover situations
could suffer from this additional delay, especially if other mechanisms are also to be
supported in conjunction with PACP.
Figure 5.7: Packet capture showing the 6 nodes registering with the Charging Manager. Times
are indicated as delay since last packet and not absolute.
5.3.2 Session establishment
Each time a session is established, if the node is unknown to the network, the
session must be authorised by issuing a PACP FlowAuthorisationRequest message. This
message is sent by the originator and by all forwarding nodes. The Charging Manager
consults the database and verifies if the flow should be accepted or not. In this case the
authentication data is stored using a MySQL database. The delay associated to the
response from the Charging Manager, besides signature verification and generation, is
highly influenced by the backend database.
Figure 5.8: Packet capture showing the 6 nodes asking for permission to forward a flow
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Figure 5.8 shows a screenshot of Wireshark with the sequence of FlowAuthorisa-
tionRequest and FlowAuthorisationResponse. Node5 is starting to send a flow towards
the Access Router and, as the first packet is routed, nodes start asking for authorisation.
The entire process of session establishment takes 268ms after which the packets are free
to flow until the authorisation token expires. In average, the Charging Manager takes
7ms to verify process the request, consult the database and issue a reply. Large delays
between requests are visible, especially from Node5 and Node4. This happens because
a number of routes are requested to AODV. As an example, the first request received
is sent before there is a route to the destination or even AODV is aware of the packet.
In a scenario using static routes or a proactive routing protocol this value is expected
to be smaller. In the optimal case it will be the sum of round-trip delay between the
requesting node and the Charging, plus the processing delays at the Charging Manager
and requesting node.
After inspecting the token received in the FlowAuthorisationResponse, nodes
much schedule a renewal of the token. The renewal should be scheduled to some time
before real expiration. Otherwise flow would be blocked for the period of the request.
As this operation is performed independently of the data packets, the impact is reduced.
However because nodes only have 1 processor, while the FlowAuthorisationResponse is
being processed, data packets are delayed. The delay introduced corresponds to packet
decoding and more importantly, to verification of the MAC. Figure 5.9 shows the im-
pact of a renewal, occurred at t=100s, to packet delay. As it is clear, other factors such
as buffers or medium access contention, are introduce more variations than the renewal
process.
5.3.3 End to end delay
End-to-end delay is of vital importance to be analysed. Applications dealing
with bulk traffic such as HTTP browsers, email clients or ftp applications can operate
with relatively high delay. Some streaming and real-time applications can also deal with
delay. However, other applications generating interactive real-time traffic, such as VoIP
or Video conferencing are not that tolerant. According to [itug.107] delay should be
maintained below 150ms as users are usually not able to detect such low delay. Higher
values can start affecting conversation, making real-time interactive services unusable.
In the current software implementation, delay can be added from four sources:
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Figure 5.9: 256Kbit traffic from Node2 to the Access Router. Node1 is forwarding and issues
a renewal at t=100s.
IP6Queue, PACP processing, Routing Protocol Query and cryptography. The total
delay applied to packets will also be conditioned by available CPU resources or wireless
medium access. In this case the CPU was idle and no other traffic was present.
Table 5.1 depicts the typical values obtained by the four delay sources. IP6Queue
adds a fixed amount of delay to each packet due to transport between kernel space to
userspace (and vice-versa). Internal processing by PACP adds almost the same amount
of delay, both in the range of micro-seconds. Consulting the routing protocol is needed
in order to verify if the next hop is the destination node. This query is performed
periodically and asynchronously not impacting directly packet delay. Although this
verification, as well as IP6Queue, are almost meaningful, they may both be penalised
by context switching, adding a multiple of the context switch granularity to the delay.
In the kernels used, this penalty was 1ms and will vary with kernel compilation flags.
Still, if there is no previous information about a destination, the packet will have to
wait for an answer before it is sent or forwarded.
In the case cryptography is enabled (generation of MAC ), the sending node will
create an ECDSA signature per packet. The forwarding nodes will perform a ECDSA
verification operation. According to the values obtained with a 163 bit ECDSA key,
using such methods will pose major restrictions to protocol operation. In the first
place, it is expected each node to add +2.4ms to each packet upon forwarding. This will
113
Chapter 5: PACP implementation evaluation
increase the delay deterministically along the route. Because these values were obtained
using a synthetic benchmark and CPU was idle, in real world values are expected to
be even higher. Even considering 3ms per hop, still 40+ hops are possible without
reaching the 150ms delay limit. Other aspect is that in busy networks, verifying packet
signature will consume large amounts of CPU and battery. It is not clear whether nodes
will simple accept all packets in order be able to gain responsiveness and battery. One
option is to use lower key sizes or dedicated hardware. Finally node that the maximum
packet rate will be limited by the less capable node along the path. This aspect will be
discussed on the next section.
Source Added delay
IP6Queue 51 µs
PACP Processing 43 µs
Routing Query 1.5 ms
ECDSA verification 2.4 ms
ECDSA sign 0.5 ms
Table 5.1: Processing times obtained on a Athlon XP-M 1800+ (1533Mhz), ECDSA
secp160r1, linux kernel 2.6.17, Openssl v0.9.8a
The results obtained for delay and jitter are presented in table 5.2. In order to
synchronise machines, NTP [mills92] was used. During the course of the experiments,
error was always less than 1ms between end-points. Values show that PACP in reality
introduces little delay. Because machines do not have exactly the same resource ca-
pabilities the delay does not increases linearly. After 4 hops, there is a 8ms difference
between a plain network and a network with PACP. Clearly context switching penalty
is increasing the delay at each hop. The average delay introduced by this configura-
tion is, in average, 8ms
6
= 1.3(3)ms. The denominator of the equation is 6 and not 4
because the sending and receiving nodes also process the packet and add delay. When
adding message authentication and verification, the delay greatly increases. In the same
scenario, after 4 hops, the additional delay is 30ms. There is 1 sign operation plus 5
signature verifications being performed, per packet. In the same Athlon XP-M 1800+
this would add 5 ∗ 2.4 + 0.5 = 13ms. Such difference is verified because no machine in
the testbed has such processing capabilities which greatly increases the delay.
Even with these low cost machines and 4 intermediate hops, the results show
VoIP calls are still possible to be performed without audible degradation to users. The
average delay introduced by using PACP with MAC generation and verification, in this
testbed, is 30ms
6
= 5ms. If every hop introduces such delay, 30 hops would be needed
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for the delay to reach 150ms.
Delay (ms) 1hop 2hop 3hop 4hop 5hop
Plain 4.47 9.06 13.97 19.58 23.62
PACP no Sec 6.27 9.15 14.92 23.28 31.71
PACP w/Sec 10.04 18.20 26.74 35.77 53.62
Jitter 1hop 2hop 3hop 4hop 5hop
Plain 0.56 1.26 1.25 2.21 1.45
PACP no Sec 0.47 0.50 0.50 1.16 1.26
PACP w/Sec 0.50 1.00 1.02 1.43 1.34
Table 5.2: Delay and Jitter obtained for several numbers of forwarding nodes. Obtained with
traffic UDP 64kbits CBR. Values are in milliseconds.
VoIP flows are also very sensitive to jitter. Jitter measurements are defined in
[schulzrinne03] and can be summed as the variation in delay. Queuing, delays accessing
the medium and variation in the processing of packets are some of the sources of jitter.
Typically values under 80ms can be corrected easily using a jitter buffer. Higher values
will be more difficult to correct without adding too much delay. Because the network
was only lightly loaded, and processing times are constant, jitter suffers no apparent
variation maintaining values between 1 and 2 ms.
5.4 Overhead
The control traffic by the control protocol (overhead) has a negative impact on the
bandwidth resources. The less overhead is introduced, the most bandwidth is available
to transport user data.
PACP has several mechanisms adding control traffic to the network: registration,
flow authorisation, marking and reporting. Registration is performed at node login and
consists of two messages not having a big impact on overhead. Flow authorisation is
only relevant with many nodes or flows. Even in such situations, it is only performed
once per flow. The marking process differs from the previous mechanisms by constantly
adding control data into the network. All data packets sent will be added a charging
header with, at least 48 bytes. To this value, it should be added the size of the MAC
which, for an ECDSA 163bits, results in 88 bytes. As the packet rate increases, so
will the control data added inband to packets. Variations in the size of the packets
will have no impact on the size of the header. Applications producing small packets
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(VoIP) will be responsible for a big increase in the ratio between control and user data.
Typically, considering that the size of VoIP packets vary between 64 and 128 bytes,
PACP will add close to 100% of overhead. Reporting overhead consists of one packet
which is sent by the last forwarding nodes toward the Access Router which replies with
an acknowledge. This process is repeated at each n data packets, in which n typically
is equal to 36 (MTU = 1500 and MAC = 40bytes). Table 5.3 depicts the overhead of
each process considering several flows from Node5 to the Access Router.
Packet Rate 16 31 62
Registration 0.11% 0.06% 0.04%
Authorisation 0.09% 0.04% 0.03%
Marking 9.37% 17.18% 9.37% 17.18% 9.36% 17.18%
Reporting 8.07% 8.07% 8.08%
Total 17.64% 25.45% 17.56% 25.35% 17.51% 25.33%
Packet Size 256 512 1024
Registration 0.2% 0.06% 0.05%
Authorisation 0.15% 0.04% 0.04%
Marking 18.75% 34.37% 9.37% 17.18% 4.68% 8.59%
Reporting 15.84% 8.07% 4.01%
Total 34.94% 50.56% 17.56% 25.35% 8.78% 12.69%
no MAC w/ MAC no MAC w/ MAC no MAC w/ MAC
Table 5.3: Overhead of each process measured for different packet rates. First sub-table
depicts results obtained with constant packet size (512bytes) and variable packet rate. Second
sub-table packet size varied (256, 512, 1024) and packet rate was maintained (31pkts−1).
Clearly, marking, together with reporting mechanisms, are the principal contrib-
utors to control overhead. Without usage of ECDSA signatures, overhead of both
marking and reporting is similar. Including a MAC in all packets almost doubles the
marking overhead. As expected, these mechanisms produce the same amount of control
bytes as the packet size varies.
Bulk transfers with large packets will surely produce less relative overhead than
real-time applications such as VoIP. Registration and authorisation are almost irrelevant
in all situations, and as the number of packets transmitted increases, their impact
decreases. Except for the marking process, others’ are not influenced by the usage of
ECDSA MAC as all control messages are obliged to contain a MAC.
Table 5.4 depicts the values of control overhead using a TCP application. First
column represent a standard scenario where TCP flows are charged as other types
of traffic. In this case, the marking reporting processes, as in the UDP tests, are
the mechanisms adding most of the overhead. Other important factor is the usage
of ECDSA to authenticate packets which adds between 3 to 5% of overhead. Other
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Mode With TCP/ACK Without TCP/ACK
Registration 0.02% 0.02%
Authorisation 0.01% 0.01%
Marking 5.7% 11.0% 3.2% 6.6%
Reporting 5.3% 5.8%
Total 11.03% 16.33% 9.03% 12.43%
no MAC w/ MAC no MAC w/ MAC
Table 5.4: Overhead of each process measured for TCP. Considered both the cases where
ACK packets are charged and where they are free. Also evaluated the usage of ECDSA MAC
on charging headers (ECDSA 163bits)
aspect described is the possibility to forward TCP ACK packets, without payload, for
free. These packets are sent into the network as a user is consuming a TCP service.
However they carry no actual data. They are very small, consisting only of an IPv6
header followed by a TCP header with the ACK flag to 1. Charging such packets
normally would almost double its size when the actual data was already charged. There
could be the possibility to forward TCP ACK packets without any manipulation, in
order to reduce the control overhead. The results show (please refer to table 5.4) this
optimisation is able to reduce control overhead by almost 5%. The same method could
be applied to other types of traffic, namely control flows of VoIP applications. Should
be noticed this optimisation is only reasonable if TCP flows are unidirectional, i.e. TCP
ACK packets have no payload. If they carry data, they should be charged normally.
5.5 Maximum throughput
The maximum throughput achievable by PACP will be affected by several factors.
First, the overhead introduced in the network in-band in each packet will reduce the
bandwidth available to application data. Then, reporting proofs, authorising flows
and registration packets, will introduce additional control data, also reducing available
bandwidth. Last, the delay introduced will limit the number of packets per second
transmitted, resulting in a limitation of the throughput. First two factors reduce the
available bandwidth directly by introducing additional information in the network.
TCP because it creates two flows of packets will produce more overhead and will be
penalised in terms of throughput. One flow carries actual data while the other is used
to send the TCP lacknowledgements.
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The results obtained for control overhead are described on section 5.4. One impor-
tant value is the limitation imposed by delay. Because nodes only have one processor,
the must process packets sequentially. If packets arrive faster than they are processed,
the will be queued and even dropped. PACP implementation queue size is limited to
the internal IP6Queue queue size which, by default, is of 1024 packets. After the queue
is full, IP6Queue will automatically start dropping packets.
Internal processing by PACP, using AODV, is demonstrated (see table 5.2) to, in
average, be situated around 1.5ms. The best possible value is the sum of IP6Queue
delay and the processing delay, which equals, 100µs. This value is however difficult
to maintain due to context switching and locking mechanisms. Without authenticat-
ing packets, this delay will be the service time of each packet to be served at each
node. Considering authenticating packets, delays will be situated between 2 and 5ms,
depending on node capabilities, otherwise will be between 100µs and 1.5ms. The max-
imum packet rates are calculated by u = 1
serviceT ime
. Considering the presented delays
and various packet sizes observable in 802.11 networks, table 5.5 depicts the maximum
theoretical throughput values observable. Without usage of data authentication, the
maximum throughput exceeds current 802.11 throughput and even surpasses 100Mbits.
As the delay increases, the throughput decreases rapidly. Service times of 1.5, 2 and
5ms, set the throughput to values which start to be less than 802.11 medium bandwidth.
Applications generating many small packets, such as VoIP, are able to be supported.
However the total number of such applications simultaneously using the same nodes to
forward packets will be limited.
Delay 100µs 1.5ms 2ms 5ms
Packet Rate 10000 666 500 250
Throughput (48 Bytes/pkt) 3,8Mb 256Kb 192Kb 96Kb
Throughput (512 Bytes/pkt) 41Mb 2.7Mb 2Mb 1Mb
Throughput (1500 Bytes/pkt) 120Mb 8Mb 6Mb 3Mb
Table 5.5: Maximum throughput calculated for various packet sizes and rates.
On multi-hop wireless networks, the major impact on throughput will not be the
charging protocol but contention in accessing the wireless medium. As the number of
hops increase, the maximum throughput will decrease [sargento06]. TCP and UDP will
suffer differently, first because of TCPs’ congestion avoidance mechanisms and because
it creates more transport overhead than UDP. TCP headers are larger than UDP and
it uses acknowledgement messages. The overhead introduced to packets will sum its
effects with the access penalty much limiting the maximum throughput of the network.
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Table 5.6 depicts the results obtained by sending TCP and UDP flows to the access
router from the different nodes. UDP throughput is determined as the average data
rate received while no packet loss occurs.
Hops 1 2 3 4 5
Transport Proto TCP UDP TCP UDP TCP UDP TCP UDP TCP UDP
Plain 1400 1571 588 681 378 427 246 279 216 246
PACP no ECDSA 1310 1526 549 643 355 407 235 267 204 237
PACP w/ECDSA 1260 1487 528 623 344 385 226 254 192 215
Table 5.6: Maximum throughput measured for various number of hops. Values are in kb/s
The maximum throughput is observed in directly connected nodes, achieving
1.6Mbps of available bandwidth. These values are close to the 2Mbps configured at
the wireless medium. It is clear the limitation in throughput as the number of hops
increase. At 5 hops, the maximum throughput is, in average, reduced to 16% of the
original value and 11% of medium bandwidth. This is due to contention in accessing
the medium, already studied in several other publications [sargento06] [holland02]. In
all situations TCP proved to provide about 10% less throughput than UDP, which was
expected. Adding PACP to the network also introduces some penalty to throughput.
The observed penalty is 3.9% in UDP and 6.2% in TCP being directly related to over-
head. These values are directly related to overhead as the throughput penalty is of the
same order as the overhead. When PACP is adding and verifying MAC fields in data
packets, overhead and delay will much increase, decreasing throughput. The degra-
dation of using PACP with ECDSA verification (163bits keys) is, in average, 9.9% to
TCP and 7.2% to UDP.
5.6 Charging process
The charging process of PACP cannot be easily evaluated on a testbed with
the described resources. Analysing the proofs reported, during the tests performed
in the previous sections, reveals perfect behaviour. Because nodes do not move and
the topology is somewhat fixed, there is no error introduced and the charging rate is
always 100%. The only situation producing any anomaly is when network load increases
causing the charging rate to decrease due to packet losses. This issue is however much
better analysed on a simulation environment where mobility can exist, load can be
shaped and topology changed dynamically.
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In order to validate the implementation, the ratio of charging proofs reported
versus the number of packets received was measured for two different load situations.
In both cases an UDP flow was sent from the Access Router to the last node of the
topology (node5). Packet rate was constant to 32 packets per second, the packet size
was either of 256 or 1024 bytes and flows lasted for 300s. PACP was adding and
verifying MAC both on data and control packets and enough time was given in order
for PACP to report all proofs. Such values result in flows with either 64kbits or 256kbits
of bandwidth. As presented in table 5.6, 256kbits is more than the throughput available
at with five hops. Moreover, the overhead of the charging protocol will further reduce
the available bandwidth. The result of such constrains will be a divergence between
the data received and the data reported due to packet loss, before the receiving node.
Table 5.7 represents the values obtained in the described test. When the network
is not congested, PACP is able to charge every packet received by the destination
node and there is no charging error. As the bitrate increases, the link becomes more
congested and some packets start to be dropped. According to the values obtained in
5.6, packets will be lost both before the last forwarding node and before the destination
node. On both cases, the network has no available bandwidth to route the requested
256kbits. The Last Forwarding Node will thus report less packets than sent, but more
important, it will report more packets than received. The total error corresponds to
the percentage of packets lost in the last hop.
Packet Size
(bytes)
Bytes
Received
Packets
Received
Bytes
Reported
Packets
Reported
Charging
Rate
256 2457856 9601 2457856 9601 100%
1024 8780800 8574 9363456 9144 107%
Table 5.7: Comparison between the data received and reported in a 6 node string scenario
using UDP flows.
One particularity about the encoding method used by PACP is the higher com-
plexity to both encode and decode the route. This issue is dependent on the hardware
and can be tested using the real implementation. Testing the performance in simulation
environment is somewhat difficult because processing time is not real. Moreover, the
load of the machine is being altered by the simulator. In order to test the performance of
the charging process, both the encoding and the decoding processes were benchmarked.
The benchmark program was divided in two blocks: encoding and decoding.
The encoding block generates 255 random host identities (IPv6 addresses) gen-
erated and stores them in a array; then a value r was iterated between 1 and the
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maximum route length possible (255); for each route length, r + 1 proofs were gener-
ated and forwarded across r of the generated hosts. The resulting values are the same
as if the packet was routed in the real environment with the operations used. In order
to better measure the delay between operations, the forward process was repeated t
times (typically t = 10000). The total duration of these operations was measured and
used to calculate the delay of each encoding.
The decoding block receives the proofs previously encoded and performs the de-
coding as the Charging Manager would perform. As with the forwarding process, proofs
are decoded a few thousand of times in order to better measure the delay. Measuring
delays in a multitasking environment is not easy, particularly the time resolution is only
of 1 or 2 milliseconds using standard libraries.
Tests were performed on an Athlon XP-M 1800+ laptop with power management
software disabled and no other service running. Figure 5.10 depicts the results obtained
for decoding 10000 proofs, recovering the encoded addresses. The encoding process is
not depicted because its impact is negligible. In reality, encoding is implemented as
only 16 multiplications and additions consuming only a few instructions per packet for-
warded. The decoding process is more complex than the encoding, however, as shown,
it does not require significant amount of processing. Even if the route length is of 250
hops, when decoding 250 proofs and identifying the forwarding nodes, only 170µs are re-
quired. These results make possible real-time decoding of the proofs and identification
of the forwarding nodes, even on low resource equipments. Particularly, considering
that the average route length in MANETs is considerable shorter, the decoding process
will be comparable to calculating a simple digest such as MD5 or SHA-1.
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Figure 5.10: Time consumed when decoding proofs 10000 times for various route lengths.
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Conclusions
Self-organised ad-hoc networks are of much importance on future networks. The
complexity of the systems requires higher coordination much beyond the possibilities of
centralised networks. Ad-hoc networks are of vital importance to the new ubiquitous
networks where network access is available anywhere. In such networks equipments
interact with others in the neighbourhood and cooperate in order to provide access
and share resources. Connectivity and routing are already thoroughly addressed with
many proposals already at a stable state. Using the routing proposals existing, many
other, higher layer solutions, are already developed covering other aspects like auto-
configurations, service discovery, QoS and security.
Enforcing a good behaviour of nodes is fundamental to the correct function of the
ad-hoc network. Without proper behaviour, application of self-organised networks is
severely compromised. In heterogeneous scenarios, where the resources nodes and req-
uisites of each user are very different, conflict of interest is provable and active enforce-
ment is easily required. Many solutions are already able to provide proper monitoring
of node behaviour, acting accordingly when detecting suspicious events. Other solu-
tions enforce proper utilisation by means of credit exchange. Either performed directly
between nodes or using a central bank, credit based solutions make use of common
incentives (credit) to both control the usage of the network and promote forwarding.
Solutions considering the usage of a central bank have the advantage of making possi-
ble to integrated ad-hoc network on, commercially driven infrastructure networks with
wireless hotspots.
This thesis developed two protocols for secure charging in ad-hoc extended hotspot
scenarios. They are able of providing efficient yet secure charging mechanisms in op-
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erator driven scenarios. Interface with a central credit clearance system is envisioned.
Also, integration with user profiles specifying either QoS or service based restrictions
is supported. Forwarding nodes are rewarded for the packets they forward. The possi-
bility of crediting or charging users based on the packet size, service port QoS class or
time is provided. This makes it possible to create products, providing ad-hoc network
access, with much granularity.
The solutions presented and analysed on this thesis proved to be capable of effi-
ciently integrating ad-hoc networks in infrastructure based environments. The solutions
developed also proved to improve the current state-of-the-art with better management
capabilities, performance and reduced overhead. This was proved using an analytical
analysis, extensive simulation and, in the case of PACP, a real world implementation.
PACP was adopted as the charging and rewarding solution in the Daidalos project, fur-
ther enhanced the requisites of the solution and its implementation. PACP was further
tested in the Daidalos testbed.
Overall, results show that the different proposals do not present equal perfor-
mance. In all results, UDP flows present more variation than TCP flows. The relative
packet delivery ratio is influenced by mobility, network load and the routing protocol.
All proposals introduce some penalty to throughput which, in the scenarios simulated,
is never less than 11%. Using AODV, PACP presented the best (and more stable)
results, while SCP the worst. When using DSR, because of the optimizations present
in SCP and SACP, they provide slightly better throughput than PACP. One issue to
consider is that increasing the route length or mobility has a negative effect on SACP
and SCP performance while PACP is more resilient.
Overhead is much affected by the parameters analysed, in particular the routing
protocol and node movement velocity. Network load seems to only marginally affect
the resulting charging overhead. Mobility affects overhead in two different manners:
more control messages and reduced session end-to-end length. SACP needs to send
more RouteUpdate messages as mobility increases while reducing the session length will
require less nodes to be reported. The second effect affects all proposals by decreasing
the produced overhead and is dominant over the first. In terms of overhead and using
AODV, PACP is the most efficient proposal followed by SACP. SCP is the proposal
presenting higher overhead values when using AODV. DSR apparently reduces the
charging overhead of both SACP and SCP. However, the information previously added
by these proposals is still added to packets. As it is added by DSR and not by the
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charging protocol, it is not accounted as charging overhead but routing overhead.
One of the primary functionalities of the protocols evaluated is to charge network
traffic. Charging can be done to the sender or to the receiver and both possibilities
are supported by these proposals. Because proofs are gathered at the last forwarding
node, the efficiency is different when charging the sender or the receiver. The charging
error is always higher when charging the sender and much aggravated when using UDP
flows. Using such combination, as the network load increases, only a fraction of the
packets sent will be charged. With the same load and mobility, the receiver is accurately
charged. Other aspect affecting the charging error is mobility. As mobility increases,
the charging rate of SCP and PACP decreases. In SCP this is due to the need of proof
acknowledgement. In PACP this is the result of slighly lower number of proofs reported
in each report message.
All packets charged are also able to be rewarded, and SCP is actually able to
always preform both. In some situations PACP and SACP are unable to reward users
accurately. PACP is sometimes unable to identify the forwarding nodes, while SACP
can credit a small amount of proofs to the wrong users. Results show the rewarding
error to be always less than 3% (SACP). The major contributors to the increase in
the rewarding error are mobility and network load. Increasing one of the variables will
result in an increase in the rewarding error. Overall, PACP presented lower error rates
than SACP. Also, it is more imune to load and mobility.
Regarding the implementation, IP6Queue proved to be an usable method of in-
tercepting packets, with the possibility of change and block. However, because of the
exclusive nature of the interface, a closer integration with the Linux kernel would be
more suited. The implementation is well designed providing the mechanisms described
along this thesis. The performance provided makes possible real-time communications
such as VoIP. Using ECDSA to secure the payload of data packets proved to add much
delay, limiting the throughput and the maximum number of forwarding nodes.
Future work may focus on the development of even more efficient reporting meth-
ods. This may be achieved either by following the work presented or by novel interaction
schemes. ECDSA is secure and lightweight in terms of bandwidth, however, without
any hardware acceleration, it adds much delay to nodes. Novel authentication methods
could be used resulting in increased performance.
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